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PART SIX 
CHARACTER 
(Chapters 19-20) 
CHAPTER 19 
(2) Agesilaos at home 
5 tne! 51 dnEv6CFTIJOEV OrKQ5E, npoo(pLXýq PtV ýV EOOOq TOEq noXCTOLq 
K011 nEPC0xcnTO(; 6n6 TOO RCOU Kol Tý(Z 5LOCTIIC, - 6 oO y6p, tionEp of 
nXetGTOL T0V GTP0TnY(5V, KaLV6q tnovfiX0cv 6n6 Tfiq &eVflq, KaTO1KEKqXnPeVOq 
On' 6XXOTP(G)V 103V9 Kol 5UGKOXCM(vG)v np6q T6 OrKOL Kat CUYOPOY6V. 
In Hellenika Xenophon says nothing more about Agesilaos until at 
IV. iv. 19 he describes the attack on the territory of the Argives, who 
had by then taken control of Corinth (HeIL IV. iv. 6). In Agesilaos he 
goes straight on to record this invasion as Agesilaos' next action 
(tK 
59 TOOTOU 11.17), without indicating the passage of time. Plutarch deals 
with it in c. 21, and, perhaps to denote an interval, has taken the 
opportunity of Agesilaos' return to Sparta -to comment on qualities 
relevant to the resumed domestic context. He has selected and 
developed references found in several places in Xenophon's Agesilaos. 
The first topic is Agesilaos' conduct at home as a private individual, 
and the second, which occupies the next chapter, presents him as a 
public figure. In the prepositional phrase, the nouns referring to 
these two topics are in reverse order, D(oq being the Life to be 
written, UOLTa being the style of living, and the order is again 
reversed in the following treatment. For the affection in which 
Agesilaos was held cf. Xen. Agesilaos VI. 4: 5Ld 51 T6 (PLXEtY T6V 6PYOVTa. 
Plutarch at this point appropriately praises Agesilaos as 
unaffected by service away from Sparta. The Athenian envoy at 
Thucydides 1.87 voiced the cultural dangers that Spartans faced in 
going abroad. For Agesilaos' rejection of Asia in favour of Spartan 
traditions, Plutarch could draw on Xenophon's judgements: 
IX6p&voq (5VT1 TOO PeVLOTOr. ENCIL tV Tt 'AOCQ1 OrKOL Td 
v6PLP(I PtV 6PYCLVp T6 v6ptpa U 6PYEGOOL 
and: OncGTAGOITO Tb TOO ntpoou &aCovEC9 (Agesilaos 11.16, IX. 1). 
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6XX6 6po(&)(; TOE(; pnE)r:, ncSnOTE T6v EOP6TUV E)LOREPTIK60L T6 nap6VTCI 
TtP6V KOC CFTePY(JV9 06 beEnvov JXXOECV, 06 XOUTp6v, oO Gepom(av 
YUVOLK6q, o6y 6nXG)V K6apov, 06K OCKCOq KOTCI(JKEU4V, dXXdl KOC Taq OOPOq 
6ýOýKEV OGT(A)C, o6aaq aq)65pa naXaLdq (5q 50KEEV EZVOL TOOT01r, IKE(VO(Z (54; 
Inl0qKEV 'APLOT65TIpoq. 7 KQI T6 KdVVO0p6V (PlIOLv 6 ---EVO(PG)V Ob5eV TL 
aEpv6TEPOV EZVOL Týq IKECVOU OUYCXTp6q ý T3V 6XXG)V. 
Xenophon treats Agesilaos' attitude to the pleasures of food and 
drink as part of a contrast with the King's expensive taste: A51wr, n(OL 
45t(Jr. (16YOL (Agesilaos IX. 1). Agesilaos is above such pleasures: 
'A, \Xdi PAV KaC (30M YE Aboval noXXOV KPWOOOLY div0p(Snov, 
notaq Olbe TLC 'Ayno(Xoov ATTnO&Ta; (Agesilaos V. 1). 
Xenophon stresses the simplicity of his house, the doors and the 
furnishings, his furniture, his sacrificial meals, and the carriage which 
takes his daughter to the festival: 
6 52 OLITWC 6VTEGKE: U(3(YOTO T43V ONOV9 &FTE TOJTWV P115EV60, 
npoofttOOOL. Et 51 TLC TOOTO dnLGTEt, WTO PIV9 OrCI OIK(O 4PKEL 
06TO, Oeoodoftft 59 Tdr. OOPOC 06TOCJI ... nELPdG()(a) 
U OedG(XGOaL TAV 
ZV50V KCITCIGKEU4V, tVVOIIGdT(A) Uj 6C tOO(VCICEV tV TaCC OUa(aLq, 
6KOU06T(A) 51f, 6C ýnl nOXLTLK013 KCIVvdOPOU KCIT4EL E: Iq 'AptjK, \Q(; 
E)uy6TIlP 06TOD (Agesilaos VIII. 6-8). 
Plutarch has drawn extensively on Xenophon, not only for the carriage, 
but he has made it clear by the context that the reference is to 
contentment with the Spartan standards. Agesilaos is satisfied not to 
renew the old doors, installed by a legendary king, but for simplicity, 
rather than pride in their antiquity. For Xenophon, however, the 
stress is on the match between expenditure and income. 
96 ptv 013V --"EVOqZV 
6VOP(X Tfiq 'AynGLX6ou OUYOTPdq 06 YtYPQýXp KOC 6 
ALKCICOP)(Or, tnllyClVdKTTI(JEV (5(; PATE TýV 'AVTI(jt, \dou E)UYQTt'pa PATE TýV 
'EnapELV(SV50U PnTtPa VLVCOGK(3VTCJV ýPC)V* 10 APEtr, 69 EOPOIJEV IN TOE4; 
AOKG)VLKCltq 6VOVPCIWrq 6VOP(3COPtVnV YUVaCKCI P2V 'AyqatXdou KXEdpav, 
OUYC[TtPaq 61 EOnG)XCCIV KCIt np6OUyOlV. 
Antiquarian interest may be less significant here for Plutarch 
than the importance he attaches to details about members of Agesilaos' 
family, and especially the female members, perhaps brought to mind by 
the reference to the daughter's carriage. The prosopographical 
information is, however, potentially significant for hints of Agesilaos' 
political associates (P. A. Cartledge (1987) p-149). The daughters' names 
are not given at Xen. Agesilaos VIII. 7. Plutarch indicates that he had 
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access to archives of some kind at Sparta, but Xenophon says nothing 
about these. The inclusion of these names in archives suggests a 
domestic collection, perhaps reminiscent of those in Lysander's house. 
The digression on the absence from the tradition of the names of 
Agesilaos' close relatives was perhaps intended to contrast with the 
erection by others of monumental inscriptions from which such 
information could be obtained: it required special research to find 
these names tV TOCr, AOKG)VLKCIIC, dvaYPaw%, which reveals Plutarch's 
interest in the family, matching that of Agesilaos. 
11 ECFTL 51 Kol X6y)(Tiv 16r:. tV CIOTOG KELPtVnV dypt VOV IV AC)KEbCICPOVL, 
PnblV T8V 6XXG)V 6LC1(PtpoUGaV. 
Again, the point is not the unique antiquarian value of the spear, 
but explicitly to show that what was on public display is exemplified 
by Agesilaos' very ordinary spear, a visual image with which Plutarch 
has rounded off the subject of Agesilaos' popular appeal through 
moderation in private self-advertisement, proving how ordinary the 
king's was. Xenophon contrasts the simplicity of Agesilaos' clothing 
with his concern for the army's equipment: 
KOE Y(5P &CXXXG)n(CETO Tt PtV dpýOt T6 GrJPa wu, \6TTITL, Tý) 51 
6PCPI T6 crrp6TEUpa K6apQ, TO 51 OOTO(; PýV (5(; t, \a)(CCFTG)V 5ECOOQL 
(Agesilaos XI. 11). 
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CHAPTER 20 
Agesilaos' influence at Spart 
In c. 19 Plutarch's moral comments arose from the point reached in the 
narrative. He described Agesilaos' influence on Spartan domestic life 
following his return home, advocating the gaining of respect and 
admiration without resorting to extravagant display and expenditure of 
wealth. Now Plutarch moves on to Agesilaos' influence in a more public 
context, and incidentally demonstrates the threefold nature of the Life, 
in which he interweaves the biographical element, the portrayal of 
Agesilaos' character, and the promotion of the moral values of 
Lykourgan Sparta. There is a series of five illustrations of Agesilaos' 
political influence, which focus on four named individuals and one 
anonymous group. 
The theme of extravagant display is continued from the previous 
chapter in the first of these. Agesilaos aimed to divert the Spartans' 
competitive efforts towards a politically more serviceable -end, 
by 
urging his sister, Kyniska, to enter a chariot in the contests at 
Olympia. Any victory she won would allow him to attribute this kind 
of success, not to 6PETA, but to wealth and its expenditure. Next 
comes what Agesilaos viewed as 6PETA instead. His instruction to 
Xenophon to bring his sons to Sparta for their education demonstrates 
that the best lesson to be learnt has nothing to do with extravagant 
display, but is the familiar 6PYEGE)CXL KCIt 6PYELV. 
The third illustration continues this topic, 6PYEGOaL KoC 6PYFELV, in 
two parts, presenting a negative, unwanted aspect and a positive, 
desired aspect. Lysander's desire for 6p)(etv, to be won by reforming 
the kingship, demonstrates his failure to learn its necessary 
counterpart, 6PYEGE)aL, whereas Agesilaos, having learnt both, displays 
them by obeying his adviser, one of the YePOVTCr., in the exercise of 
his kingly function. 
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The last two illustrations of Agesilaos' influence concern the 
elimination of political opposition, reviving the topic dealt with at c-5- 
Agesilaos had an indirect method of controlling policy, presumably to 
be used when whatever discussion or debate there was had gone 
against him, perhaps to be seen as parallel to the Athenian practice of 
bringing the leaders of an opposing faction, or their friends, to trial. 
He arranged for those who had revealed their opposition to him to be 
appointed to offices in which their conduct could be observed, and any 
who erred in the exercise of their new powers could be brought to 
trial; he then provided assistance for them in their troubles and so 
converted their opposition to allegiance. 
By contrast, finally, his junior colleague, Agesipolis, was brought 
under his influence in a different way, through the development of the 
personal relationship of an older with a younger man, which was 
typical in Spartan society, as it is presented in the tradition. The 
influence is here given positive definition by Plutarch's return to the 
use of the word 6PETA, last used in the first section, and, by placing 
the reference to Lykourgos at the end of the treatment of this topic, 
he suggests a legitimacy which extends to the whole series, as if 
Agesilaos was in all this practising his interpretation of the main 
principles underlying the Spartan way of life, although the elimination 
of competition was detrimental, contrary to Lykourgan prescription. 
The thematic links between the several illustrations of Agesilaos' 
influence show the application of the rhetorical skills of inventio, 
ornatio and compositio to the selection, presentation and arrangement 
of material. Plutarch has placed this topic appropriately where 
Agesilaos has returned to Sparta at the end of the major Asian 
campaign, and, as it is the twentieth chapter of the forty, he has also 
marked the halfway point with this prominent study of Spartan 
character and an unobtrusive hint that it may be flawed. 
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1 06 PAV (NXX' 6P6V eV(Mr. TOv nOXLTrJV d(Ps fnnOTPO(P(OC, 15OK00VTaq 
EZVOC TLVOr, Kai PeVO (PPOVOiJ-VTQ(;, irnELOC TýV 65EX(phv Kuv(OKOV 6PIJCI 
KOGErCFaV 'OXupn(OGLV dV6)VC(YOGOCIL, RouX6PEVOq tv5E(EooOaL TO[q 
"EXXTJ(YLV 
6q 065EPLEIC t(JTLV 6PETfiq, dtXX6 nXO6TOU Kai 5an6vqq 
h V(Kq. 
Xenophon has used Kyniska's victory in the chariot races at 
Agesilaos IX. 6 as part of a proof that Agesilaos was, as a person, 
superior to the Persian King. Following the contrast with the King's 
seclusion and luxurious standards, he establishes Agesilaos' merit as a 
man of action in keeping hounds and war horsesq instead of breeding 
chariot horses. The argument against relying on the glory of winning 
at chariot racing is also used at Hiero XI. 5-9 in defining a ruler's true 
service to the state as T6 KdX, \LGTOV KOC pcyaXonpr:. nICFTaTOV 
6V6VLOPa. 
Plutarch has transferred the episode to the Spartan scene, and uses it 
to illustrate how Agesilaos, unaffected by foreign influences, attempted 
to discourage citizens who sought renown through display of their 
wealth. The wealthy citizens are not identified by name, but their 
existence was part of the problem of the unequal distribution of wealth 
in Sparta, recognized by Aristotle (Pol. 1270a18, . 1307a36). Agesilaos' 
suggestion that by the use of great wealth to acquire and train a 
chariot team a woman might win at Olympia, where a woman was not 
allowed even to be a spectator- (Pausanias V. 6.7; M. I. Finley and 
H. W. Pleket (1976) pp. 45-6; J. Swaddling (1980) pp. 41-2), is presented 
here as a protest against the non-participating race-horse breeder. 
Efforts directed towards display of wealth, without making any 
contribution to the perceived interest of the city, damaged the 
harmony of Sparta's society of "Equals". A demonstration of 6PETý, on 
the other hand, could be encouraged by the right sort of competition, 
though again it had to be in the right field, for he supported only 
Sparta's own competitive games, and, in particular, those for the young 
(c. 21). In the competitions which he held in Asia and in the 
Chersonese, the only prizes awarded to individuals were for excellence 
in weapon training; the others were collective prizes awarded for thq 
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best large contingents of soldiers (. Xen. Hell. III. iv. 16, IV. ii. 6; cf. 
Hipparchilcos 1.26). 
Inscriptional evidence from Kyniska's pedestal (Pausanias VI. 1.6; 
J. Ebert (1972), no. 33), dated to early fourth century by its lettering, 
may indicate that this passage refers to a time after Agesilaos' 
accession. She seems to have won more than once, ' for Pausanias 
speaks of her victories (VI. 1). At 111.8 he suggests Ihat although she 
was the first woman competitor, she was not the last Lakonian woman 
to have won Olympic victories, which would indicate that Agesilaos' 
action may have had rather the reverse effect from that intended, and 
led the way to an increase in this form of the display of wealth. At 
V. 12 Pausanias describes as less than life-size Kyniska's bronze horses, 
said to have been created by Apelles at VIA, where he mentions 
chariot, team and driver as well as Kyniska, thus dispelling any doubt 
about whether she herself was a charioteer. 
2 2EVO(J)0VTCI 59 T6V GOCP6V lY(JV PCO' toUTOO onoubaC6PEVOv IKýXCUC 'TOL)4; 
narbaq tV ACIKEbC(CPOVL TPe(PELV PETanep4)dpcvov, 6q PaGqGOPeVOUq T(3V 
PaBflpdtT(aV T6 K6XXLGTOV, 6PYECYOaL Wit 6PYELV. 
Since joining him in Asia Minor, Xenophon was a friend of 
Agesilaos and was granted an estate at Skyllous, in territory annexed 
from the Pisatai by Elis early in the'fifth century and then from Elis 
by the Spartan King Agis. Skyllous was not far from Olympia, and is 
described as in good hunting country (Pausanias V. 6). In the ancient 
world Xenophon was regarded highly as a philosopher, but he has been 
overshadowed by the more powerful minds of his contemporaries and 
successors. He does not record his sons' education, but Diogenes 
La6rtius (11.54) quotes from Diocles' Lives of the Philosophers that they 
were educated at Sparta. The privilege of admittance to Spartan 
education equipped non-Spartans, probably only from among those 
friendly to Sparta, to serve as cavalrymen and hoplites, perhaps with 
the Spartan army, thus easing to some extent the 6, \tyav6pwn(o. There 
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were E9VOL T6V Tpoq)(PG)V KOXOUPevG)v among those who accompanied 
Agesipolis to Olynthos after the death of Teleutias there (Xen. HOIL 
VAHM. Plutarch clearly wishes to combat foreign influences by 
encouraging Spartan ideals, particularly the familiar one of obedience 
and leadership (see c. 1), which had a long history: of V6110L 61 POL 
60KODaLV of noXAol TaOTO 500 PdXLCFTO 5L56GKELV, 6PYELV TE KOC 6PYEGOOL 
(Xen. Kyropaideia Lvi. 20; cf. Agesilaos 11.16; Lyk-ourgos 30). Plutarch 
gives priority to the obedience, and then adds the command. A case 
may be made for translating "obedience as well as command". 
3 TOO 5e Auadv6pou TETCXEUTTjK6TO(Zq Eop6v t TCI L PE COV noXVIv 
CFUVE; CFTC)(YaV, 4V tKEIVOq EOGOq inciVEX06V 6n6 Tfiq 'Ao(aq CrUVeGTqGEV gn! 
T6V 'Ayna(Xaov, 45ppfl(YEV ObT6V tECXtYYCLV OlOq ýV COV nOXCTnql 
Plutarch refers here to the discovery of the formation by 
Lysander of a political club directed against Agesilaos rather than 
specifically to change the Spartan hereditary monarchy. He does not 
say how the discovery of the club was made, having already referred 
separately at c. 8 to Lysander's plan to reform the monarchy, again 
without revealing the means of discovery, whereas at Lysander 30 he, 
like Diodoros, links it with the search among documents at the late 
Lysander's home. It is always difficult for the historian to penetrate 
secret societies, and to authenticate their existence or aims. Xenophon 
omits the episode, no doubt not wishing to make a direct reference to 
any threat to Agesilaos' position as king, but when, in his report of 
the quarrel between Agesilaos and Lysander in Asia Minor, he mentions 
the contrast observed by those who visited them, he uses terms which 
might have been suggested by knowledge of what had been attempted: 
6 pev 'AynaCXaoq (5LC5Tnq &PONCTO, 6 61 Adoav5poq POGLXEOq (Hell. 
III. iv. 7). The idea of Lysander as a king seems to have existed in 
Xenophon's mind: a "Freudian slip". The challenges that Xenophon has 
recorded, however, are none that threaten the monarchy, but appear to 
be expressions of social unrest, among the Perioikoi who defected 
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(VI. v. 25,32, VII. H. 2), and, among those close to the citizen class, only 
the protest led by Kinadon against his inferior status (Hell. III. W. 8). 
Plutarch adds a mutiny at c. 32. 
Lysander did not have very long in which to set up this society 
between his return from Asia Minor and his death at Haliartos. At 
Lysander 24 Plutarch assigns to him the attempted implementation of 
his plan to open the kingship either to all the Herakleidai or to all 
Spartan citizens, instead of only to the two royal houses. Although 
Plutarch suggests that the plan had been made earlier (Lysander 24), 
it is recorded at the time of his return from Asia Minor "in disgrace" 
after his quarrel with Agesilaos, when Lysander would be a less strong 
candidate than he had been before, but when the tradition of the 
quarrel in Asia Minor would be seen as contributing to his 
dissatisfaction. In the next chapter (25) he mentions the speech of 
Kleon of Halikarnassos and the attempts to win the support of the 
oracles. The plot is said to have been abandoned (26), when an 
accomplice failed to play his part in an elaborate deception, though it 
was not uncovered until after his death. 
Plutarch attributes the record to Ephoros (Lysander 20,25,30)p a 
source much used by Diodoros, who deals with the whole event in a 
single narrative. Diodoros describes it in three episodes: Lysander's 
plan for the reform of the monarchy, his visits to the oracles to obtain 
support, and the discovery of the speech (XIV. 13.8). He puts 
Lysander's intrigues soon after the end of the Peloponnesian War 
(XIV-13.1), when his part in Sparta's victory had so enhanced his 
reputation, suggesting the support he might have been relying upon. 
Plutarch himself at L. Ysander 18 records Lysander's self-advertisement 
at Delphi at this time. At this time, too, Lysander might have been 
hoping in due course to become the successor to the ageing Agis. 
Diodoros here gives only ambition as the motive, whereas stronger 
reasons for aiming to become king are to be found in the political 
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disagreement with Pausanias over the Athenian settlement, mentioned at 
XIV. 33.6, and in the change in policy denoted by the decree of the 
ephors, which at least withdrew support from Lysander's system of 
rule by dekarchies: ej<nEnTCA)KU(OC. 5e 6Ld TOO(Z tp6pour,, oC TdIC, nUTPCOUq 
nOXLTC(cx(z nap4YYELXOV (Xen. HeR III. iv. 2). By contrast, the quarrel 
with Agesilaos would have provided only a petty motive. 
Plutarch here omits references to Lysander's contact with oracles 
and the impersonation of Silenus as Apollo's son, which he records at 
Lysander 20 and 26, for they occurred before the accession of 
Agesilaos and do not concern him, but lie inserts the account of the 
foundation of the club at this point, and makes Agesilaos defend 
himself by attacking Lysander's character. Diodoros' three episodes do 
not include any reference to later intrigues, or to exploitation by 
Agesilaos of the discovery of the speech. For him the "plot" became 
public knowledge only when a copy of the speech urging the reform of 
the monarchy was found during a search of Lysander's house for other 
documents (Diod. XIV-13.8), and this followed Lysander's death, as here. 
Plutarch, but not Diodoros, makes Agesilaos responsible for carrying 
out the search. The earlier date of the attempted reform was known to 
Plutarch, for when he described Lysander's visit to Ammon, he 
mentioned the alternative explanation of its purpose offered by Ephoros 
(Lysander 20). The separation of the two events, the plot and its 
disclosure, in Diodoros' account, and even in that of Plutarch himself 
at Lysander 26, seems to have called for an explanation, and Plutarch 
evidently found it in the discontent of Lysander on his return from 
Asia. The public revelation at the later date indicated another crisis. 
One of Lysander's possible political motives for change is 
indicated by the speedy arrangement of Agesilaos' Asia Minor campaign 
soon after his accession, suggesting that, if Lysander had himself 
become king, he would have been an effective leader of the aggressive 
imperial expansionists. The association of some of his possible 
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supporters with this policy for Sparta is indicated by a long-lasting 
trend of dissatisfaction with the so-called Lykourgan restraints on the 
accumulation and expenditure of wealth, early manifested by Lichas' 
extravagance in Thucydides (III. v. 50), and later by Agesilaos' 
opposition to wealthy breeders of race-horses. This opposition, and 
the disappointing withdrawal from Asia Minor, may explain the unrest 
to which Plutarch here shows Agesilaos responding. 
The intended disclosure at this time of Lysander's supposed plot 
is clearly not simply to discredit the memory of the man himself, for 
Plutarch, or his source, seems to see it as part of the machinery of 
Agesilaos' control of the Spartan citizens who were opposing him, and 
who evidently could be identified as seeking to return to the policies 
advocated in the preceding decade by Lysander, which they had then 
presumably supported. Agesilaos is therefore shown to have sought to 
discredit those who were currently members of opposition groups, by 
linking them also with the reformist plans of Lysander. Any attempt to 
change the laws would be sacrilegious and revolutionary, according to 
Lykourgos (Lyk-ourgos 29), unless with the approval of Delphi, which 
Lysander had failed to obtain. 
In the battle of Haliartos, Lysander's supporters lost their most 
powerful leader, but their remaining strength is indicated by 
Pausanias' flight into exile, rather than face trial. Not only they, 
however, but also those Spartans who had welcomed his policies, will 
have continued to cherish their hopes and to wish to change the 
restricted "imperialist" policies now being followed. The presentation 
of the expedition to Asia Minor, after Agesilaos' accession, as intended 
to prevent war coming to the mainland, indicates the range of 
imperialist slogans created for his supporters when Lysander obtained 
a military command for the king. Some would see imperialism as the 
means to secure Sparta's survival, whether in the Peloponnese or in 
the whole of Greece. Others would hope for positions of responsibility 
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and residence abroad, to enjoy using wealth for conspicuous 
consumption, or to create opportunities for accumulating further 
wealth. These clearly had continued in Agesilaos' reign to wish to use 
their wealth as before, on, in some cases, breeding and training 
race-horses. Their earlier determination may be illustrated from Thuc. 
III. v. 50 and Xen. Hell. III. H. 21, referring to the wealthy Lichas, 
renowned for lavish entertainment, who in 420 had even entered his 
team as a Boiotian in order to avoid the Eleian ban on Spartan 
participation at Olympia. The Spartans paid Lysander many honours at 
his death (Lysander 30), and if, by claiming to be acting in his name, 
his associates were gaining support for unacceptable policies, they may 
have caused Agesilaos and the authorities to resort to blackening 
Lysander's record, by presenting him as aiming to take over from 
Agesilaos, as the quarrel in Asia could also be used to show (cc. 7-8). 
4 KC11 A6yov dvayvoOq tv DtDXCQ dnoXeXELPdVOV, 6V lypoqje ptv KX&jv 6 
*AXLKaPVC1GGC6q, EPEXAC U XtVCLV dvaXaP& 6 Moav6poq tV TC) 6ýpQ nEpt 
nPaVPdTWV KC(LV3V KOC PETOOT6GE(A)q TOO nOXLTC0PaTOq, AOdAnOEV ECq PeOOV 
tEEVL'VKCtV. 
G. Grote ((1869) Vol. IX p. 59) suggested that the speech may have 
been one - perhaps unsolicited - of the many manifestations of 
enthusiastic support for Lysander at the time of the renaming in Samos 
of Hera's festival as Lysandreia (Lysander 18). Its preservation in a 
private house provides a parallel to the records found 9v TaU(; 
ACIKL)VLKGtq 6VOVPO1POtr, (c. 19), and evidence for literacy at Sparta at this 
level of society, perhaps with professional assistance (P. A. Cartledge 
(1978) pp. 28-9). Such documents may also have contained the 
information relevant to the dispute among the allies, for which 
Agesilaos was conducting the search (Lysander 30). In retailing 
Diodoros (XIV. 13.8) or Ephoros Plutarch gives no evidence for this 
interpretation of Lysander's intentions and motives, which cannot be 
known without a special informant. If Lysander did intend to make his 
proposal in front of the people, his aim was evidently constitutional 
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reform rather than revolution. As Grote also argues (Vol. IX pp-60-1), 
though from a different starting point, the change in selecting the 
kings might have been validated in full legal form without any appeal 
to violence, if the kings' families and supporters formed the minority 
and were outvoted: "the extreme attachment of the Spartans to old arid 
sanctified customs" would also necessitate divine validation of the 
changes, as Lysander's dealings with oracles demonstrate that he knew 
(Lysander 25). 
5 Inct U TO; T6V YEP(5VT(JV TdV J\6YOV 6VCIYVOOC, KaL (POplnGCe(; TýV 
5ELv6TnTClp (: YUVEPOLJXEUOE Pý Tl3v Adcyciv5pov 43VOPL5TTCLV, 43JUal T6V X6VOV 
Pl5XXOV CIOTO (YUYKCITOPOTTCLV9 IncCOOq KCIE KOOqOtjy(3CE:. 
The fear gives a hint of the possible strength of the opposition 
and of the determination of the establishment to avoid weakening the 
state by open confrontation. The advice appears to refer to the 
publication of the speechp and possibly also of evidence that others 
were involved, but mainly it avoids creating a need for formal 
accusations of any kind. Suspicions may be aroused by the obscurity 
of the adviser, for he is not named in Diod. XIV. 13, and, although he 
was said at Lysander 30, on the authority of Ephoros, to be the senior 
ephor, Lakratidas, he is otherwise unknown in the sources. Indeed, 
the unfulfilled intention to publicise details of the plot may further 
raise speculation that what took place at this time was all invented for 
the purpose of propaganda. The story of the suppression of 
publication is a particular case of convenient cover to put the 
accusations of conspiracy beyond any challenge. Agesilaos' agreement 
to suppress the speech would not preclude the mention of his 
discovery of the plot itself, or its use as a veiled threat to any 
participants who were generally known to have had links , with 
Lysander; his opponents, referred to in the next section below (TOO,; 59 
6neVQVTLOUPtVOUC. ), were first made aware that they were marked men, 
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and then sent off with the chance to behave themselves on service, 
subjected to further manipulation, if need be. Revelation of the 
discovery would, of course, have to be publicised at about the time for 
it to have come into the record: this will have been enough to rally 
the king's loyal supporters to a show of strength to the opposition. 
6 TOOr, 59 OneVC1VTtOUP1VOU(; OOTCJ q)OVEPC)r, Pey OOK irp, \onTE, 
6LanPC1TT6pcvoq U nepneaGa( TLVaq dC! CFTPOTnYOOq KOI 45PYOVTOq tE OOT6V, 
Incbe(KVUE YLVOPiVOUq IV TOtq IELOUG(OL4; nov9POOq KU! nXCOVtKTOq. 
An account of other means of converting opponents into friends, 
which did not go unobserved or unpunished, is given at c. 5. Plutarch 
may be starting a new topic here, but he could well be continuing the 
same incident. Agesilaos' use of deception is well documented in the 
Life. Plutarch may be enlarging on Xenophon's references to the 
treatment of opponents at Agesilaos VIII and of misdemeanours at 
Agesilaos XI. 6. If this device may be compared with the Athenians' 
resort to the courts in political conflictsp what was going on would be 
less obvious to Agesilaos' victims, but in the end charges will have 
been brought, not for the act of opposition itself, but for some 
perceived malpractice in the later position of responsibility held by the 
man. There were evident risks in making these appointments, and 
5LanPC1TT6pEvoq suggests that they, too, were not made easily or 
unopposed. Presumably some victims did not immediately perceive their 
opportunity to change their ways. 
CITO KPLVOPeVOtq ndxLv o3 OOqO6V KOI OUVOYWVLC6pEVOq, OCKE(OUq tK 
5Mp6pov InoLEtTO KOt PEOCGTq np6q 06T6v, 60TC PT15W &VT(naXov ctvaL. 
This constitutes the second of a double use of deception in 
Agesilaos' scheming, his response after their misuse of authority in 
office; the first lay in apparently making no response to their joining 
in the opposition. They had erred twice and would be doubly indebted 
to him when they realized what he had done. 
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76 ydp ETCPOq DOCFLXCt)C, 'AyTla. Cno, \tc,, 6TE 5ý n(ITP6C, PtV 45V ýOUY(3504; j 
ýXLK(Q be nC[VTcinC[GL PCtp6KLOV, (POOEL 5e npOtOq Kal K60PLOq, oO noXX(3 T8V 
noXLTLKrJV gnpCITTEV. 
Plutarch attributes Agesipolis' limited political inactivity first to 
externally imposed restraints, his father's exile and his own youth, and 
then to the internal restraints imposed by his inborn character. 
Evidently he also inherited some of the ill-will experienced by 
Pausanias. The overlap between innate and acquired tendencies in 
Plutarch's view of the development of character is illustrated by the 
phrase (PJGEL U npOOq KaC K60PLOq, used of Agesipolis, in so far as the 
latter refers to orderliness, which is a matter of training as well as 
temperament. 
8 06 PýV dlXX6 Kal TOCJTOV tnOLEtTO YELPOýOTJ. (YUGCYLTOCJUL Y6P Of 
PCX(YLXEtq Etq T6 CXOT6 (POLTOVTCq CPL6(TtOV, 6TCtV InLbnp&50LV. 
Plutarch emphasizes Agesilaos' influence even in the case of his 
colleague, where perhaps the kings might be expected usually to be 
more independent, and implies that what part Agesipolis did play in 
public affairs was sometimes in opposition to Agesilaos. Perhaps the 
similarity of the two names was deliberately created in the naming of 
the younger man: -kaoct by then associated 'with Agesilaos' alleged 
6nPOTtK6V Kat cptXdvOpwnov (c. 1), to be countered with -noXLq, the man 
to unite the whole community. There was little chance of success, in 
the circumstances. In view of his father's record at Athens, Haliartos 
and Mantineia, he was not likely to be aligned with Lysander. His 
gentle nature suggests a less aggressive tendency, representing 
perhaps a third, more peaceful policy (G. L. Cawkwell (1976) pp. 77ff; 
Diod. XV. 19.4; S. Hodkinson (1983) p. 279). Xenophon gives a hint of this 
difference indirectly, when he describes, perhaps in defensive terms, 
Agesilaos' response to the news of his colleague's death in Chalkidike, 
after the capture of Torone (HeR V. iii. 19-20). The kings did not go 
abroad on campaigns together. 
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9 Et56%; 013V EVOYOV 45VTa TOr4Z tP(JTLKOrC, T6V 'AyTIoCno, \LV, i5onEp ýv 
OOT6(;, 6EC TLVOr, t5nýpyc X6Vou ncpC T8V tV 6PQ' KOC nPOfiYC T6V VCCIV(GKOV 
Etq TOOT6 KCIC OUV4pCl KaC ouvenPaTTE, TOV AOKG)VLKC)V gp(STWV 0051V 
otayp6v, a163 bt noXXýV KCIC (PLXOTLPCOV KCd CfiXOV 6PETfiq ty6VTG)V, 6q tV 
TOtq ncpt AUKOOPYOU yeyponTOL. 
Plutarch reverts to the topic of c. 11, clearly with Xenophon in 
mind: 
6 51 'Ayija(n0XL4; TO 'AynatXdQ (KOV6q PIV ýV KQC ýPnTLKCW KQC 
OnPEUTLKC)V KCII (nnLKC)V KCIC naLbLK6V X6vov PETgYCLv- np6q U 
TOOTOLq Kal Onn5ctTO 06T6V tV Tt GUGKnV(Q, (Bonep EIK6q npeOPOTEPOV 
(IIelL V. W. 20); 
Kal PAV PCTECYC PtV 16LCFTa naL6LKOV X6yo)v, ouvEonoMoCc 59 
ndIV 6 TL UOL (PCXOLC, (Agesilaos VIII. 2). 
Plutarch seems to have found hints of the situations and conversations 
that he describes here. Xenophon's vocabulary at (KOV6r, ýv and 
naL6LK6V X6yov suggests Plutarch's at 6ancp ýV QOT6q and TOC4; 
IP(JTLKOr4;. The context of Hell. VAH. 20, when Agesilaos heard the 
report of the death of Agesipolis with tears, not, as might be expected, 
with joyl as of an opponent (the word 6VTtnd), Q is used also by 
Plutarch in this chapter), is presumably a reference to the friendly 
relationship which Xenophon appears to oppose to the not unknown 
mutual hostility of Spartan kings, who, of course, were unique in 
reigning together. Xenophon lists the topics of the conversations they 
shared, and the chiastic pattern links the inner two together and the 
outer two together, so that these carry the same, apparently innocent, 
sense, considering that associated words occur at Lak-. Pol. III-IV as 
terms for Spartan age groups. However, at Agesilaos VA, dealing with 
control of affections, Xenophon compares Agesilaos' love for Megabates 
with the love that a most earnest nature feels for TOO Ka*M\CCFTOU, which 
in the abstract context, for a philosopher, should mean "that which is 
most honourable", neuter. Plutarch's version stretches Xenophon's 
meaning, but it is to be noted that he, like Xenophon, presents only 
the conversations of the two men. Plutarch's references to L. VA-ourgos 
are found at 17.1 and 18.4. The emphasis there is on the friends' 
dedication to honour that results from these relationships. It seems 
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that Plutarch could not be single-minded on this subject, but at least 
he does give a fair-minded account. 
Apart from the sources discussed above, Apophth. Lak. Wor. 212) 
contains versions of many of the items used here. Thus of the five 
items, the first is in Moralia and Xenophon's Agesilaos IX; the second is 
in Moralla and is confirmed by Diokles, Lives of the Philosophers, as 
reported by Diogenes Ladrtios 11.54; the third is in Moralia and 
Diodoros XIV9 and the fourth is in Aforalia and perhaps Xenophon's 
Agesilaos VII and XI. The last is found only Xenophon's Hell. VAH. 20 
and Agesilaos VIII. The indication here is that these Apophth. Lak-. 
clearly go back to a source before Plutarch, whether or not he was the 
collector. Plutarch's material for the parts outside his narrative may 
not be wholly unreliable. 
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PART-SEVEN 
THE CORINTHIAN WAR 
(Chapters 21-22) 
CHAPTER 21 
Games at Corinth contrasted with those at Sparta 
1 MeYLGTOV OOV 6UVCiPCVO(; eV Tt n6XCL, 5tanp6TTETOL TcXCUTCOV T6V 
6POPATPLOV 65EXCP6V tnt TOO VOUTLKOO YCVtGOOL. 
When Xenophon describes the joint expedition to Argos and 
Corinth (Hell. IV. iv. 19), he does not record Teleutias' appointment by 
Agesilaos, but he does stress the relationship. On a previous occasion, 
too, Agesilaos had appointed a relative, Peisandros, to a high command 
(c. 10), but it will have been harder to justify this appointment in 
Sparta than the earlier one in Asia Minor, where there were fewer 
eligible Spartans available. Of course, both Teleutias and Peisander 
were given charge of a fleet while the army was commanded by the 
king himselfq but the defeat sustained by Agesilaos' first appointment 
will not have made the second any easier. Difficult negotiations and 
the use of devious methods are implied, perhaps, by Plutarch's choice 
of verbp which was- also used of Agesilaos at c. 13: pdXa p6XLq 
5LCnP6EaTO oOv noXXt nPOYPOITC(Q, and the placing of this verb, 
alongside the claim that Agesilaos' power was supreme in the city, 
perhaps points to a wish to suggest influential opposition. Even in 
Sparta, however, at this time, and not only in Asia Minor, strong 
candidates were presumably in short supply. In any one generation or 
year group, there can have been only a limited and small number of 
talented Spartans, if the total citizenship was around 1,000. In 
numbers, the Spartan Assembly may be comparable with a school of 
1,000 pupils at the present day. Leaders are required each year in a 
school as prefects, captains of sports teams, principals and 
administrators of other indoor and outdoor activities. The school's 
tryear group" is the annual intake, approximately 120, and the school's 
age range is about 8 years. Sparta's hoplite age range is perhaps 
roughly (since some did not live to retiring age) four times as much$ 
so that Sparta's "year group" would be in the order of 30. This is a 
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small pool from which to take men of excellence who will be responsible 
for the many state activities that called for qualities of leadership, but, 
of course, the organisation of the dyuyý was hierarchical, enabling 
selection at each stage to be based on sound practical experience, 
however fallible that might be. Teleutias turned out to be an able 
admiral and general (Xen. HeIL V. ii-iii). It is perhaps surprising that 
Plutarch, who was interested in the family, did not comment on the 
significance of his phrase, T& 6POI]ATPLOV d6&#\(P6Vj for the mother of 
the two successful commanders, whose delight was pointed out by 
Xenophon (He1L Miv. 19), though there is a lacuna in the text here. 
2 Kai GTpaTEUGdPEVOq E1q MptvOov, OOT6q PtV tPCL KOT6 YfiV T6 POKPd1 
TC()(Tj, TOrC, be vauaCv 6 Te, \EUTCaq ... 3 'ApyE(ov 
be TAv K6PLVOOV 
1y6VTG)V T6TE Kai T6 '100PLa CFUVTEXOOVTG)V. 
Xenophon associates Teleutias' seizure of the dockyards with the 
first of Agesilaos' two expeditions, in which he ravaged Argive 
territory, and went on to Corinth to capture the walls. He records a 
second expedition tK U TOOTOU, during the games at the Isthmus, after 
which Agesilaos took the Peiraion (IV. v. 1). Plutarch does not separate 
the two campaigns, perhaps influenced by Xenophon's phrase: orKabc 
6n&XOG)v E1q TdI *YOKCVE)La (Agesilaos 11.17), which seems to indicate only 
a temporary absence. However, the essential military details are given 
in two parts, the second continuing in c. 229 after the development in 
this chapter of the theme of competition in athletic contests. 
The two cities, Argos and Corinth, had clearly united by now to 
become one, in some way (Xen. Hell. IV. iv. 6), following a violent 
uprising against the supporters of peace with Sparta, but since 
Agesilaos was not involved, Plutarch has mentioned it only now. It was 
a unique development, which might, despite its origin, have been 
extended advantageously to other cities in the course of time, but the 
details are not so clear. Xenophon uses phrases that retail the hostile 
propaganda of his Corinthian friends (as also at Hell. IV. v. 1, viii-15s 
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34), who wanted to re-introduce co-operation with Sparta, and Diodoros 
(XIV. 92) may describe massive Argive intervention only when allied 
control of the city was under threat. The military situation of Corinth 
at the time suggests only a formal isopolity arrangement, made with 
Sparta's traditional enemy by the faction opposed to Sparta, to ensure 
reliable defence of the city against the Spartans, but it was "an 
experiment with considerable potential" (J. B. Salmon (1984) p. 411), 
although the state of the evidence does not make it possible to accept 
full merger of Corinth into the Argive polity. Plutarch's main concern 
later in the chapter is with the celebration of the Isthmian Games by 
the Argives, as is implied by Xenophon: of 'APYCrOt QOTOO tT6YYOVOV 
T6Tc nOL00VTEC TAV OUG(QV T(Z noUCL6(BVL (5q wApVouq Kop(vOou 6VTOq (Ilell. 
IV. V. 1). Clearly, the isopolity agreement allowed participation in 
religious matters, and this is not disputed, although sole Argive 
presidency is not proven (G. T. Griffith (1950) pp. 236-56, C. D. Hamilton 
(1979) p. 2709 J. B. Salmon (1984) pp-357-62,411). Even joint celebration 
would be a powerful announcemnt of the solidarity of the opposition to 
Sparta. Eventually, by the insistence of Agesilaos on the terms of the 
Peace of Antalkidas, the cities were separated again, as Sparta could 
not accept the legalizing of Corinth's transformation from a former ally 
into a new enemy, the enhancement- of Argos, the old rival for 
leadership in the Peloponnese, and the combined strength of the new 
unitt occupying a position from which to control movement through the 
Isthmus. 
Intq)avetc, tKE(VOUq pIv iEAXctcycv 6PTL Tq) GEO TEGUK6T0q, TAV 
nOPOGKEUýV dnacrav dnO, \Ln6VTOc, - 4 Inet bt T0v KOPLvE)(G)v 6aoL CpUy65Er, 
ITU)(ov nop6VTEC, UE40TIOCIV CXOTOCJ T6V dlY0VCI 6LCIOErVCIL, TOGTO ptV OOK 
tno(nGEV, QOT0V 61 tKCCVG)V 5LCITLE)eVTG)V K01 CYUVTE*\OOVTov, nopepE; VC KOC 
naptcryev dcrqS, \Etav. 5 GOTEPOV 6' dnEX06VTOq OOTOG, ndXLV On' 'ApVcC(av 
AYGn Tdt '100PLO. 
Xenophon says that when the Argives abandoned the games, I 
Agesilaos encamped in the sacred enclosure, offered sacrifices to the 
god, Poseidon, and waited while the exiles conducted the games (HeIL 
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IV. v. 2). Plutarch has not mentioned the sacrilege of interfering with 
the games after the due sacrifices, which his version more strongly 
implies. He now begins the development of -Agesilaos' attitude to, these 
and other Games. At this initial stage Agesilaos refuses the invitation, 
which does not occur in Xenophon, to hold the Games himself, and he 
does not even sacrifice here, as he does in Xenophon, but he provides 
protection while they are held. Agesilaos is thus in contrast with both 
the parties who have celebrated the games, the exiled Corinthians and 
the members of the sympoliteia. The use of -the Argive name for the 
s. vmpoliteia was one of the changes that some, ot RIXTLOTOLp found 
impossible to live with, 60C(aTov (Xen. Hell. IV. iv. 3,6). Plutarch has 
followed Xenophon in using of 'APYCIOL for those in the city, to 
distinguish them from the exiles he still called Corinthian, also, 
perhaps, sharing some of Xenophon's disapproval of the situation in 
Corinth. 
Ka( TLVEr, ptV tV(Krl(yav n6XLV, CIGI 61 OV VEVLKlIK6TEq np6TEPOV, 
hTTYIPtVOL 61 ticrTEpov, dvEvp6(pij(7av* 6 Int TOtJTQ U no, \Xýv 6n&pqvc 
5ELXCOV KaTqYOPErV tOUT6V TOOq 'Apyc(ouq 6 'AynaCXaoq, El GEPV6V OOTG) 
Kal PtYa TýV 6YG)VOOEOCaV ýYWPCVOL, p6yEOOQL nEpt 06Týq 06K IT6Xpnoov. 
This confused, slightly humorous, situation is not quite as 
Xenophon has described it: ECFTL PtV 45 TOV 6OX(, )V 514; INOICYTOr, IVLKAOII, 
CUTL 5' 6 6Cq OC 00TOt tKIJP6)(OIJGaV (Hell. IV. v. 2). The change seems to 
cast doubt on the value of a victory which is not repeated, just as the 
Argives' refusal to fight for the conduct of the games causes Agesilaos 
to question the sincerity of their respect for the festival, and so to 
devalue the institution. 
7 CIOT6C, U np6q TCAGTa ndVTa PETP(G)q (ZCTO 5EIV EYELVO KOiC TOOq PtV 
OrKOL )(OPOO(; KCII dyC)va(; tnEK6apEL, Kat oupnop4v del gt#\OTLPCG(; KCIC 
onoubýq PEGTdq G)Vj KOC OOTc no(5(jv OgTe nopOgvG)v 6p(XXnq dnoXetn6pEvoq, 
61 U TOOq 61XXOUq t6pa Oaup6COVTOq t56KEL Pn6l YLV(5(YKCLV. 
Plutarch portrays Agesilaos as regarding this as a complex 
question. It seems that PETPCG)q bECY tyr:, LV involves the exclusion of 
attendance at the Isthmian Games, and no doubt the other similar 
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international games, as a competitor. The reason for the exclusion is 
not specified. Sparta's record at Olympia reveals a decline from about 
half the victors in running down to 600 BC, to barely 20 per cent in 
the fifth century, the majority in equestrian events (M. I. Finley and 
H. W. Pleket (1976) p. 70). This may indicate that the Spartan attitude to 
athletic contests changed. Increasing professionalism produced 
specialists with narrow physical development, and the Spartans perhaps 
recognized that training specialist athletes for speed was incompatibe 
with their own emphasis on toughness and general fitness, with a view 
to military service. Nevertheless, while competition in international 
sprinting was sacrificedg speed for military purposes was not neglected 
in the Spartan training, for young Lakedaimonian hoplites once 
overtook enemy peltasts (Xen. Hell. IV. iv. 16). 
Local (Spartan) games receive different consideration. 6Y3ve(; at 
Sparta were an essential part of the dwyý, including, perhaps, the 
organized battles between the boys' units (Lvk-. 16-17). )(opoCt which 
will have included the Hyakinthia, were again an essential part of 
Spartan life. That these were to be enhanced and attended by 
Agesilaos always, was the result, no doubt, both of Agesilaos' own 
participation in the 6YG)Y4, and of his desire to encourage particularly 
the young participants he was watching. The distinction between the 
two forms of competition is clear: Spartan youthsq if not in real life, at 
least in the traditional view, which Plutarch seems to have admired, 
often fought each other when they met. The combatants were 
separated, not by competitive rules, but by watching adults (Lak. Pol. 
4), or even by the death of one, as may possibly have happened to 
cause Drakontios, one of Xenophon's few Spartiate colleagues in Asia, to 
leave Sparta as a boy, because he had accidentally killed another boy 
with a dagger, perhaps in such a fight (Anabasis IV. 8): "No real 
Spartan ever surrendered" (M. I. Finley and H. W. Pleket (1976) p. 71). For 
Plutarch's purpose of revealing Agesilaos' attitude, the emphasis is on 
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courage. The Argives' refusal to fight for control of the Games, 
though the victories were subsequently celebrated by the competitors, 
is contrasted with Agesilaos' moderate attitude to his own recent 
victories: as if to show that he had fought and won the battle that 
gave him control of the Games, if he had wanted it, but had rejected it 
as worthless display. The contrast is between Spartan real 
achievement and the empty glory of competitive games, and forms a 
bridge to the next section, Agesilaos' view of empty glories that have 
impressed others. 
KOC nOTE KTX. 
Three anecdotes, found also in Apophth. Laic. (Afor. 212-3) and 
elsewhere, are given, from which the reference in nP6C, TGICJTa ndVTQ 
PCTP(4)q (ZETO 6EVV EYELv, as now defined, may be discerned. The first 
two introduce the tragic actor, Kallipides, known for his pride (Xen. 
Symp. 111.13), and an anonymous imitator of the nightingale. The 
admiration they enjoy here has been earned by them as theatrical 
entertainers who pleased their audiences, and they relish the fame of 
their successes. Douris of Samos recorded (Alkibiades 32.2) that 
Kallipides the tragic actor gave the rhythm of the stroke to the crew 
of the ship that brought Alkibiades into the harbour of Mounychia on 
his triumphant return from Samos, and, although Plutarch prefers a 
different account, the fame, and perhaps the flamboyance of Kallipides, 
may be proved by Douris' use of his name. The third anecdote 
introduces Menekrates, who was an unusually successful medical doctor, 
still known to Athenaios (VII. 289) and Aelian (Var. Hist. XII. 51), whose 
grateful patients called him Zeus. These three have in common not 
only their fame, but also their presumptuous demands to be 
acknowledged by Agesilaos) in insisting on recognition at sight, on the 
acceptance of an invitation to witness a performance, and on the 
return use of a flatteringly complimentary form of address. Although 
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their eminent achievements, two of them highly valued, cannot be in 
doubt, Agesilaos refuses each demand. The less worthy case of the 
anonymous imitator of the nightingale, however, suggests that his 
objections to international games may now be seen to have been 
directed against the quest for immoderate fame and against 
participation in trivial activities. Praise for success even in war was 
restrained at Sparta, though there is to be an exception (c. 33): 
normally, only men who died in battle, and women who died in 
child-birth, were allowed gravestones (Lvkourgos 27.2, if the reading is 
correctly interpreted; P. A. Cartledge (1979) p. 3099 citing IG V. 1,713). 
International games were thus unworthy activities, and victory in them 
did not earn the competitor an entitlement at Sparta to admiration for 
proven 6PCTý. Plutarch has continued the character study of c. 20 in 
this way, and completes the Olympic reference by extending it here to 
the non-equestrian events in the games at the Isthmus. The Spartan 
view must be distinguished from the Roman aristocratic disdain for 
popular entertainment, which would substitute for it political or 
literary pursuits. In Plutarch's Sparta the preference of Agesilaos was 
for activity which benefited the state, in respect of its survival 
against its enemies, but he has added the moral dimension, too, of 
moderation and self-control, which even Kallipides and Menekrates 
lacked. 
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CHAPTER 22 
Retribution at Corinth: rehabilitation in Akarnania 
Plutarch continues the narrative of Agesilaos' second campaign, from 
before the digression in c. 21. He has selected three military actions, 
which are complimentary to Agesilaos, and has separated these with two 
rather longer passages in which moral failures are associated with the 
humiliation of Sparta. In this way he illustrates and judges both 
competence and character. 
1 AtCATPCDOVTOq U nept TAv KoptvVov OOTOG KC11 T6 'Hpatov EtXq(p6TOq 
Kal T(5 C1tYP6XG)T(3 TOOq CYTP(ATt(5T0q 6YOVTOq K01 CPIPOVTOq 1ntPXtnOVTOq. 
In Xenophon, Agesilaos approached the site of the Isthmian Games, 
near the shore of the Saronic Gulf, from Corinth to the west. He then 
moved north to reach the Peiraion, still in Corinthian territoryq where 
refugees from the city had evacuated their stock (Ilel. L IV. v. 1). The 
remains of the temple of Hera are in a very beautiful setting on the 
sea-shore near the tip of the Perachora peninsula, facing the city of 
Corinth across the Corinthian Gulf (H. Payne (1940) pp. 10-18). The 
adjacent tiny harbour was probably used by the pilgrims from Corinth 
who came here at festival times, and it was now providing an 
alternative to Lechaion for communications across the gulf between 
Corinth and the allies (Xen. Agesilaos 11.18), for there is also 
convenient access to the Boiotian coast, through the port of Kreusis 
which lies to the north-east across the Halkyonic Gulf. There is 
another port, too, lying further to the east, Aigosthena, which is 
convenient for Athens. Xenophon speaks of Agesilaos watching the 
booty being brought from the Peiraion, seated in a circular building: 
K004PEVOr, 6' tnt TOO nept TýV X(PVTIV KUK#\OTEPOCJr, ON06OP4PCITOC, (Hell. 
IV. v. 6). Two such buildings have been identified at Perachoral the 
more likely one higher up the peninsular from the sanctuary area 
(R. A. Tomlinson (1985) p. 261). Another, partly or mostly submerged, can 
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be observed on the sea shore, near the lake, now a lagoon. The 
purpose of the buildings cannot be determined, but in the vicinity of 
the upper circle are several elaborate constructions concerned with a 
water-supply. Following the loss of control of this area, the early 
surrender of those in the Heraion would be inevitable, since there 
would be no water for men or for animals. 
The events of this campaign are given in detail by Xenophon at 
Hell. Mv. 3-6, but Plutarch has chosen to set the scene briefly with his 
statement of Agesilaos' military achievement on the peninsula of 
Peiraion, conveying the full measure of Agesilaos' success with just two 
participles, leading off the livestock and carrying off other objects, 
and one noun, Td QCYP6X(JTQq including people, animals and goods. Here 
Xenophon records that Agesilaos also handed over to the exiles those 
who had been involved in the violent uprising and massacre (Ifell. 
IV. iv. 2), but he has omitted this at Agesilaos 11.19, where it would be 
unsuitable for the encomium. Plutarch, too, has omitted this, since he 
did not record the massacre. He has also Ignored the two mistakes 
revealed in Xenophon's account, the first, of the Corinthians in 
wrongly anticipating that Agesilaos had committed his army to the 
attack on the cityt and the second, of Agesilaos in sending his men 
KaTd1 T6 dKp6TaTOV, without suitable clothing. These topics would 
contribute nothing to the military and moral themes of the chapter. 
6(PCKOVTo npeopetq tK OnýOv nEpt (PLX(aq. 26U PLGOV PIV 6EI TAV 
n6, \LV, o(6pEvoq U T6TC KOIC crupcpepEtv lvupp(cyat, npooenOLECTO PAO' 6paiv 
OOTOOq PAT' 6KOOELV IVTUyyav6VTWV. 
Plutarch has substituted Thebes for Xenophon's Boiotians, making 
it possible for him to present Agesilaos' regular hatred of the city as 
the cause of his moral lapse. The desire to negotiate for peace 
indicates that the allies' situation was serious, although Plutarch has 
not explained this. The presence of the Spartan forces at the Isthmus 
had already imperilled their communications by land, and the capture 
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of the harbour here by Agesilaos, following the seizure of Lechaion to 
the north of the city, deprived the northern allies in Corinth of their 
remaining access both to supplies from Boiotia and Athens, and also to 
their line of retreat by sea. Iphikrates had been guarding this area, 
but when he had been called away to the defence of Corinth itself, 
Agesilaos returned overnight to capture the undefended Peiraion 
peninsula and its fort, Oin6e. Xenophon reports several embassies in 
addition to the Boiotian, but he does not indicate the purpose of the 
other envoys, or what response Agesilaos made to them. Such 
important peace negotiations may well have needed higher 
authorization, although the envoys' sudden change of heart seems to 
have been locally motivated. 
Plutarch has adjusted the order of events in Xenophon's account. 
The envoys approach Agesilaos when he is already supervising the 
booty, with the result that the impact of the insult has been increased, 
by juxtaposing it with the sudden arrival of the messengers. In 
Xenophon, after the insult, there is an interval in which Agesilaos is 
only now supervising the booty, and the messengers come just as the 
envoys are leaving. Xenophon remarks on Agesilaos' rudeness: ONa 
peyaXo(pp6VOC, TOOTOUq p9v o662 6p6v M&EL, but gives him a further act 
of Optc., for when the messenger brings news of the disaster, he finds 
Agesilaos seemingly in excessive exultation - tOLK6TOC, dIYOXXOPýV(j) TOCC, 
nenpayp&otq. Plutarch uses juxtaposition again, and an oxymoron, with 
the two infinitives, OUJI(PePELV 1vUDP(oaL1 and enlarges Xenophon's 
phrase with another two infinitives, PATE 6PaV OOTOOC, PATE 6KOOELV, 
which specify the complete process of perception available, sight and 
sound. He has created a passage which indicates strikingly the 
unsoundness of Agesilaos' thinking here, and prepares the way for his 
moral comment below. There can, in the religious viewq be no lasting 
advantage to be won from acts of 00ptq. 
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3 fnaft be np(5ypa VCPEGnT6v* o6nca ydp 6nnXXCIYPtVG)V TOV Onýa((JV fiK6v 
TLVEq 6nayytXXOVTEq OOTCa TAV p6pov On' ' I(PLKp6TOUq KQT0KCK6(p8ot. 
The theme of religious retribution has been made explicit here by 
Plutarch, although he has not exploited the air of mystery introduced 
by Xenophon earlier, regarding the unknown cause of the fire in the 
temple of Poseidon (HeR IV. v. 4). The world view of the two writers is 
similar (O. Murray (1972) pp. 200-13): actions on the human plane seem to 
have a causal influence on, or are a response to, other actions on the 
same or a higher plane. The Spartans were on several occasions 
conscious of being punished by the gods for contravening "natural 
law", over the start of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. VII. 18) and, at 
least in the opinion of his enemies, over the restoration of Pleistoanax 
(Thuc. V. 16-7). Plutarch, too, was conscious of the intervention of the 
gods at Aulis, as he has made most explicit at Pelopidas c. 21. 
The report to Agesilaos follows immediately upon the act of 00ptq, 
suggesting the link between Agesilaos' IVUPPCOOL and the disaster, but 
clearly the punishment had already been inflicted on the p6pa. No 
doubt, it was taken as confirming Plutarch's optimistic view of the 
omniscience and absolute competence of the gods in pre-arranging 
things, a view which Xenophon evidently shared: 46T) YdPq 6q COLKE, T6 
6atp6VLOV ýYEV (Hell. VI. iv. 3); and, in circumstances more favourable to 
the Spartans: M)KE YdIp T6TC YE 6 OC6q OOTOZq CPYOV OUOV 065' TIG&OVT6 
nOT1 6V (Hell. IV. iv. 12). 
4 KOt n6001; TOOTO PýYO 5L& noXXoO yp6vou ouvýnEGCV OOTOtq- noXXoOq 
y6p Mpoq dyaGoOq (5n1OQXOV KPaTqO1VTQq On6 Te nEXTQGTG)V 6nXCTOq KOý 
pLo6ocp6pov AQKE50tpOVCOUr,. 
The noun, nd0oc., recalls the verb, Cno0e, above. The disaster, 
and not the report, was the npdypa VEIIECrllTdvl although the assumed 
link with divine revenge was made possible by the timing of the 
report. For Plutarch this moral problem marks the start of the 
down-turn in Spartan affairs, almost immediately after the half-way 
stage in the Life. It is not a continuous slide f rom this point on to 
30 
the end, parallel with a decline in the behaviour of Agesilaos. Plutarch 
rather presents, in both Sparta and Agesilaos, a complex character, 
neither perfect nor wholly bad, but the imperfections are manifested in 
the steps of the decline, and the high standards still become visible 
f rom time to time. 
Plutarch perhaps has in mind a comparison with the disaster at 
Koryphasion. Xenophon records the deep distress throughout the 
army, but describes the disaster only as 640OU(Z TOrC, AaKE6aLpOV(oLq 
YEYCVTIIItVfl(; Tfiq TOtQJTTj(; OUP(POPdq (HeR Mv. 10). He stresses the 
contrast between the opposing forces, hoplites and peltasts, and 
records the Spartan commander's confidence that his men would not be 
attacked (Hell. Mv. 10). Plutarch here uses the pattern of words to 
bring this aspect into sharp contrast. The interweaving of the light 
and heavy armed troops, and the mercenary and allied forces, 
highlights the paradoxical nature of the result of the engagement, 
which impressed Xenophon, and required some revision of the 
traditional concept of the relative values of the different military units. 
Plutarch has also held back the word AoKe5otpov(ouq, so that it is 
placed in the emphatic position at the end of the sentence, as if, by 
the delay, to heighten the sense of shock to the Spartan army, 
hitherto considered invincible. Even more paradoxical, then, is the 
defeat of the Lakedaimonians, prefiguring for Plutarch, perhaps, what 
he regards as the decline in Spartan power in the rest of Agesilaos' 
reign. 
5 'AvenOnar ptv o5v cWq 6 'Ayno(Xaoq &; OoTI04acav- tnEt 51 irywa 
5tonenpayptvouq, aOE)Lr, Ell; TC) *Hpa[ov fiKE, KOC TOL)(; BoLG)TOOq T6TC 
npoocXOEtV KEXCOCC[q, IYPnPdTLCEV. 
As commander, Agesilaos' response to the crisis is immediate, as 
indicated by the placing of the verb firstq and a truly Spartan 
response, described by Xenophon in greater detail, as he organized the 
rescue force. For Plutarch, clearly, the down-turn is not in his 
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qualities as general: it is a decline in his moral character, though it is 
a military loss that Sparta has suffered, and Agesilaos, for all his 
generalship, cannot retrieve it. His show of willingness and readiness 
to do business is an ineffectual attempt ýto recover the initiative. 
6 &; 61 6V0U0P(C0VTEr, tKEtVOL TA(; PtV EtPAVII(; OOKW tPIPVIJVT0, 
napeOývaL 6' hE(ouv c[q K6PLV00V, 6PYLGOEtq 6 *Ayna(Xaoq Elnew 
The retribution continues in the envoys' change of heart, 
adequately motivated by their knowledge of the serious loss of 
Spartiates. The number of Spartans still in the area had also been 
reduced by the departure, to attend the festival of the flyakinthia, of 
all the Amyklaian members in the army, for Agesilaos had deliberately 
left them behind at Lechaion (Xen. Hell. Mv. 11). On the other hand, 
Iphikrates had, no doubt, revived the confidence of the allies at 
Corinth. The envoys' request was unlikely to be granted by Agesilaos, 
who would not wish it to be reported to the allies that he had suffered 
such losses, and the Spartan habit of secrecy still prevailed (cf. Thuc. 
v. 68). Xenophon's report of Agesilaos' rejection of the request 
describes the external display that accompanied his words: 6 51 
tnLYEX6Gaq ... Nn (Ifell. IV. v. 9), an example of Iv6pyeta allowing the 
readers to observe the scene for themselves. He has not made explicit 
what lay behind that display, but his account suggests that Agesilaos 
was still in control of the situation. Plutarch, however, has preferred 
to present the effect on Agesilaos of the frustrating reversal of his 
successful progress in the war. His account suggests that the new 
attitude of the envoys reveals their revived confidence, leading 
Agesilaos into further moral decline in succumbing to anger, which is 
often taken by Plutarch to precede downfall (e. g. Pelopidas 22, 
Alexander 62). 
Erye OOOXEGOE TOOr, Cp(*\OU(; OWOV IE)CtV IJIYCI (PPOVOOVTO(; tv orc, 
EOTUYOOGtVt 0OPtOV 6Gq)QX3q 6WZV TOOG' On6PECL. 
Agesilaos' irony is perhaps matched by the irony of Plutarch in 
32 
his close repetition of the words Xenophon used in criticizing Agesilaos 
himself, P6, \a PeYoXo(PP6vc-)(; above, for keeping the envoys waiting (Hell. 
IV. v. 6). Agesilaos' display of force may have made a deeper impression 
on his own troops, perhaps as he intended. 
7 OGTG) 52 TOO(; KOPLVOCOU4; I&CXtY&Qq 6POVECE)QL JJý TOXPC)VTO(;, &PýKE 
Týv npeupe(av. 
The Corinthians were clearly not likely to accept the challenge in 
these circumstances. The moderate effect of the disaster on the 
strength of the whole Lakedaimonian army was not commensurate with 
its impact on the resources of the Spartiates themselves. 
8 GOT6C. U TOO(; nEPL*\EXELPPIVOUq 6VE)pOq IK Tý(; P6pGq dVaXOO(SV, 
6nýyEv Elq AaKEbClCpova, np6 Aptpaq nOLOOPCVOq T6q (5VOCE6&ELq KOý n6XLV 
GKOTO(OUq Tdlq KCITCIXOGELq, dn(, )q ot PLCYOGVTEq KCIC 00(YKOCVOVTEq T6V 
'APK65wv pA InLY(3(PG)(YLV. 
This perhaps is the more valid indication of the real state of the 
conflict than Agesilaos' freedom of movement around Corinth. Plutarch 
has presented this more clearly than Xenophon, who postponed the 
account of the disaster, and used it to separate the Spartan challenge 
(Hell. IV. v. 10) from the departure of the army for home (Hell. Mv. 18). 
It was unsafe for Agesilaos to stay in the Corinthia. The 
Lakedaimonians held on to Lechaion, but Iphikrates recovered all other 
places taken by Agesilaos. The secrecy observed on the march home is 
explained by Plutarch, following Xenophon, as Agesilaos' wish to avoid 
exposing the troops to humiliation. He no doubt also wished to avoid 
being attacked at critical stages, and, by lengthening the day's march, 
also to expedite his arrival in Sparta. Since he had with him only the 
remnant of the defeated p6pa (Hell. IV. v. 18)j it wass perhaps, of 
paramount importance for the Spartans not to allow its reduced 
strength to be observed by an enemy that had recovered some of its 
high spirits. 
The route through the more friendly western Arkadia, which 
avoided the powerful enemy Argos, passed through the territory of 
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Orchomenos, Mantinea and Tegea, before Lakonia was reached. Arkadia 
had been invaded and ravaged by Iphikrates, but the Mantineans had 
once been mocked by the Spartans for their flight before an onslaught 
by peltasts, outside the Lechaion wall (Xen. Hell. IV. iv. 16-17). 
9 IK TOOTOU )(OPtC6pEVOq TOrr. 'AyatOrC, bLePaLVEV Efr, *AKOPVOVCCIV 
CrTPOTLO PETO CIOT(3V KOý noXXAv ptv AX60CITO XECOV, PdYU U TOOq 
'AKOPVOVOq IV(KnUE. 
Agesilaos needed to respond, in order to keep the route open 
through Arkadia and its northern neighbour, Achaia, to give access to 
the Isthmus and across the gulf to Central Greece. The Achaians in 
possession of Kalydon, in ancient times an Aitolian town near the 
border with Akarnania, had been attacked by the Akarnanians, who 
were helped by their Athenian and Boiotian allies, for the Akarnanians 
had deserted Sparta, and joined the allies of the Council of Corinth 
(Diod. XIV. 82.2); and they were on the Athenian side at the battle of 
Nemea (Xen. HeIL IV. ii. 17). The Arkadians had called on the Spartans 
to repay them for their support, under threat of abandoning them 
(Xen. Hell. IV. vi. 1-14). Plutarch ends the chapter with a brief but 
exaggerated account of the successes won against the Akarnanians, 
omitting the historical background given by Xenophon, and portraying 
Agesilaos still as a formidable general. Yet Xenophon has not 
described Agesilaos' campaign as an unqualified success, except in the 
devastation of the countryside, while he was advancing at the rate of 
ten or twelve stadia a day, and in the capture of cattle, horses and 
slaves (Hell. IV. vi. 1-14). The Akarnanian peltasts were superior in 
guerrilla actions, but the Lakedaimonian hoplites won an engagement 
for which Agesilaos set up a trophy. Xenophon stresses his failure to 
capture any of the towns he assaulted, and further implies his inability 
to recover Naupaktos for the Aetolians. This important base, where 
Messenians from Ithome had been settled by Athens, was retaken after 
the end of the Peloponnesian War (Paus. IV. 26.2, X. 38.10; Diod. XIV. 34.2) 
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and then occupied by the Lokrians. Its recovery for friends of Sparta 
would have been a major achievement. Clearly Plutarch's selection 
from Xenophon (Hell. IV. vi. 6,13; vii. 1), shows a favourable picture of 
the generalship of Agesilaos. 
10 6COPIVWV U T6V 'Ayat6v 6nG)q T6V YELp3va nopopE(voý; d(P6XqTOL T6v 
an6poV TOv noXcpCG)V, TOOVQVTCOV fcpq noL4GCLV- PdXXOV Y6P (POO40COOOL T6V 
n6Xcpov OOTOOq, 16v lonappeVqV TAV YAV Etq (SPOq 9YWtV1 6 KOý OUVIR9. 
11 napayyEXXopevilq VdIP C113E)Lr. tn' CIOTOO(; CrTPCITECOC,, 6LT), \, \6YtJ(JaV TOEr, 
'Ayatotq, 
Agesilaos' generalship is further enhanced by this account of the 
end of the campaign, presenting him as a skilled strategist. The crops 
would be vulnerable, but also the invaders would have supplies at 
hand, which would both facilitate their own operations, and thereby 
increase the inhabitants' anxiety. The conclusion of the chapter is the 
biographical point that Agesilaos' military judgement was correct, and 
consequently the decline suffered by Sparta was not due to any 
deficiency in Agesilaos' competence as commander. Plutarch has not 
stressed the historical significance of the campaign: in Xenophon the 
Akarnanians transferred their allegiance and joined the Spartan 
alliance. 
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PART EIGHT 
THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS: 
PHOIBIDAS AND SPHODRIAS 
(Chapters 23-25) 
CHAPTER 23 
Failures of ST)artan justice: the Peace of Antalkidas and the Kadmeia 
Plutarch deals favourably with Agesilaos during the making of the 
Peace of Antalkidas, but in the second section of the chapter he is 
critical of his part in Phoibidas' seizure of the Kadmeia. He then gives 
a favourable analysis of Agesilaos' theoretical attitude to justice, and 
in the final section returns to Phoibidas with the criticism of his 
practice. The issues here are both historical and biographical, leading 
Plutarch to make a shrewd assessment of the decline in the 
maintenance of the Spartan ideal. 
1 'EnE t be K6v(av KCI I Oapv6pacoq To PCIG LXý Wq VC[UTLKO 
OaXaTTOKPaTODVTEq tn6pOOUV To napdXLCI Tfiq AOKWVLKAqf ITELYCOOn 59 KCAC 
T6 6(YTU T(3V *AOnvo((, )v, 4)apvoPdiCou YP4PCITCI 56VTOq, 660EE TOrq 
AOKE60LPOV(OLC, etpývnv nOLEtCOCIL np6c, POOLXIG- 
Whereas Xenophon apparently - prefers to give precedence to 
Pharnabazos in this episode (HelL IV. viii. 1), Plutarch puts the Greek 
commander first, as if he, like Diodoros (XIV. 81.4), considers Konon to 
be the initiator of the enterprise. Persian naval development was first 
mentioned in c. 6, as one reason for Agesilaos' expedition to Asia'Minor. 
The King had been persuaded by Pharnabazos to make available the 
means of building a fleet, and Konon, the Athenian', had 'been given 
supreme command (Diod. XIV. 39.1-2)f but he and Pharnabazos were later 
made joint commanders (Diod. XIV. 81-4). The Persian fleet was initially 
intended to help in dealing with the Spartan interventions on behalf of 
the Greek cities of Asia Minor, and with the trouble in Cyprus and 
Egypt (Diod. XIV. 35.3-4,98.2). While the fleet was still being 
assembled, Pharax, the ýLakedaimonian commander, was operating with 
one hundred and twenty ships from Rhodes (Diod. XIV. 79.4), and just 
before Agesilaos was sent to Asia Minor, Derkylidas was ordered by the 
ephors to combine with him, against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos, in 
Karia (Xen. Hell. III. H. 12). The defeat off Knidos of the Spartan fleet 
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under Peisander (c. 17) led to the subsequent activity in the Aegean, 
and at this time it was clear that the whole of the King's hostile 
activity against Greece had been concentrated on Sparta. 
After the Akarnanian campaign, which gave some relief to the 
Spartans, Plutarch has immediately recorded the raids on Lakonia and 
the re- fortification of Athens, as leading to the Spartans' desire for 
peace. Xenophon does not mention this desire until after he has 
turned back several years to describe the war at sea, and so he has 
not connected it with the fighting on land. lie has also passed lightly 
over the raids on Lakonia, saying only that Kythera received an 
Athenian garrison (Hell. IV. viii. 8). For him it was the re-building of 
the Athenians' walls, and the activities of Konon in gaining islands and 
cities for Athens, which led the Spartans to contact Tiribazos in an 
attempt to arrange peace (HeIL IV. viii. 12), yet the sense of insecurity 
created for Sparta by the presence of hostile forces threatening 
Lakonia itself may be judged by the consternation caused by the 
similar occupation of Koryphasion (Thuc. IV. 1-41). 
2 K01 E n1pn0U0LV 'AVTCIXK(baV np6q, TLPCRCICOV9 C1 rOy L GT(3 KCI t 
naPC1V0P6TC1TC1 TOOq TýV 'AcrCaV KOTOLKOOVTOq 'EXXnvaq, Ontp 6v enoXtpnacv 
'Ayna(Xaoq, fý00LXCZ naP05L66VTCq. 
There was perhaps good reason for the choice of Antalkidas to 
undertake this mission: he got on well with Tiribazos (Xen. Hell. V. i. 6) 
and had Persian connections as a long-standing Eevoc, of Ariobarzanes 
(Xen. HeH. U. 28), who replaced Pharnabazos as satrap at Daskyleion. 
lie is thought to be the son of the Leon (Artax. 21) who was, among 
other things (P. Poralla (1913) p. 23), the Olympic victor in 440, the 
oilcist of Herakleia (Thuc. 111.92.5) and ephor of 419/8 (Xen. Hell. 
11.3.10). His mother was most likely Teleutia. The family tree is given 
by Poralla on p. 83 under Ae(jv. In Greece Leon was a common name 
(A. Andrewes (1981) on VIII. 28.5) but the father of Antalkidas may still 
be the Leon known to Thucydides (P. A. Cartledge (1987) pp. 145-6). 
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This peace initiative failed, however, although Plutarch does not 
mention that. Xenophon (Hell. IV. viii. 13) records that when the 
Athenians learned of the Spartan mission, envoys were sent also by 
Athens, the Boiotians, Corinth and Argos, who prevented agreement 
because their cities did not want to be deprived of their various 
dependencies. About five years later, by Xenophon's account, 
Antalkidas was navarch, and, sailing from Aigina to Ephesos, made his 
way from there to the King of Persia, with whom he agreed a Spartan 
alliance, and the conditions of the peace named after him (Xen. Hell. 
V. i. 6,25,36: Diod. XIV. 110: Artax. 21). Plutarch has apparently 
attached the second, successful, mission to the preliminaries of the 
first, which was inconclusive. He has omitted the new motivations for 
peace: Artaxerxes' transfer of support to Sparta with the arrest of 
Konon; Sparta's weariness of the situation at the Isthmus; the reverses 
at sea inflicted on Athens by Teleutias; the concession that Athens was 
to be allowed to retain Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros. Control of Abydos 
also appears to have been a crucial factor on both sides, since it was 
in a position where it could prevent shipping from the Pontos from 
sailing to Athens (Xen. Hell. VA. 28). Iphikrates had besieged the city 
for Athens, taking it when its Spartan governor, Anaxibios, had been 
killed (Xen. Hell. IV. viii 39). Antalkidas sent Nikolochos, his &1L(7TO, \E6q, 
to re-occupy it, but he was blockaded by the Athenians. Antalkidas 
eventually relieved him and the Spartan ships under siege there, 
forcing the Athenians finally to desire peace. It was after winning 
this struggle that he negotiated with Persia, and agreed that the cities 
in Asia should belong to Artaxerxes (Xen. Hell. V. i. 71 25-28,31). 
Plutarch shows more concern and moral outrage over the betrayal 
of the Greek cities in Asia Minor than is evident in Greece in the fifth 
and early fourth centuries. The domination of Ionia had frequently 
been endured, ever since the reign of the Lydian, Gyges) in the 
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seventh century, and it is likely that, by the payment of tribute to the 
King, some Greek cities preserved their independent status, just as 
non-Greeks in the area did. (D. M. Lewis (1977) * p. 122; J. M. Cook (1983) 
pp. 178-82. ) The possible exchange of their autonomy for Persian money 
or support had been referred to first by King Archidamos before the 
Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.82), and during the war both sides had 
been willing to compromise themselves over the autonomy of the Greeks 
in Asia Minor, in order to compete for Persian financial support, 
perhaps as early as at Thuc. 11.67 and IV. 50. There were at times, too, 
Greeks in the cities who were willing to cooperate with the Persians in 
return for political power (Xen. Hell. IIIJ. 6). The attitude changed, in 
literature at least, when Isokrates and others used the prospect of a 
crusade for liberation to urge the abandonment of wars between Greeks 
and Greeks. (See below. ) 
3 60EY ýKLOTO ouvOn Tfi4; KOK050E(Oq T06Tnq 'A"atX6Q PCTOGYCtV- 
There is no trace of KOK050&(a in Xenophon's accounts of the two 
occasions when Antalkidas took his proposals to Asia Minor. The allies' 
responses were fears that the autonomy clause would deprive them of 
possessions. Later, Diodoros (XIV. 110), using a different source, claims 
that the Athenians, the Thebans and some of the other Greeks were 
concerned over the abandonment of the cities, but without power they 
agreed of necessity. There is in this no personal attack on anyone, 
except that the King of Persia is said to have specified the terms, 
though Xenophon suggests that he rather followed Sparta's terms. 
There was concern seven or eight years later, when, according to 
Lysias' Olympic oration (XXXIII. 521), much of Greece was subject to the 
foreigner, and Isokrates (Panegyrikos) uses the shame of the Peace in 
order to inspire Greece to a crusade against Persia as the only way to 
end internal rivalries and hostilities (see below). 
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6 ydip 'AVTQXK(5O4; 1)(Op6c, 
ýV 0113TC), KC[t TAV E1P4V1jV IE 6noVTO(; 
fnPOTTEV 6q TOO noXgPOU T6V 'Ayna(Xoov OOEOVTOq KOC nOLOOVTOq 
1v5oE6TOTOV KOt PeYLOTOV. 
Agesilaos is not mentioned by Xenophon as concerned directly in 
the diplomacy that led to the peace - it was a Lakedaimonian initiative 
- and it appears that Plutarch took his absence from the record to 
mean that he was opposed to peace. This could be a reasonable 
interpretation for him to make, in view of Agesilaos' earlier campaigns 
against the Persians, and given the tendency to personalize 
policy-making. He may have had it in mind, indeed, that at Agesilaos 
11.21 Xenophon mentions opposition from Agesilaos: not on principle, 
however, but only, apparently, as a service to his friends, ý0L, \ETC1LP(Q1, 
to ensure the restoration in the cities of exiles loyal to the 
Lakedaimonians. Perhaps the opposition was remembered, but not the 
explanation. Plutarch consequently now needed to explain the political 
difference between the two men. In c. 26.3 he quotes the anecdote in 
which Antalkidas claimed that Agesilaos' wound was a tuition fee for 
teaching the Thebans in so many battles how to fight. Clearly, 
however, this is hardly enough to prove that the two were enemies, 
and rivalry with Agesilaos is not the only possible explanation of 
Antalkidas' prominent part. It was surely Agesilaos' record of hostility 
to Persia that required him to be excluded personally from the 
negotiation of the peace. That Xenophon refers to the peace as Tfi4; tn' 
*AVTOXKC50U CIPAVTI(; (Hell. V. 1.36) rather than associating it with 
Agesilaos does not therefore prove any political disagreement. 
Plutarchq in giving personal rivalry as the reason for the political 
difference between Agesilaos and Antalkidas, suggests that the latter 
wanted peace to be made in order to prevent further enhancement of 
the king's military record. He is here portraying character in 
it Homeric" fashion, indirectly, through one of the people present, for 
Antalkidas' thought expresses an implied criticism of Agesilaos as 
cpL, \on6, \Epo(;, a word also found in Diodoros (XVA9.4). He has$ howeverg 
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already given his two adequate reasons for the Spartans' decision to 
make peace; mention of the persofial differences allows the remarks 
expressing his strong feelings about the betrayal of the Asian cities to 
be diverted away from Agesilaos. Indeed, Antalkidas' criticism of 
Agesilaos is a somewhat inappropriate one at this point, following the 
references to Sparta's plight, his humiliating return with the remains 
of his army from Corinth, and the limited success he achieved in 
Akarnania. Some later successes had been more positive, but the 
credit for them did not belong to Agesilaos, the most decisive, that 
indeed forced Athens to accept the peace, being won at sea, by 
Teleutias in the Saronic Gulf, and by Antalkidas himself - clearly no 
pacifist - at Abydos. The statement could perhaps have been more 
truly made about the campaigns in Asia Minor, though still only with 
some qualification, as has been seen above. 
4 06 PýV &\X& Kol npdq T6V Efn6VTC1 TOOq AOKEbCILPOVCOUq Pq5CCELV 6 
'Ayna(Xaoq 6nEKP(VCITO P15XXOV TOOq Mý5OUq XQK(JV(CELV. 
Plutarch continues now with a saying which reveals Agesilaos' 
attitude to the peace: that the peace enhances Sparta's position as 
leader of the Greeks, for the word used of the Persians is not 
IXXnVCCELv, but J\OKG)V(CELv. This thought is therefore favourable and 
complimentary to Sparta. The statement will be closer to the truth, if 
the terms of the peace are attributable to the Spartan side originally. 
Immediately preceding this is Antalkidas' criticism of Agesilaos as 
gaining power and glory from the war. However, Antalkidas' hostility 
has been introduced by y6p as an explanation of Agesilaos' escape f rom 
any share in the ill-repute arising from the peace terms, and Y6P 
makes its sentence a parenthesis, thus allowing the connecting 
particles, oO 11AV &X& KO! (see Endnote 6), to link up with the 
preceding 6Bev sentence. , The two lines of thought, in brief, will now 
be: "Agesilaos took no ill-repute" and "In factq it was the Persians, 
having suffered so much in his wars for the liberation of Asia Minor, 
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who wanted peace with Sparta". The intervening sentence is an 
explanatory parenthesis. 
The remark of Agesilaos here is in chiastic order of word stems, 
AOK- P116- M45- XaK-. ' It occurs in a different form at Artax. XXII. 2, 
where there is chiastic order of the parts of speech: verb, noung noun, 
verb: pn5(COUGLV Ot A6K(JVEr, .. Of Mý50L XaK(MCOUGL. This word order 
is again used at Afor. 213C, but in reported speech: P115CCCLV T004; 
AOKEE)OLPOVCOU(; .. * T064; M46OUr, 
XOKWV(CELV. The three different 
patterns show Plutarch's versatility, but evidently he did not feel tied 
to any one form which he could claim to be the original one of 
Agesilaos himself. Perhaps he relied, on memory or deliberately 
rephrased and even used different names - the form A6K(JVEr, of ArtaA,. 
22.2 gives the closest correspondence with the verb stem, while the 
endings of TO04; AOKE5OLPOV(OUr, ... TOOC, M65OUr, strengthen the 
pattern. Since it isq of coursel not possible to put these words 
together without some form of chiasmus, Spartan rhetoric is not 
necessarily illuminated. 
Emotion and reason have provided different judgements of the 
Peace. It was the true character of this "incident of serious and 
mournful import" that Plutarch described (G. Grote (1869) Vol. IX p. 215). 
This view presents Athens in a more favourable light than Sparta and 
follows Plutarch's emotional judgement. The contrasting argumentl 
rejecting the "emotional judgement" of the issue of the freedom of the 
Greek cities of Asia Minor, is that "Practical politicians, dealing with 
the everyday needs and ambitions of their states, saw no danger in 
medizing" (N. G. L. Hammond (1967) p. 467). The fact that both sides 
sought Persian support, when it seemed to suit them to do so, does not 
validate, but illuminates, the morals of the politicians. It was not 
necessarily that they felt they were or were not a part of a 
"brotherhood of nations", but that they wished to benefit themselves, 
even at the expense of fellow Greeks, and disregarded the danger, 
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until, when it was thrust upon them, they were forced into war. This 
was at times true of all cities, not only of those having relations with 
Persia: understandably, since their often very precarious existence was 
continually threatened by forces beyond their control. Altruism is not 
to be expected in diplomacy, but, in seeking solutions to such 
problems, the philosopher would wish politicians, in Sir Isiah Berlin's 
phrase (BBC broadcast (1978)), "to do their best", exploring all the 
possibilities. The theoretical approach appears not to have been 
attempted, but in practice the cities seem to have enjoyed increased 
prosperity after the peace (S. Hornblower (1983) p. 175); and the King 
was occupied with affairs in Cyprus and Egypt (Diod. XIV. 110, XV. 2). 
5 TOtq U PA POUXOPeVOLq UYEGOOL TAY E1p4Yqv dnEtX6v KOC 
KaTaYYtXXG)v n6Xcpov, Av6YKOGEV tppevetv dnQVTaq orq 6 n1panq MKOCOGE, 
PdXLCYTO 6Ld TOOq enpaCouq., 6nG)q (XOT6vopOV TAY BoLOTCOV 6ýOýVTEq 
6GOEV&FTEPOL YtVCaVTaL. 
The Thebans claimed that they should take the oath for all 
Boiotians and later refused to send troops on campaign. The 
Corinthians had taken the oath but then refused to dismiss the Argive 
garrison. Both were forced to complyl after Agesilaos had threatened 
war on the ground of the autonomy clause. Passage through the 
Isthmus was freed, and Thebes was not allowed to be powerful enough 
in Boiotia to block the route to the north. Hostility towards Thebes 
has already been said to have determined several of Agesilaos' actions. 
The autonomy clause in the Peace now becomes a powerful weapon in 
his armoury, but equally it may be seen as the main external factor 
contributing to the hostile attitudes to Sparta. Its enforcement in 
Sparta's interest not only offended many allies; it also spurred Thebes 
to re-establish leadership of the Doiotian Confederacy. The clash 
between these two cities represents the conflict of opposing policies 
which, though it cannot be claimed that they were designed primarily 
for this purpose, yet on fulfilment might each have united Greece in 
peace, Sparta through military supremacy, Thebes through expandable 
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confederation. Even Alexander's later achievements left the Greeks still 
warring, though on a larger scale and for greater prizes. At this time 
"land empire in Greece was not within the powers of any Greek state 
to maintain indefinitely " (G. L. Cawkwell (1972) p. 275). Spartan strength 
failed. Thebes also failedq partly through lack of strength, partly 
through the loss of inspired leadership, but partly, it seems, through 
reliance on federal idealismq after the restraining threat of Spartan 
domination had been removed, permitting the resurgence of continuing 
rivalries. 
The history of the Boiotian Confederacy is of great interest, both 
because of its unique promise at the timet and because to ignore it 
leaves unexplained the emergence of a power strong enough, not only 
to recover from almost total extinction during the Spartan occupation 
of the Kadmeia, but even to achieve, by repeated military success, the 
liberation of the subject population of Messenia. The success of sur- 
viving Athenian historiography has created a tradition unfavourable to 
the proper appreciation of the points of view of the more peripheral 
Greek cities, always overshadowed by Athens and Sparta, and modern 
commentators often retain this prejudice. The Spartans' right to take 
the oath for the allies has been pronounced justified, on the ground 
that "it was a very different thing" from the Theban right: of old the 
Peloponnesians had had "an autonomous voice in decisions about war 
and peace" (I. Bos (1947) p. 162). This view ignores the more democratic 
procedures of the Boiotian Council, to which representatives were 
elected, to some extent in proportion to the distribution of the 
population of its members (Hell. O. Y. XI; J. A. O. Larsen 1968). If Sparta's 
"boast that the cities she led were autonomous had some substance" 
(A. Andrewes (1978) p. 95 n. 14), the same should have been clearly 
recognized in the case of the Confederacy. 
Boiotia is a rich agricultural areap and seems to have shared with 
Spartal once Messenia had been won, such self-sufficiency as to make 
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colonization and further conquest economically unnecessary, but, while 
Lakonia has natural defences, the plains of Boiotia make the cities so 
vulnerable to attack that more peaceful means of co-existence needed 
to be tried. Orchomenos was always an important Boiotian city, but 
Thebes was better placed centrally to become the leading power; it had 
at an early date, as the remains of the palaces and the legends used 
by the tragedlans show, one of the most advanced cultures in Greece, 
and was in later times not too remote to benefit from the influence of 
central and southern cities. The vulnerability of the country led the 
Thebans to co-operate with the Persians during Xerxes' invasion, 
though perhaps not immediately, for they may have joined the 
Thessalian expedition (Herodotos VII. 173; Afor. 864E), and some of them 
were at Thermopylai (Herodotos VII. 205). Their medism partially 
explains their unpopularity in the literary tradition, as does, among the 
writers who favoured Athensq their participation in the Peloponnesian 
War on the Spartan side. At the end of the Peloponnesian War Thebes 
had reason to be proud of its military record and was powerful enough 
to be a focal point of attraction, after its quarrel with Sparta, for 
anti-Spartan elements such as the Athenian democratic exiles. 
Theban culture is indicated by the presence there of the 
philosopher, Lysis, a Pythagorean refugee from Italy (Mor. 583), who 
perhaps taught Epameinondas (N. H. Demand (1982) P. 80). With this 
background, and a willingness to develop new ideas in the formation 
and use of the phalanx, it may not be strange that Thebes found the 
potentiality to challenge the established leadership of Greece. Thebes 
found also the vital necessity to make that challenge, when the threat 
to its very existence was imposed by Sparta, in creating the ring of 
hostile garrisons inside the borders of Boiotia - chiefly at Thespiae, 
Haliartos and Orchomenos. When the chance came, Thebes was also 
fortunate in having in Epameinondas, Pelopidas and others, men of 
courage with the ability to take it. Plutarchq as one on the periphery 
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of Greece and Boiotian, had some sympathy with the Theban position 
and in this way viewed Sparta critically. Since both Thebes and 
Sparta felt themselves hemmed in by potentially hostile neighbours, 
neither should be faulted for being motivated by self-protection: what 
may be judged is their respective treatment of each other. 
5ýXOV U TOOTO TO[q GUTEPOV tnoCnaev. 6 tnEl Y6P 4)OLR(60q 9PYOV 
Etpy6CFCXTO E)ELV6V tv onovbaCr, KC11 EtPAVIO TýV KOE)PeCOV KQTaXOO(5V, KOC 
n6VTEq PIV ýyov&TOUV Ot 'EXXqvEq, yaXen6q 51 9(pepov ot EnOPTL6TOL. 
For topography, see S. Symeonoglou (1985), and the review by 
G. Huxley (1987). Thebes, like Sparta, had no unassailable citadel. The 
Kadmeia is a striking featurej but hardly a formidable stronghold. The 
substantial stone wall round it now visible has been identified as of 
late fourth century construction. Its main importance, particularly for 
the Spartan occupation, was its use as the meeting place for the 
Council of the Confederacy. Some such meeting may even, though 
there is no record of this, have continued despite the autonomy clause, 
until now. 
Plutarch condemns the action of Phoibidas as a violation of the 
Peace, overlooking Xenophon's report (Hell. V. ii. 26-27), perhaps 
intended as uncomplimentary to Thebes by its author, whoever that 
was, of the betrayal to Phoibidas by one of the polemarchs, Leontiades. 
Secret arrangements of this kind cannot readily be checked, but other 
features of the event render this aspect less important: what matters 
more is why and how the seizure was accomplished. From Xenophon's 
account (He1L V. ii. 11-36), it is clear that Sparta was continuing an 
interest in the northern region, which he calls Thrace, and the cities 
of Chalkidike. This can perhaps be understood only as a design to 
frustrate Theban Interests, and to prevent the securing of friends who 
might counteract the encirclement of Boiotia by Spartan garrisons. 
Xenophon records three other matters: the decision of the assembly of 
47 
I it 
the allies to allow the Lakedaimonians to impose a fine upon any who 
failed to supply troops when required; also that according to 
Leontiades a proclamation had been made forbidding Thebans to serve 
in the force which Phoibidas was collecting for the Thracian expedition; 
and, further, that Phoibidas, who had been sent in response to appeals 
from Apollonia and Akanthos for help against the encroachments of 
Olynthos, had himself encamped near the grmnasion outside Thebes. 
He gives no reason why Phoibidas should have delayed his march north 
in this manner, but it seems reasonable to suppose that the three 
recorded facts are relevant, and that Phoibidas was there to collect 
either the troops or the fine. Collusion with Leontiades, who was 
friendly to Sparta, and may well have used Phoibidas to score over his 
opponent, Ismenias, clearly would make the task much easier. When 
Leontiades later came to Sparta to address the Lakedaimonians, he 
promised that Thebes would now fulfil all demands that were made. 
Xenophon says that as a result the Lakedaimonians were now in better 
spirits for the expedition: presumably they had ensured a friendly 
Thebes that would not hinder their communications, or block any 
retreat of the allies. However, Plutarch's complaint is still justified, 
for occupation exceeded the collection of the fine that was allowed. 
Even Xenophon has admitted that it caused the annoyance of the 
ephors and Spartiates and aroused the indignation of the gods (Hell. 
VAL32, iv. 1). 
KOE Pd, \LGG' Of 6Wýpcp6PEVOt T(ý 'AyiIaLAdq) IIET1 15PYýq tnUV0dVOVTO 
TOO (0OtP(6OU T(VOq TOOTCI KEXE000VTOq gnpoEcv, CIq iKEtVOV TýV 6n6VOLOV 
TPtr1OVTE(;. 
If the above interpretation is correct, Phoibidas will have been 
empowered to deal with the question of the Theban contribution to the 
expeditionary force, and that may explain Diodoross statement (XV. 20) 
that Spartan commanders were given secret instructions to take any 
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opportunity to sieze the Kadmeia, although according to the ephors and 
the majority of the citizens the occupation of the Kadmeia was not so 
authorized (Xen. Hell. V. ii. 32). Xenophon's account, at this point, 
ignores the question of the fine, and instead stresses the personal 
element, first in Leontiades' flattery of Phoibidas, next in the criticism 
of Phoibidas' character (Hell. V. ii. 27-8), and finally where Agesilaos 
suggests- that Phoibidas was right to have acted on his own initiative, 
if Sparta benefited (Hell. V. ii. 32). The seizure of the Kadmeia is 
separated by Xenophon from the decision to keep a guard there, for 
that was taken only after Leontiades had advised it (VAL33-5), 
transferring the guilt from the Spartans. Plutarch seems to have been 
dissatisfied with Xenophon's failure to confront the issue directly, and 
implies the existence at Sparta of some suspicion that there were 
secret instructions. 
7 06K G)KVTIaE TO d)OLR(6Q1 POnOG)V XtYELV 6VO(PaV66V 6TL 6CC TAv np(5ELV 
OOTAV Er Tt )(P4GLPOV 1)(EA GKoneCV1 Tdl Y43P CYUPý09POVTO Tý AOKE6O(JJOVt 
KCI, \C)(; E)(ELV 016TOPCIT(CECOCIL, KaIV Pn6Ctq KCXEOGU. 
In c. 20 Plutarch described how Agesilaos made friends by helping 
men in their difficulties, and he later appointed Phoibidas harmost at 
Thespiai (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 41-6). In practical politics, the interest of the 
state - ultimately the secure survival of the state - is paramount. 
Even if the distinction is to be drawn between the short term and the 
long terml the guiding principle will still be the national interest. 
Plutarch records Agesilaos' equation of national interest with 
honourable action, an equation found also in the Melian Dialogue (Thuc. 
V. 105), where the Athenians quote the Spartans' belief that what suits 
their interest is just. Xenophon reports Agesilaos' view, based on 
ancient practice, that authorization is not required for service to the 
state: Ct 5' 6YO069 6PYCItOV CIVOL v6PLPOV tEetyat Td TOLOOTO 
06TOGYE&ReLvo and the moral implication of his question, n6TEPOV 43YO06 
49 
ý KOK6 tGTL Tdt nenpaypeya, is shown clearly to be related not to ethical 
principle but only to the initial pragmatism: 6 JJ9VTOL 'AyrIo(Xooq, EXeyev 
6TL EC P9V OXOPEPdI TZ AOKC50(POYL nEnpay6q ern, 5(KOLOq Ern CnPLOOGOOL 
(Hell. V. ii. 32). Thus Spartan justice regards a crime as an injury to 
the state, while service to the state is simply part of the Spartan 
tradition, a matter not for the laws of morality but for individual 
decision and endeavour. Agesilaos is extending domestic justice to 
international affairs: unless the deed is injurious to the state, the law 
does not operate. Xenophon records no punishment of Phoibidas, and 
it is Leontiades the Theban who convinces the Spartans that it is in 
their interest to continue the occupation. Plutarch here introduces the 
moral element, by substituting KCIX0C. f)(ELV for Xenophon's tEENCIL, and 
so can take the discussion further into the theory of individual ethics 
in the rest of the chapter. The world view has changed (O. Murray 
(1972) pp. 200-13). 
8 Ka(TOL TQ \(5yQ noVTO)(00 TAV E)tKaLOGOVIIV dnipaLve npG)TEOELV TOV 
6PETOVI dV5P(O(; PtV VdP 0051V 6(PCXOq E? VaL, Pý nOPOjGTJ(; 5LKOLOCYtJVII(;, Ef 
U 6(KCALOL n6VTEq YIVOLVTO, Pn5tV 6V6P(O(; 5CAGECIOat. 
Plutarch attributes to Agesilaos a contradiction between the above 
policy and his statement of the primacy of the principle of justice, in 
which the quiet virtue is said to have priority over all others, so that 
Phoibidas' unjust action (IPYOV CCPY600TO 5ELV6V) is not to be defended 
successfully by expediency. To facilitate Plutarch's e fortiori 
argument, the expedient action of Phoibidas requires to be replaced by 
the example of the chief active virtue, courage (&v5pe(oq). "Courage is 
useless if it lacks justice; courage is useless if there is justice already 
there. " The instability of the active, competitive virtue, courage, 
contrasts with the stability of the quiet, co-operative virtue, justice. 
Courage is desirable in order to make a'change to, not in or from, a 
just situation. 
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9 np6q 59 TOL)4; XtYOVTO(; 6TL TOOTC1 6OKEt TQ PEY6XQ POCFL, \r:. t, TC 5' 
tKEtVOC, ýpoO, erne, pc(Cov, e? [JA KOC 6LKOL6TEPOr,; 6POCN; KOC KOX0Aq 
ot6pEvoq 5CEV Tý) 5LKOCQ K006nep PeTPQ OCICYLXLKQ PCTPCE0001L TAV OnEpoyAv 
TOO PECCOVOq. 
The argument is questioned by a reference to an invalid counter 
example, which concedes the supposed Persian lack of courage: the 
King would not be disadvantaged in a world which dispensed with the 
need for it. He would then, however, have to prove his greatness - 
"that he was more entitled to be called Great King" - by being more 
just, but, of course, justice is another, even clearer, supposed Persian 
deficiency. Agesilaos' belief in the primacy of justice is thus 
confirmed. In suggesting that "Justice must be the standard by which 
to measure the quality of a king", he departs from the Homeric 
standard of 6PETA, as seen in the comparison of Achilles and 
Agamemnon: 
Et U GO KCIPTEp6r, &YOL, E)Ed U GE YCCVC1TO WATnP, 
6XV 6 YE (PIPTEp6r, ICFTLV, Inet nXE6vEGOLV 6v6aoEL 
(Iliad 1.281-2). 
But another poet, Terpander, attributes justice to the early Spartans 
as some form of open assessment of worthy actions: 
wEvOl atyp6 TE ViG)V 06XXEL KCIt P0G(X XCYEW 
KC(t 6(KCI Ebpu6yULCI, KOXOV InLT6ppoOoq Epyov. 
10 fiV U Tfl4; EtPAVrlq YF-VOPeVnq InEptpev GOTO nEPI &EV(Qq KQ1 (PLX(Oq 
InLOTOXAV 6 PC[aLXEdq OOK tXopcv, c1n6v IECIPKEtV TAV KOLVAV (PLX(OV KOC 
PnUV t6COq 6E40EGOOL PCVOOGnq tKC(Vnq. 
Having disposed of the chief rival contender for primacy, dv6p(o, 
Plutarch now returns the argument to the absolute value of the quiet 
virtues, for, in Agesilaos' response to the King, the security of the 
friendly relationship implies the primacy of the quiet virtue of honour. 
Friendship is said to have binding force, presumably even at the 
expense of expediencyl and personal commitment is as reliable in public 
treaties as it is in private agreements, requiring no institutional 
re-inforcement. In the King's world, Agesilaos had observed that 
personal ties were exploited, as in the marriage of Cotys and 
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Spithridates' daughter (c. 11), which he had himself arranged. 
11 IV 52 TO[(; fPYOL4; OOKftL TaOT11Y E)LO(PU, \6TTG)V TýV E)6&ov, &W Tý 
CPLXOTLPCQ KaC Ta (PL, \OVCLK(gi no, \, \ayoCi (3UVEKCPCPdPCVOCý, KCXl jJdlXLCFT0 Tb 
np6q E)TlRa(ouq. 
Plutarch now resumes the case of Phoibidas and the theme of the 
decline of Agesilaos. The biographer believed that a man's character 
was displayed in his actions. Although, in a sense, words and actions 
are equivalents, as in Thucydides 1.23, a man's actions and his words 
may not be consistent, and the actions need to be assessed. Socrates' 
perfect man, knowing what is right, will not do wrong; a lesser man 
may have TAV 66EOv and may be judged adversely if he does not follow 
it (Protagoras 345d; G. M. A. Grube (1935) p. 216). Thus what Agesilaos 
does is more revealing than what he says, and it is by the two 
competitive virtues attributed to Agesilaos, Tt (PLXO-TLPCQ KOL' Tt 
QL, \OVE: LKCQI, for which he was praised at c. 2, that his actions are 
determined, rather than by the abstract professions that have just 
I been assigned to him. At c. 5 Plutarch warned that, although these 
virtues were introduced by the Spartan lawgiver, there were 
reservation s, and the quarrel between Agesilaos and Lysa nder at cc. 7-8 
illustrated the dangers caused by indulging th em to excess. Here the 
key word is CYUVCK(PCP6PevO(;: Agesilaos is at fault in indulging his 
hatred of Thebes to excessive lengths. Plutarch approves the 
Lykourgan ideal, but finds fault with Agesilaos' deviation from it. 
o6 p6vov tGOGE T6V OOLP(baV, 6XXel KCII TAY n6XLv fnEtGEV Etq tOUTAV 
dIVOUEOCYGaL T6 66(KllpQ KCIC KOTeYELV TAY Ka5pe(av 60 IOUTý(;, TOY U 
npoyp6TG)V Kat Tfiq nOXLTE(Oq 'Apy(ov Kat AcOVTt65av 6no5ct&CIL KUPCOUq, 
60 C)V 6 (POLO(bC(q EtCFfiXOE KOC KCITtXCIPE TAY 6Kp6noXLV. 
With the saving of Phoibidas, Plutarch returns to the beginning of 
the argument, when Agesilaos helped him by defending him. There is a 
continuity in the argument$ in that the active virtues activate the 
principle of the interest of Spartal overpowering the quiet virtues, and 
this leads to the injustice of the acquittal of Phoibidas. Plutarch now 
52 
shows that there are consequences on a higher level, for Sparta is 
persuaded, first, to involve itself in the action by taking on the 
responsibility for the seizure, and, then, to authorize the continued 
occupation of the Kadmeia. The city is thus also guilty of the 
injustice, explicitly so called to give definition to the original rPyov 
5ELv6v above. The city may now be expected also to share in the 
eventual decline, having compounded the crime by putting Thebes in 
the hands of the traitors, Archias and Leontiades. Xenophon names 
only Leontiades as the conspirator and as leader of the government set 
up by the Spartans, but at V. iv. 2 Archias is polemarch, and both are 
killed by the liberators. It is only here that Plutarch mentions Theban 
collaborators, having allowed attention to focus on the moral argument, 
and the parts played by Phoibidas, Agesilaos and Sparta. 
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CHAPTER 24 
S-Dartan interventions in Thebes and Attilca 
'Hv p9v OOV ECJOt)(; tK TOIjT(A)V On&OLCi 4)OLD(50U PtV CPYOV E? VOL, 
P06XCUPa 61 'AYTIOL, \60U T6 ncnpaypevov- at 51 GOTEpov np6Ectc, 
6poXoyouptvqv tno(nGoV TýV GETCOV. 
The opponents of Agesilaos were suspicious when the seizure of 
the Kadmeia was first known, in c. 23, and since then, two new factors 
have more publicly directed attention towards Agesilaos: the rescue of 
Phoibidas and the retention of the Kadmeia, and these have suggested 
that planning for the long-term had determined the action. The 
accumulation of grounds for the growing public suspicion, culminating 
in general agreement, seems to indicate Plutarch's own acceptance of 
Agesilaos' involvement. Plutarch has omitted much of Xenophon's 
narrative for the next three years, but he seems to have noted his 
admission that it was under Lakedaimonian control that Thebes had 
been subjected to the rule of tyrants: POUX1JE)eVTOq AOKE6aLPOV(OW; 
6OUXEOCLV Týv n6XLV (SaTE CIOTOI TUPaVVCCV (HeIL V. iv-1), and the 
correspondence between this statement and Agesilaos' reluctance to 
risk being accused of helping tyrants: 6nor, POT104GELE TOt4; TUPdVVOL4; 
(V. iv. 13). He evidently takes this as indicating that Agesilaos had had 
a hand in installing the tyrants at Thebes. 
2k Y(3P WPaXov ot OnRCICOL TAV QPOUP(5V KCIC TAv ndXtv AXEuoepwaav, 
IYKOXOV (XOTOtq 6TL T6V *APYCCIV Kat T6v AeOVTLdbov 6nEKT6vEaav, L,, pyQ ptv 
TUPdVVOUqq X6yQ 61 noXEp6pyouq 6VTC[q, IE4VEYKe n6XEpov nP6q QOTOOq. 
Plutarch gives fuller accounts of the liberation of Thebes at De 
Genio Socr. 594Bff. and Pelopidas 7-13. ' He avoids duplication where 
Agesilaos is not concerned directly, and here makes only this brief 
reference, but he supplies later, when they are needed, the relevant 
details of the events at Olynthos and Phleious which occupied the 
intervening three years in Xenophon's account. 
Neither Xenophon nor Diodoros mentions Agesilaos' accusation 
against the Thebans, but. both record the punishment of the Spartan 
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commander or commanders of the garrison. Xenophon makes the 
Lakedaimonians call out the ban, as if to recover Thebes, but not to 
punish anyone else. The ephors then send Kleombrotos in command 
"on receiving information about those banished after the slaughter in 
Thebes", evidently to restore them to power there, for it was "tyrants" 
that Agesilaos really wished to avoid being seen to be helping, when 
he declined the command, though he made out that it was because of 
his age (Hell. V. iv. 13). No doubt, Plutarch assigns the accusation to 
Agesilaos as the motive for the declaration of war, in order to 
advertise more emphatically the fact that they were tyrants. 
3 KCI t KXEdPPPOTOC, 45n RaGLXEOG)V 'AynaLn6XL50q TEBVnK6TOq CIq 
BOLG)TCOV Intpq)Oq PET6 5uv6pEcjq* 
Agesipolis died of fever on the campaign against Olynthos, of 
which he eventually became the commander, after first Phoibidas and 
his brother, Eudamidas, and then Teleutias, too, had been sent. Since 
Agesilaos was not involved, Plutarch has not included the episode. Ile 
has mentioned the relevant part of it now to fill the gap in the 
information available to the reader. 
6 Y(3p 'AyilaC. \aoq, 6q ETq TEGGOPdKOVTQ YCYOV6q 6ý01 Aonq KC(C 
OTPCITECCI(; E)((JV 6(PECFLV 6n6 TOV V6PG)V, ECPUVE TAV (YTPOTTIYCCKV tKE(Vr)V, 
atayuv6pEvo(; r:, t 4)xLaaCoLr. 6, \(Vov Epnpoo0ey Cintp (puV65G)v nEnoXEprlKG)(; 
ODOLq 6(pOAGETOL OfloCICOUq KOKi5q nOLOV 6Lel TOOq Tup6vvouq. 
Plutarch fills another gap that he has left in the narrative, by 
referring to the campaign against Phleious for the restoration of exiled 
aristocrats. Xenophon had already recorded this at Hell. V. iii. 10-25, 
mentioning the comment of some of the Lakedaimonians there, that they 
were making themselves unpopular 6, \CYG)V CVEKEV dv0p(5n(jv. Plutarch 
seems to have associated this with Xenophon's mention here of the 
tyrants at Thebes. Xenophon's account indicates that there would have 
been opposition to Agesilaos at Thebes, as at Phleious. Plutarch's 
comparison implies that the oligarchic exiles at Phleious were in the 
same category as tyrants, in Agesilaos' view, if the interpretation is 
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correct, and perhaps this was Plutarch's viewv too. Xenophon's view is 
expressed clearly: T(5 nEpC 'ApyCOV TE T6v noXePOP)(OCJVTa KOC TAv nEpI 
OCXLnnOV TUPOVVC50 (Hell. V. iv. 2). The government of Archias had been 
a tyranny, and the exiles to be restored would no doubt have been 
similar. Agesilaos is imagined as quoting the adverse criticism he 
feared in the phrase OnRa(Wq KOK6q noLOv. The residual moral element 
in the adverb clearly indicates the attitude of Plutarch. 
4 ýV U TLq A6KWV E(pO5p(Oq tK TAq OneVOVT((Xq GT60EWq T(Z 'AynGLXdQ 
TETaYPtVOq & GEanLarr, 6ppocrT4q, OOK LITOXIIO(; PIV 065P 6(PL, \6TtPO(; &ýP, 
Ut 51 UnCbov p6X, \ov fi ýOPEVCW 6YCIE)3V pr:, GT6(;. 
Plutarch's narrative and technique are treated here and the other 
evidence for this episode is discussed separately at Endnote 7. This 
type of opening, like "Once upon a time", gives Plutarch the 
opportunity to present relevant pieces of background information, and 
also key words denoting the characteristics which will determine the 
progress of the episode, Sphodrias' daring, enterprise, optimism and 
intellectual weakness. Xenophon gives no character study of 
Sphodrias, and Diodoros (XV. 29.5) has only (POGEL 69 6VTOC, PETE(SPOu KOC 
nponET00,;. Although Xenophon records both the raid into Attika and 
the subsequent reactions to it in Hellenika, in Agesilaos the episode 
receives no mention at all. It would be inappropriate in the encomium 
to suggest Agesilaos' personal involvement in what, as Xenophon 
himself says, many judged to have been the most unjust decision ever 
made in Lakedaimon (Hefl. V. iv. 24), and what is reported in Hellenika 
fails to penetrate to the central issues. 
5 ObTOq tnLOUP3V 6v6pQTOq PEYdXOU$ K01 T6V (POLOC60V VOPCC(JV tv6oEov 
YCYOVeVOL KOC nEptP69TOV 6n6 TOO nepC E)4ROq TOXP4PCITOq, tne(cOn noXO 
K6XXLOV ENCIL KOC Xapnp6TEPOV Et T6v neLPOL15 KaTOX600L 6L9 tOUTOO KO! 
TOY 'AOnvoCov 6(PtXOLTO TAY O(SXOOGaV, 1K yýq 6nPOO6OK4T(a(, ' InEX06v. 
Plutarch continues the idea of Sphodrias' enterprising character 
and daring, attributing to him the wish, which Xenophon does not 
mention, to rival the achievement of Phoibidas. The surprise 
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occupation of the Peiraieus from well to the west across the Thriasian 
Plain, out of sight of Athens, was itself not an impossibility as regards 
topography. The significance of the port is Athens' vital need of 
imported corn, and consequently any threat to the supply was of great 
advantage to an enemy. Teleutias had made a successful and daring 
attack on Peiraieus from the sea at Xen. Hell. U. 19, finding the 
Athenians totally unprepared, and Konon's repaired walls may have 
been breached again after the Peace (6TL 6A dnd. \(JTO(; 4V Hell. V. i. 20). 
The port will certainly have seemed vulnerable. 
6 XtYOUGL U TOOTO P9YCiVnPCI YEVICYOCIL T(3v nEpt neXonC5ay Kat Ml, \(jva 
ROLG)TOPYG)V. OnInEp4joy y6p div0p(Snouq XOKCJV(CELv npocrnOLOUPeYOUq, OV T6V 
E(pobp(av enaLVODVTEq KaC PEYC(XOVOVTEq 6q CPYOU TnXLKOOTOU p6vov 6Etov, 
tnýPOV KCIC nop6ppncyav 6VEXtGOaL np(5Etv 66LKOV PtV 43POCOC, tKE(VU KOt 
nop6vopov, T6Xpnq 51 KCIt TOYqq MEO YEVOPeVnV. 
Plutarch shows Sphodrias' weakness in being persuaded to 
undertake the mission. He has retained the Theban connection, from 
Xenophon's account (Hell. V. iv. 20), but only to reinforce by flattery the 
existing temptation to undertake the enterprise, and he has discarded 
Xenophon's suggestion that bribery was suspected (Yp4paTO 156VTEq, 6q 
6nonTCOETO), as he almost does explicitly, after mentioning it, at 
Pelopidas 14. Plutarch has named the Thebans as Pelopidas and 
Gorgias at Pelopidas 14, where, too, they use a single merchant as 
intermediary. At the start of the action he gives a clear indication of 
its unjust nature, repeats the key idea of the daring involved, and 
adds that the essential requirement of good luck was missing. 
7 APIPQ Y(5p 06TOV tV TO E)PLoicFCQ nc6CQ KOTt, \QRE KOC KaTtXOPkPEV 
1, \n(CYOVTCI VUKT6c; npoop(ECLV T(ý nELPaLEto KOIC (p(5c, 6(p9 (EP(ZV TLVG)V 'EXEUGLv6GEv t66VTOq XeYOUCFL (PPEEOL KOIC nEPL(p6Pouq YEVeGOOL TOOq 
CrTpaTL6TOq. 8 OOT6q U TOO Gpdcrouq tEtnEaEv, 6q OOKtTL XOGCCV ýVP KOC 
TLYO Ppayetav 6pnayi)v E)IPEVO(;, CI(CrYPC)q 6VE)((SPTIOF- KCII 656EGN; EIr, T(3(; 
OEonL6r,. 
That Sphodrias was unlucky to be overtaken by daylight is 
suggested by Plutarch's choice of verb, and it is the consequence of 
this, that the hope of reaching Peiraieus in darkness was unfulfilled, 
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which immediately warns of the ultimate failure of the mission, forming 
a turning point in the story. It seems that Plutarch, or at any rate 
the soldiers, believed that the light that appeared was an indication of 
a divine warning. Sphodrias' failure of nerve, however, is more 
rational, but that Plutarch wished to emphasize the moral aspect of the 
failure may be indicated by the elaborate chiastic pattern of the 
composition at this point. In describing the nervousness of the 
soldiers, he has placed one of the verbs first and the accusative 
subject last: (PPEEM MIC nEPL(P60OUr, YEVe(YOCIL TOOr, CrTP0Tt6TQr,. In 
describing Sphodrias' failure of nerve, however, he has placed the 
verb last and the subject nominative first: GOT6C, U TOO 0P6GOUr, 
tUnEacv, reversing the order. The commander is thus contrasted with 
the men by juxtaposition, and the reasons for their nervousness are 
given in prominent positions, that of the commander explaining his next 
course- of action. This is presented by Plutarch with condemnatory 
adverbs, thus closing the action with a return to his initial 
description. 
9 IK U TOOTOU KCIT4YOPOL ptv tntp(pBijaov ctq EndpTIIV tE Wriv6v, 
EbPOV U KCXTny6p(OV Pn5lV tni TdV ECP06PCCIV bEOPeVOUq TOOq 6pyOVTOql 6XX6 
BaVdTOU Kp(OLV OOTO npOELpnK6TC(q) qv tKCtVOq Onopevctv dntyv(j, 
(POPOOPCVO(; TAV 6pyýV T(3v no, \LTC)V, CXECFYUVOPeVCaV TOO(; 'AOnvacOU(; KOC 
POUXOPeVG)V GUVa5LKCtCF00L 50KEtY, rVCI Ph GUVQ5tKEtV 50KOOLV. 
Plutarch omits entirely Xenophon's report of the three 
Lakedaimonian envoys who happened to be in Athens at this time. It 
is, perhaps, not unlikely that Athenian accusers went in person to 
Sparta to reinforce the envoys' complaint, and the two versions could 
be complementary rather than contradictory. The capital charge 
brought by the magistrates in the end is the same. Plutarch ends 
with Sphodrias' assessment of the expected reaction of the Spartan 
citizens, which corresponds in function) though not in content, to the 
assertions of the envoys in Athens, suggesting that the enterprise was 
not authorized by the city. The episode is closed with the two 
58 
compound infinitives whose stems return to the first description of the 
action as np6iELv 65LKOV. 
A major problem in attempting to penetrate this secret operation 
is the Theban involvement. Xenophon records it explicitly, and adds 
that bribery was suspected: 
Ot 011ýatOL ... nE(0OUGL T6V 
IV TC[tq 0canLQtqq 6ppOGTýV 
E(PO5PCOVp )(P4POTa E)6VTECg 6C, t5nonTEOETO, 1PRCACtV CCq TýV 'ATTLK4V, 
rV9 tKnOXEP60CLe TOO(; 'AOTlvaCouq npdq TOOq AOKE6aLPOVCOUq. 
K6KEtVOq nct06pcvoq 00TOtr,, npoonOLnGdPCVOq T6V nELPOLd 
KOTOXftEGE)aL (Hell. V. iv. 20). 
Plutarch, indicating some uncertainty with XeVOUGL, ignores the bribe 
here, although he admits its slight influence at Pelopidas 14. 
Thereafter he and Xenophon make no further reference to Theban 
responsibility. The Athenians were apparently in no doubt$ for they at 
once denounced Sphodrias to the Spartans, and it is difficult to see 
that the Athenians could so readily have joined the Thebans at V. iv. 34, 
if they had suspected them of complicity. Theban involvement may 
therefore be discounted, and it would be a difficult task to explain how 
the Thebans might expect to bring Athens into war with Sparta in this 
way, since they could not be at all sure that Sparta would not disown 
Sphodrias' action. Plutarch's other suggestion is that Sphodrias acted 
on his own initiative, but there is no mention of the use of this in his 
defence here, although Agesilaos had approved of Phoibidas' use of his 
initiative, and it was employed successfully in his defence (Xen. HeD. 
V. ii. 32). 
Plutarch has not distinguished between an invasion of Attika and 
the capture of Peiraieus, which Xenophon attributes only to the mind 
of Sphodrias. The distance involved makes Peiraieus an-, impossible 
destination for an overnight march, one which an experienced Spartan 
harmost is unlikely to have attempted, and since it was not attained, 
the expedition may be considered as what it turned out to be. 
Plutarch follows Xenophon in recording the final plundering of the 
land, but while Plutarch says it was no longer possible to escape 
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observation, Xenophon says that Sphodrias was doing nothing to avoid 
it even at Thria. This suggests that Sphodrias' task was perhaps to 
demonstrate the vulnerability of the unguarded frontier of Attika, and 
the night march would then have been timed accurately to ensure 
penetration into Athenian territory in darkness. The purpose may 
even have been to establish Spartan control of the pass by the 
garrison of Thespiai, which Agesilaos certainly made use of at Ifell. 
V. iv. 37, without further dispute. Once in Athenian territory, according 
to Xenophon, Sphodrias made no effort to avoid detection, and, indeed 
his presence was noticed and reported to the Athenians, who arranged 
to intercept him. There is no justification at this stage in Xenophon's 
account for criticism of Sphodrias, and he has made no comment in 
breaking off his accou nt at the start of the return to Thespiai. 
Plutarch ends the action with the Spartans' loss of nerve, absent from 
Xenophon's account. He is explaining what he sees as the failure of 
the expedition, and, having already described Sphodrias as Un(50v 
PdXXOV A (PPEVC)V 6YO03V PEOT6q, and his objective as something 
Xopnp6TEPOV, he has imputed weakness of character. Xenophon gives no 
characterization of Sphodrias, but he had described Phoibidas at Hell. 
ULM o6ft ndvu (pp6vtijo(;, and his objective as something \oIJnp6v. 
Plutarch may have adapted these phrases in describing Sphodrias and 
analysing his performance. 
The King's Peace was still being observed at this time, yet the 
situation was becoming highly charged, for, as Plutarch records at c. 26 
and Xenophon at Hell. V. iv. 34, the Athenians prepared for war as the 
eventual consequence of the whole episode, and the outrage was the 
occasion for the breaking of the Peace, and the cause of the 
resumption of hostilities. It was believed also to have led Athens to 
found the Second Confederacy, until the reliability of Diodoros' account 
(XV. 25-35) was largely reinstated, and the Confederacy was shown to 
have been founded early in 378, before Sphodrias' raid, for which it 
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was therefore responsible (G. L. Cawkwell (1973) pp. 46-60, followed by 
R. M. Kallett-Marx (1985) pp. 127-51, with the further modification in the 
chronology, that the events of Diodoros XV. 28.2 precede even those of 
XV. 27.3). 
The affairs of Athens and Thebes$ from the seizure of the Kadmeia 
down to 379/8, even omitting the foundation of the Confederacy, reveal 
clearly enough that Athenian relations with Sparta had been tense, and 
further embroilment in Theban politics in 379/8f at the liberation, meant 
that Athens was in a far from secure position regarding possible 
reprisals. There had been a strong Spartan garrison in Thebes and 
another at Thespiai, and Plataia still supplied help to the Spartans in 
response to the harmost's appeal (Xen. Hell V. iv. 10). The Athenians 
were already alert to some danger at the frontier when they sent 
Chabrias out to guard the pass at Eleutherai (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 14-16), 
and the guard was retained, conceivably in case Kleombrotos returned 
that way from Thespiai. It may also have been keeping the Athenians' 
line of retreat open, for according to Diodoros' account, Athenian help 
in the liberation of Thebes included the dispatch of an expedition by 
formal decree (XV. 25.4-26.1). Some Athenians were at Thebes attacking 
the Akropolis soon after the city was recovered: 
fneptpav 51 tnnlaq 0C KaTEXTjXUE)6TEC, Kat tnt TOO(; nP6r. TOCC, 
6P(OL(, ' Wr)vat(av 560 T6V OTPaTTIYOV ... K01 Ot WnvaroL 6n6 T6V 6p(G)v 46TI nopýaav (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 9,10), 
and Athenians were still there to save some endangered citizens, after 
the garrison's withdrawal from the Akropolis (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 12). If the 
decree mentioned by the orator Dinarchos at 1.39 about help to be sent 
for the Theban exiles refers to the recovery of the Kadmeia 
(G. L. Cawkwell (1973) p. 57), it is evidence that the Athenians' presence 
was officially sanctioned. Whether they were officially sent or not, 
however, Kleombrotos, who was sent to Boiotia, may, perhaps, not have 
wished to break the Peace by engaging them. It was after his return 
that the two generals were brought to trial: again, perhaps, to 
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preserve the Peace. Xenophon gives no evidence to show whether the 
Athenian assistance was official or unofficial, but he indicates that the 
condemnation of the generals was not because of their guiltp but for 
fear of war with Sparta, making them the scapegoats (Hell. V. iv. 19: 
OCJTG)(; &POPOOVTO). He had already claimed that Sparta had secured 
Athenian isolation: 'ABilvaCouq 6' AP111JOCOaL (Hell. V. iii. 27), and the 
troops that Kleombrotos had left at Thespiai would not have diminished 
anxiety at Athens (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 15). 
This isolation, however, refers only to Sparta's hold on Olynthos 
and Central Greece, and Sparta also had reason to be anxious, for 
Athens had begun to make treaties with states soon after the King's 
Peace, and an inscription (Tod 118) shows Chios in alliance by 384/3. 
This Athenian diplomatic activity, the shelter provided for the exiles, 
always a threat to the puppet government in Thebes, and the support 
given to the liberators, could appear to the Spartans as indications of 
an approaching crisis, and if the new Theban regime continued to 
enjoy this supportl it would be indebted to the Athenians and friendly 
to them, an intolerable prospect requiring prompt action from Sparta. 
The raid and the embassyl which Xenophon records at Athens without 
specifying its purpose, have been perceived as a Spartan reaction to 
the same event, viz. the foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy 
(G. L. Cawkwell (1973) p. 55), and even if this Confederacy was not yet 
fully in existence, it still presented a potential threat to Sparta while 
it was evolving in its early stages, long before Sphodrias' raid. The 
embassy was intended, it may be conjectured, to Put pressure on 
Athens to remain neutral, and also to discourage the new League, if it 
was one of those mentioned by Diodoros (XV. 28.4), as is probable 
(G. L. Cawkwell (1973) p. 55). Sphodrias' expedition may have been 
intended to exert more pressure, perhaps, and to make a demonstration 
of force, in impatience with a stubborn resistance, on the part of the 
Athenians, to Sparta's diplomatic reaction to the Athenian alliances. If 
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this was so, the plan failed, for according to Xenophon the Athenians 
were alerted and defended themselves: of PIV 
5ý TCI)(I) 6n, \LCF6PE; VOL KOi 
tnnErC, KOt 6nXtTaL tV QUXOKb Tfiq n6XEwc, ýGav (Hell. V. iv. 21). 
I- 
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CHAPTER 25 
Negotiating the acquittal of Sphodrias 
ElyEv o0v uC6v 6 E(pobpCoq KXe(Svupov, ob nOL56q 6VTOq ETL KOC KOXOO 
TýV 6tPLV 'Apy(5opoq 6 'AVflGLX60U TOO ROaLXeG)q U[6q ýPa. 
Xenophon introduces Kleonym6s in the same narrative style that 
Plutarch used to introduce Sphodrias at c. 24. Plutarch has varied the 
form, but retains the story-teller's stance. Although both authors use 
the terminology of a legal trial, they record only the development of 
attitudes which determined in advance the decision of any formal court 
that may have heard the case. Of such a trial only the verdict is 
known. The context for the resolution here of the different political 
and social alignments is provided by the sort of relationship which was 
clearly important for both Xenophon and Plutarch. It has occurred 
already at cc. 2,11,13, and now involves Agesilaos' son, Archidamos. 
Xenophon describes Kleonymos as KdXAt0T6q TE KOý E050KLP(5TC1T0q TOV 
ýXCKGW (Hell. V. iv. 25), while Plutarch is more restrained: KOX00 TýV 6tPLV. 
2 K(It T6TE CyUvnVG)VCCX pIV 6q EtK6q C16TO KLVbUVEOOVTt nepC TOO nCITp6q, 
oupnP6TTELV U q)UVEP@q KCIC POqOECV OOK CZYEVI ýV Y13P 6 ZCP06PCOq 9K T15V 
5La(p6PG)V TOO 'AynOLA60U. 
Archidamos' involvement is recorded by Xenophon only in 
response to Kleonymos' request for help, but Plutarch has portrayed as 
spontaneous his desire to help, and records its frustration by the 
opposing political alignments of their fathers. Xenophon does not 
speak of this opposition directly, though it is implied later in the 
reference to the views of Agesilaos' friends (Hell. V. iv. 32). He refers 
initially only to the friendship of Sphodrias with the other king, 
Kleombrotos. That the friendship of the king's son involves the son of 
a friend of the other king indicates a degree of social mobility, which 
may, perhaps, have been reflected in their attendance earlier at the 
same (PLUTLOV or (PLACTLOV (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 28; cf. Agesilaos V. 1, Lak. Pol. 
111.5; S. Hodkinson (1983) p. 252). It may be that Agesilaos exploited his 
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son)s relationships, either by planning this connection from its 
inception or manipulating it now, in order to infiltrate his colleague's 
circle, as has been suggested (P. A. Cartledge (1987) p. 147). 
3 TOO 52 K, \E(, )vOpou npo(3EX06VTOq OOTC) KCIC PET(5 5&40EG)q KOC 6C(KPO(JV 
IVTu)(6VTOq, dnG)q T6v 'AyTiaCXoov E: Gvouv napdayla, p6*\LGTCI Y(5p ? KEUVOV 
OtOTOrq (POOEP6V EZVOL, TPEEr, PtV I TiGaOPOq I)PepOq C[1506PEVOq T6v nOT9PCI 
KOI 5E5L(, )q GLG)ný nopijKoXod0Et- 4 TIXOr, U TfiC, KPCCEG)r, tVyOr. O&Fljr., 
IT6XpnoEv elnetv np6q T6V 'Ayfla(Xaov 6TL KXE(LVUPOq 06TOO 5EqOeCq nEpt 
TOO naTp6q. 
In recording Kleonymos' approach, Plutarch again presents a 
spontaneous action, whereas Xenophon specifically mentions that it was 
Sphodrias' suggestion that his son should seek Archidamos' help. The 
spontaneity enhances the relationship, and its impact in the context. 
The son's fear of Agesilaos, implying that he and his friends would be 
hostile to Sphodrias, here replaces the anxiety, in Xenophon, of 
Kleombrotos and his friends, whose inclination was to acquit Sphodrias. 
In neither version does Agesilaos declare himself at this point. 
Where Xenophon says KCXý Tt OGTEPOCQ1 52 TOOT(I TOOTa tnoCrjaEv, 
Plutarch seems to exaggerate the interval, but there is also a time 
during which the friends did not meet (Hell. V. iv. 29), which Plutarch 
puts after Agesilaos' disappointing response below. In both versions, 
Agesilaos is shown as untypically unapproachable. Plutarch suggests, 
using the participial phrases, OL'606PCVO(; T6v nUTtPQ KC11 5E: bL(54;, that 
Archidamos felt that he should not convey his friend's request, but 
Xenophon makes him actually acknowledge Sphodrias' guilt, first in 
telling Kleonymos that he could not look his father in the face, and 
then in agreeing with Agesilaos' condemnation (Hell. V. iv. 27,31). 
Plutarch reverses this impression of general unapproachability when he 
ends the chapter with Agesilaos' strong love of children, but Xenophon 
makes much more of it, repeating Archidamos' own hesitations because 
of the difficulty (Hell. V. iv. 27-31). 
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56 E)t 'Ayll(3C, \CX()r, Etö(ýý 9PiaVTG TÖV 'ApyCbcxpov OÜK gnouacv- 
fiv YÖP 6 
KXEc5vupor, EÜOÜr, eK naCÖ(, )V gn(ÖOZC)r Er Ttr, KCXt (5, \*\0(;, 
ÖVI)P 1r0E000t 
anoubaior,. 6 OÜ PAV gVgbWK9 TL T6TE YPTIGTÖV 
fi tpLÄciv0ponov 9, \nCooL 
bE0P9V4) Tý) nCILU, CYK9tPEaÜCXL E)g (PACYCKr, 6 TL KOMI; 
ZY0t KOL' npF-n(5VTG)r 
änýAev. 
That the friendship had been noticed, and not stopped, may have 
been suggested to Plutarch by Xenophon's reference to Agesilaos' 
suspicion of Archidamos' movements: 0661V PIVTOL 
ýP&a, dM\9 ErO OOT6V 
(Hell. V. iv. 29). Agesilaos' approval of his son's friendship here may 
also have been transferred from the commendation of Sphodrias' 
behaviour as a youth, when he was giving his final judgement: ncltq; TE 
OV KCIt naLUGKOr, Kal ýD& n6VTa T6 KOX6 nOL6V 5LETýJ\EOE (Xen. Ilell. 
V. iv. 32). Plutarch curtails Xenophon's narrative by allowing the 
request to be made on only one occasion, instead of Xenophon's two. 
He had, of course, already used Archidamos' second suggestion at c. 13 
in illustrating Agesilaos' attitude to friendship with the letter about 
Nikias. While in Xenophon Agesilaos clearly asserts Sphodrias' guilt on 
both occasions, Plutarch only makes him resolve to consider what is 
right and proper. 
8 TrJV 'AYTI(YL, \60U CPC, \G)V 'ETUPOK, \fi(; tV TLVL KOLVO, \OVCQi npd(; OOTOO(; 
6nEV6PVG)GE TýV YV6pnV TOO 'AynGLXdOU- 9 T6 PtV Y6P tPYOV (Sq tVL PdALCFTQ 
tPýVELV C(6T6Yq 6XXG)q ye pýV 6V5Pa T6V ECP05PCOIV 6YO06V ýYCtOGCIL KCII TfiV 
n6XLv 6P13V TOLOOTWV CITP0TLG)T6V 6EOPtVqV. 
Plutarch does not reveal any reason why Etymokles was chosen to 
carry the news. Xenophon names him as one of the three envoys at 
Athens at the time of the raid, suspected there of involvement in the 
plot (Hell. V. iv. 22). Their expressed sense of outrage is consistent with 
that of the ephors in recalling Sphodrias to face the death penalty, 
and with Agesilaos' apparent reluctance to respond positively to his 
son's pleas for help. The friend of Sphodrias, in Xenophon's account, 
questioned Etymokles as one of the friends of Agesilaos who were 
going to execute Sphodrias, and so his change of attitude indicates the 
end of the danger. In Plutarch, Etymokles conveys this news unasked, 
suggesting, perhaps, that he had been sent to do so by Agesilaos, and 
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again curtailing Xenophon's account. It is only at this point that 
Agesilaos' criticism of Sphodrias is revealed by Plutarch, and it is 
followed immediately by the mitigating factor. The new prospect of 
war, with declining numbers of men eligible to be citizens and soldiersf 
will explain Agesilaos' reluctance to lose Sphodrias, bearing in mind 
particularly the effect of casualties on the small Spartiate community 
(cf. c. 21 n. ), but the emphasisf here and in Xenophon, is on quality. 
10 TOtjTOUq y6p 6 'AyncFCXaoq ýK6GTOTE TOOq X6YOUq tnOLEtTo nepC Tfiq 
E)(Klnr., To nOLU )(OP(CEGE)CIL DOU, \(5pEVO(;, 6GTE KaC Tdv K, \E(Svupov E606,; 
OtGO6VECOCIL TýV cFnOU5AV TOO 'APYL56POU, KCIC TOU'(; CPCP\OU(Z TOOr, TOO 
Eq)05PCOU OOPPOOVTaq ý5q OonftEv. 
This is Plutarch's interpretation of Agesilaos' thoughts, not 
Xenophon's, though he has suggested it by making Agesilaos respond 
directly to Archidamos' plea for pardon AP3V EVEKOV (Hell. V. iv. 31). 
Xenophon offers no other considerations which might have led Agesilaos 
to seek a reason to acquit Sphodrias despite his persistent 
condemnation of the raid. Plutarch has avoided this violent reversal, 
since he has not committed Agesilaos to such clear statements of guilt. 
He ends the account of the working of the friendship with only the 
immediate effect of Agesilaos' pronouncements on the friends of 
Sphodrias, and so he does not report Kleonymos' grateful promise to 
repay Archidamos by loyal service, and the fulfilment of the promise 
with his death at Leuktra, which conclude Xenophon's account. 
Xenophon's opinion of the affair is expressed at Hell. V. iv. 24: KOL 
noXXorq 150EEV OGTq 5A 65LK(STOTa tV AOKE50CPOVL A 5(Kn KPLOfiVOL. The 
unsatisfactory elements in his account are the result, perhaps, of his 
own personal embarrassment in recording the means by which the 
charges of bribery, and of acting against the interests of Sparta, were 
handled, and his final reference to loyalty seems to divert the reader's 
attention from Agesilaos to more pleasing aspects of traditional Spartan 
friendships. 
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11 ýV U KOIt (ptX6TEKVOq 6 'Ayqa(Xc(oq 6Lo(pep6VT(O(Z* 
At the end of the chapter Plutarch returns the focus to Agesilaos 
with the anecdote about his playfulness when his children were young. 
He thus reverts to the personal ties on which the narrative has 
concentrated, suggesting that they were so strong in Agesilaos' nature 
as to justify the part they have been said earlier to have played. 
Plutarch reveals his interest in domestic life, here and in his several 
references in this Life to the female members of the family. The result 
of the trial is not given until the next chapter. 
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PART NINE 
THEBES 
(Chapters 
- 
26-28) 
CHAPTER 26 
Growing unpopularity of Agesilaos 
1 'AnoXuOeVTOq U TOO ECP05PCOU, KOI T6V 'A6qva(G)v, c5q ZnMOVTO, np6c, 
n6XEPOV Tponoplvwv, acp65PCI KOK64; 6 'AVtl(Y(Xao(; AKOUGE 5L' entOup(av 
6ITonOV KQt nOL6OPL(55IJ 60K0V epnoWv YEYOVeVOL KP(GEL 6LKOCQI KOt TýV 
n6XLY nopa(TLOV 6nELpy6(Y0OL nopovopqP6TG)V TnXLK06TG)V Etq TOOq 'EXXnvoq. 
To motivate the start of the next topic in the new chapter, 
Plutarch has used the delayed announcement of the verdict in the 
trial, and the Athenians' subsequent turning to war. The two 
participial phrases, arranged in a chiastic pattern, give an ominous 
start, and may be compared with the similarly patterned phrases at the 
beginning of c. 15, just before the arrival of the order for Agesilaos, 
recall from the east: KLvoupevrIq U Tfiq 'ACCOC, KUt noxXoyoO np6r, 
6n6(YTOGLV 6nELKO6a1JC,. At Agesilaos 11.22 Xenophon defines Agesilaos' 
purpose in campaigning against Thebes as to help friends, but in 
Hellenika, having himself admitted the injustice of Sphodrias' aquittal, 
he links it with the Athenian preparations for war, and disingenuously 
gives the impression of political manipulation at Athens: 
T0V PeVTOL 'AGTIva(cav of OOLG)TLdCOVTE4; 15(50GKOV T6V 5fiPOV 
6q Of AQKE5atpdVLOL oby 6n(A)(; TLP(4)p4GClLVTO, KOC tnaLvlactov 
T6V E(PObPCQVt 6TL InePO6XEUGC TOtC, 'AB4VQLr, (V. iv. 34). 
Plutarch disregards this further reference to Sphodrias' guilt, arid 
even suggests that there were some Spartans, presumably Agesilaos' 
opponents, who complained of the shame incurred outside Sparta, for 
the unjust verdict and the injustice of inflicting a war on Greece. He 
continues to concentrate on Agesilaos' involvement rather than on 
Sphodrias', and seems to be rejecting the Athenians' interpretion, 
found in Xenophon, that the Spartans as a whole were responsible, 
though he may also have had local Boiotian sources, too. The attitude 
of Agesilaos' fellow citizens is used here to show the continued decline 
in his reputation, indirectly, in Homeric fashion, 'OPTIPLKOq, and 
Plutarch says nothing to make the reader dissent from their 
judgement. The frequent P sounds in this passage may suggest 
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emphasis, contempt, and indignation. 
2 tnet 5e. T6v K, \E; 61JOPOTOV OOY e6pa np60upov 6VTa no, \EpE[V TOtr, 
OTIRC(COLr,, OGT(J 5ý YOCPELV T6V v6pov t6oac, ý) np6oOev typý-ro nEpt TfiC, 
(YTPCITE(Or,, OOT6C, etq BOLWT(OV tV9OOXXEV ý511 KOý KOK04; Ino(Et TOOr, 
OT)PaCOU(; KOIC ndXtv &VTenocycv, 3 6GTE KOIC -rpG)E)E! VTOq OOTOG T6TC T6V 
'AVTOXKC5CXV etnEtv- 
Plutarch records other cases of action running counter to 
professed principle. At c. 13 Agesilaos disregarded strict justicel which 
he approved in other cases, in order to win friends. Here his purpose 
was the more effectively to harm enemies. Plutarch has given 
Agesilaos the intiative for the invasion of Boiotia and has suitably 
adjusted the motive, missing an opportunity to repeat Agesilaos' 
readiness to comply with the city's needs. In contrast, Xenophon has 
made two complimentary points, for it was the ephors who preferred 
him: Kal T6V 'AynaCXaov VOPC(YCIVTEq QPOVLp6TEPOV 45V G(PCGL TOO 
KXcopDp6TOU AVEtUOUL, MeOVTO OOTOO UVELV TýV GTPCITLdv, and Agesilaos 
willingly agreed: Eln6v (3TL 013UY 45V 6 TL Tt n6, \Et E)OKOCTJ dVTctnr:, tv 
(Hell. V. iv. 35). Clearly Xenophon has now moved away from criticism, 
and has not explained Agesilaos' disregard of his former attitude to 
military service, as stated at Hell. V. iv. 13. Plutarch apparently has 
noticed the inconsistency, and has not interrupted his critical account 
with praise for Agesilaos. Plutarch has also overlooked an opportunity, 
taken by Xenophon, to praise Agesilaos for good generalship, in 
arranging that the Kithairon passage was in friendly hands before he 
invaded Boiotia. Instead, he has again continued the critical theme, 
juxtaposing damage inflicted and damage suffered, with the implication 
that an element of retribution was involved in the campaigns (cf. c. 27). 
Although his summary is brief, giving only one campaign, it is 
otherwise accurate, for Xenophon, too, describes reverses, including 
the death of Phoibidas, as well as successes, for Agesilaos (Hell. 
V. iv. 35-55. ). Xenophon records two campaigns in Theban territory, 
which was protected with Athenian help, and alsog to some extent, by 
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innovatory strategy of ditch and stockade (M. H. Munn (1987) 106-38). 
Agesilaos twice ravaged the countryside, but did not attempt to 
blockade the city, and on his departure the Thebans' situation was 
gradually eased, especially at Thespiai as a result of a citizen uprising, 
in respect of the Spartan garrison (Hell. V. iv. 55), though Xenophon 
does not report its loss until later (Ifell. V. iv. 63). Xenophon also does 
not record that Agesilaos was wounded herep and Plutarch's following 
anecdote is not necessarily in context chronologically. 
`H KQXÖ TI3 ÖLÖGGK6, \La nopä OllßaCov änoXopß6vEtr PA ßouX0P9voug 
GÜTOÜ(; p1153 9nLCFTOpdV0Udý P(SygaOCXL ÖLÖ(jE(: lr,. 4 Tý) YOP 6VTL OllßOýOUC, 
OÜTOÜr, tOUTC)V nOÄEPLKWTIJTOUr, T6TE yEvgaoat WOOC, TOUC, noXXoZr, 
CFTPCXTE(COLIZ TCV AOKEÖCRLPOVCG)V gnI OÜTOÜr, (3ancp tyyupvoaapgvour,. ötö 
KOt AuKoOpyor, 6 na, \oLÖ(ý 9V TCXUC, KCIXOUP9VOLr, TPLCC ßTITP(Xtr, önEtnE pA 
noXÄC5Ktg tnt TOÜg GÜTOÜg OTpaTEÜELV, Önü)g pfi noX£pctv pav06vG)aLv. 
Agesilaos' reputation was now, as Plutarch has it, being attacked 
also on other grounds by an opponent, exploiting one of the several 
occasions of his wounding. (See also c. 36.3. ) This passage is a 
powerful indictment of Agesilaos as the aberrant king who departed 
from the principle clearly set out in one of the "rhetras" of 
Lykourgos, the highest authority, in his view, on what was in the best 
interest of Sparta. The anecdote occurs among the Apophth. Lak. Wor. 
213), at Pelopidas 15, and at L. yk-. 13.6, where it is also recorded that 
the rhetra was quoted in criticism of Agesilaos. There is, no doubt, 
some truth in the charge, but the source of the anecdote is clearly in 
the Spartan tradition, since it enhances the Spartans' reputation for 
military prowess. Later, in the literary historians, too, generals tend 
to praise an enemy and disparage previous achievements in order to 
make a coming engagement more glorious. (See Tacitus Agricola 8, 
16-17,29.3-4. ) The improvement in the Theban fighting qualities 
probably came largely from the confidence that grew gradually, 
through having at least survived several conflicts with Spartan armies. 
Tile Thebans also recognised the value of organization and training, as 
Plutarch says (Pelopidas 17-18) and even Xenophon acknowledges Well. 
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VII. 5.19-), and it began, in part, before they met the Spartans as 
enemies. The success of the Theban army stems mainly from Delion, 
where the heavy concentration of the phalanx was introduced (Thuc. 
IV. 93.4). This would not have been developed, if what Plutarch 
suggests were true and the Thebans had been taught only by 
observing Spartan tactics. The Theban practice demanded not only 
training, but also creative observation and imagirlationg which was not 
inculcated at Sparta by the Lykurgan system of education 
(G. L. Cawkwell (1983) pp. 385-400). Plutarchq however, takes the 
opportunity to indict Agesilaos' disregard of the Lykourgan "Rhetra". 
6 ýV U KaC TOrr. (YUPPdYOLq TG)V ACKKEBCILPOVC(JV tnayOAq 6 'AyqoCXooq, 
6; 50 065tV tYKJ\7jPa 511P&FLOVý 13M\61 OUPC) TLVL KCIC (PL, \OVELKCQ TOOr, 
011ýa(OUC, dno. \&FaL CTITC)V. 0651V 01JV 9, \EVOV &6PEVOL CPOeCPe0O0L 5ECiPO 
KdIKEtGE KOO' 9KOCYTOV tVLOUT6V 6XCVOLC TOGOOTOL CUVOK0X0UO00V'TEq. 
Plutarch now traces Agesilaos' declining reputation further afield. 
The criticism progresses to the allies from the natural hostility of 
external enemies, the Athenians, and then from that of his opponents in 
Sparta. It is given again, *0P1jPLK6C,, as the observation of people who 
were there, that Agesilaos had compounded his aberration, not as he 
perhaps thought, in the interest of Sparta, but for a private complaint 
against Thebes. The allies had a valid point, even discounting the 
personal motive, for the alliance was not to be only for the Spartan 
interests in view here. This was made clear at a meeting in the 
Peloponnese, following Kleombrotos' failure to penetrate beyond 
Kithairon, when it was decided that naval warfare against Athens 
should replace the exhausting land campaigns against Thebes (Xen. 
Hell. V. iv. 60). Xenophon has shown that Agesilaos could starve the 
Thebans, but could not take their city (HelL V. iv. 56). 
Plutarch uses Oupdq in a blemished character as an irrational 
factor leading to catastrophe. Pelopidas brought about his own death 
in battle: 
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06 KOT6GYE Tý) \OYLCYPIý) TýV 6PYýV, 6XXdi np6q TAV OXe4AV 
6VOýOXEYOE! q KOt TC) OupC) nopobot)(; T6 O(BPO KOC TAV ýYEPOVCM Tfir. 
np6EE(aq (Pelopidas 32.9). 
Xenophon, too, stresses the point, when Teleutias, 6PYLOOE(r., followed 
the enemy too close to the wall of Olynthos and was killed (Hell. 
V. iii. 6). An excess of (PL, \OVELK(a was attributed to Agesilaos as a 
contributory cause of the quarrel with Lysander (c. 7). 
U 7 tVOCA U 5ý XeVCTaL T6V 'Avna(Xaov eEexevEaL 00UX6PCV0V a'TG)V T6 
nXfiOOq T66E PnYav4Ga00CXL. n(3VTC(q &eXEUGE K(10(001L TOOq OUPPdYOUq PET' 
(5XX4X(aV d1V0PEPLVPtV0Uq, EU9 59 TOOq AOKE5aLPOVCOUq ICP$ taUTC)V. 
There are two aspects of the numerical problem. The proportion 
of Spartans in an army was clearly a small one, because Sparta 
demanded that each of the allies should contribute the same fraction of 
their total manpowerý and the size of the eligible citizen body at 
Sparta was small and diminishing. It is hard to believe that Agesilaos 
devised this performance now, for the insult would not increase morale, 
but would aggravate the present allied mood, and the isolation of the 
Spartan contingent, sitting apart, would reveal to all the other 
contingents their own numerical supremacy. One aspect of the story 
not usually commented upon is that the allied hoplites would, 
presumably, have no more been literally potters, and so on, than the 
Spartan hoplites. Not everyone would be deceived or convinced by the 
trick. 
9 6nE(PlITO y6p 06TOtq TtYVnV 1PY6CCGGaL Kai pav06VELV 06VOUGOV. 
At Lykourgos 9 Plutarch attributes the ban on craft to 
Lykourgos' attack on luxury. It is rather the case that it was 
6XLyavGpwn(a that necessitated the legal prohibition of banausic 
occupations for citizensq and Agesilaos' device may be used as a 
further illustration of the tradition of the Spartans' exclusive need to 
be TEYVrTOL Kai GO(PLOTat TOV nOXEPLKG)V (Pelopidas 23.3). Excavations 
reported in BSA as early as 1905/6 indicated that Sparta was not 
always so austere, and by the time of Epameinondas' invasions there 
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were again houses to be plundered that contained many valuables (Xen. 
Hell. VI. v. 27). The need for military preparedness from the sixth 
century on meant that other activities were progressively curtailed, as 
the citizen population was reduced by concentration of landed property 
ownership (Aristotle Pol. 1270a29-33; Xen. Oik-. IV. 2-3; M. I. Finley (1975) 
Ch. 10; P. A. Cartledge (1976a) p. 119, and (1987) pp. 37-43). In the 
interval between the composition of Xenophon's two works just cite - d, 
there appears to have been in Sparta a change in attitude to the 
austerity of the (Lykourgan) regimen. 
OOT(J 5A YEX60aq 6 'Ayqa(Xaoq, 'OpdTE, cZncv, 6) dvbpcq, 6aQ nXc(ovoq 
OPOV aTPQTL6TOq tKntpnopev ýpctq. 
It is not clear whether by laughing Agesilaos is further mocking 
the allies or making light of their discomfiture. His speech suggests 
that the anecdote originated in the private braggadocio of the Spartan 
sussitia. 
75 
CHAPTER 27 
The weakness of Agesilaos and Sparta: the Theban influence emerges 
1 'Ev U MEYdPOL(;, 6TE TýV CFTPCITL&V 6nrlyEv eK OTJý6V, &0ý0NOVTOr, 
OOTOD npdq Td 6PYEEOV CIC, TýV 6Kp6noXtv, andOPU KCII n6voq tuyup6q EXape 
T6 OVLlr. CFKgXOC, - tK U TOOTOU 5LOYK(, )Oev afpOTOq 950&E PEGTdV YCYOV9VOIL 
KC11 ýpXeypovýv 6nepR6XXouaav napetycv. 
Like Thebes, Megara was the victim of a hostile tradition in the 
surviving literary sources: "the widespread anti-Megarian attitude .. - 
projects the stereotype of an ignorant, brutish and vulgar folk" 
(R. P. Legon (1981) pp. 11,33-4,266-85). Routes through the Megarid 
were vital for Sparta's activities in Central and Northern Greece 
(N. G. L. Hammond (1974) pp. 103-122), and so Megara suffered a long 
history of being alternately courted and threatened for the privilege of 
unhindered military passage through the Isthmus, while proximity to 
Corinth's superior facilities for trade at times denied Megara 
compensatory access to great wealth (J. Tavlos (1978)). Eventually, in 
the fourth century, the Megarians seem to have favoured a policy of 
friendly relations with all, a neutral attitude permitting passage 
without promoting retaliatory hostilities (R. P. Legon (1981) pp. 264-5), 
though a hostile Corintht especially in the Corinthian War, forced 
Sparta to use, instead, the sea crossings of the Corinthian Gulf (to 
Phokis (Krissa), or to Kreusa in Boiotia (Xen. Hell. IV. iii. 15, iv. 1, V. iv. 46, 
60.3, VIA. 1; cf. Thuc. I. 102f. ). Agesilaos' visit to the 6PYElov may have 
had a diplomatic purpose concerning the use of the land route. There 
are two small hills, close together, about 300 metres in height, the 
eastern Karia, according to Pausanias, with a sanctuary (Ccp6v) of 
Aphrodite Epistrophia (I. xl. 6), and the western Citadel of Alkathous 
(I. xlii. 1), with a POUXEUT4PLOV (I. xlii. 4) and the nPUTOVECOV (I. xlii. 7). 
Pausanias also reports a POUXEUT4PLov at I. xliii. 3, perhaps on lower 
ground, tV Tý nUet, and the 'AppoUTTIC; va6r, at I. xliii. 6. Xenophon 
does not use the same terms, but he indicates that an ascent was 
involved: d1VOOCX(VOVTOr, aOTOO tK T017J 'ATPOE)LOCOU Etr, T6 dlp)(EtOV (I-Jell. 
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V. iv. 58). 
Plutarch's attempt to detail Agesilaos' symptoms, to follow the 
development of the crisis, and to account for the cure, is reminiscent 
of observations described in the Hippocratic writings, and illustrates 
the interest of historians in recording and circulating useful medical 
information. There was a twofold affinity in methodology and purpose 
between history and medicine: a concern to discover early signs of 
developing conditions (diagnosis) and a wish to observe and record the 
course of those developments for future reference 
(prognosis) 
(J. Longrigg (1980) p. 212). The nature of Agesilaos' injury cannot now 
be diagnosed on the basis of the insufficient evidence available. 
Muscular strain may have caused swelling and internal bleeding. The 
fainting would be caused by the Syracusan doctor's blood-letting. The 
flow of blood would cease only when the clot formed, rather than, as 
TOOTO (Matritensis N 55) suggests, because of the fainting. The ancient 
world's lack of knowledge of the circulation of the blood, and of other 
modern discoveries, means that their descriptions cannot be related to 
modern practice, and the attempt to do so is not very helpful. Instead 
the texts themselves may may be used to indicate some of the theory 
on which the treatment was based, though only very superficially. 
For Homer, blood distinguished mortals from the gods: 
00 Y&P (YETOV Uoual, oO nCvoual or0ona oZvov 
Iliad V. 341. 
It came from food and drink in the diet, and was atPCITLKý TPO(PA, the 
nourishment (Aristotle (De generatione animalium 726blO, Iffstorfa 
animalium 511WOM) quoting Diogenes of Apollonia; J. Longrigg (1985) 
pp. 278-82, who kindly provided me with the references). It was 
distributed to the parts of the body as in an irrigation system (id. 
(1988) pp. 477-9. ). The theory of the four elements of Empedokles of 
Akragas was influential in suggesting the analogue of the four cardinal 
body humours or fluids recorded in later medical literature, of which 
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one was blood (id. (1989) pp. 14-22). This allows a connection to be 
made with Agesilaos' Sicilian doctor, who would have the benefit only 
of the earliest ideas, some of which were to be incorporated into the 
Hippocratic corpus., He may have followed the thinking of the Sicilian 
Empedokles, with which the theory of disease became linked, as it 
appears in the Hippocratic treatise Nature of Man (id. (1988) p. 21). 
Loss of harmony among the body's four fluids disturbed its well-being, 
and this could be caused by excessive eating or excessive exercise (id. 
(1988) pp. 477-9). The doctor would attempt to restore the balance, by 
reducing the excess. 
Xenophon and Plutarch record that Agesilaos was climbing up to 
the acropolis, perhaps indicating physical exercise as the cause of the 
malady. Plutarch has omitted the bursting vein, mentioned by 
Xenophon as allowing the blood from the body to flow into the leg, 
which became swollen between the knee and the ankle, but he retains 
the swelling, and adds inflammation, perhaps from his own experience, 
or from later medical writers such as Erastistratos (ibid. pp. 477-9). 
The swelling, here attributed by, Xenophon to excessive supply of blood 
in the leg, presumably indicated that there was internal piercing of a 
veing which had allowed it to flow there from its proper place. 
Purging and control of diet would eventually lead to a reduction in the 
supply of blood, but a speedier remedy might be desirable. The body 
was thought to have channels running through it and out of it, 
carrying the various fluids (Helen King (1989) pp. 22-3). Other excess 
fluids could be encouraged by the doctor to escape through the body's 
open-ended tubes, so as to restore the harmony: excess of blood 
necessitated its own separate treatment. 
Two later cases of the natural discharge of blood through the 
nose, which are described at Aphorisms 5.33, Epidemics 7.123 (ibid. ), 
perhaps provide a helpful illustration here. Blood, normally within the 
body unseen, conveying its nourishment, "flowed" visibly only when 
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excess was passing out through the body's channels, as in the 
reported cases of nose-bleeding (ibid. ), or when the outer skin was 
accidentally pierced. Otherwise, to discharge excess blood from the leg 
a channel must be provided artificially, by opening a vein. The 
danger was that an artery might be severed, as may have been the 
case with Agesilaos, since the loss of blood was great. Phlebotomy was 
a practice which became popular, perhaps, because of the link with 
Empedokles and the influential theories of the four humours. That 
there was controversy, some centuries later, between its advocates and 
those who preferred starving the patient, is shown by Galen's revision 
of his attitude to the theories of Erasistratus (J. Longrigg (1988) 
P. 20-1). In an emergency, however, speed was paramount. The modern 
reaction is naturally one of horror, for Agesilaos' "serious injury ... 
had been aggravated by incompetent medical attention" (P. A. Cartledge 
(1987) p. 232), but modern practices are unreliable witnesses to ancient 
literary data. The authorial intention may have been quite different, 
for Agesilaos recoveredt and this case perhaps enhanced the reputation 
of the Syracusan doctor$ and that of the theory of venesection. 
3 06 PýV d[XXd( TOCJT6 YE TýV (pop6V TOO (XrPCITO(; fnauac- KOt KOPLOOEiq 
Etq AaKE5a(pova, noXOv yp6vov CayEV 6PP60TG)(; KOC np6r, Td(; UTPOTECO(Z 
65UV6TG)C,. 
Plutarch may have accepted a causal connection, of course, 
between checking the loss of blood and the release of Agesilaos from 
danger, though the two may have only coincided in time, as in 
Xenophon, who gives T6TC PeVTOL InadOOTO. There, however, T6 k0pa is 
readily supplied as the nominative from the previous clause, but this is 
not in Plutarch. 
Xenophon introduced the injury at Hell. V-iv-58, in the springtime, 
during the visit to Megara. Agesilaos was ill for the rest of the 
summer and through the winter. He was still ill at VI. iv. 18, and from 
here, except for the Peace Conference at VIAH. 19, he is not mentioned 
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by Xenophon, during a period of Spartan decline, until at VI. v. 4 he 
was sent to Mantinea, as an envoy. Ile does not take command again 
until VI. v. 11. 
4 tV 5e TCO yp6VQ TOOTQ noW (Yuvgpq nTa(GPCITCI TOIC, EnopTtdTQLq KCIC 
KOTdl YýV KCII KCITdl 06XCITTaV- 
In this brief summary, Plutarch expresses the full purport of the 
events of several campaigns in which Agesilaos was not engaged. At 
Agesilaos 11.23 Xenophon passes from the campaigns in Boiotia to the 
events at Tegea in the year following Leuktra, bridging the gap by 
claiming that Sparta and Agesilaos had prospered until then, and 
denying that Agesilaos' generalship was responsible for the subsequent 
failures. The events detailed in Hellenika are summarized in a single 
word, CF(PdJ\jJaTO, embracing the two fruitless efforts to contain the 
Thebans' recovery of the neighbouring cities of Boiotia, the discontent 
among the allies, and the naval operations. The Spartans' fleet had 
had little success in the Saronic and Corinthian Gulfs, and in the 
Ionian and Aegean Seas, against Timotheus, Chabrias and Iphikrates, 
and the fleet of the Atheniansý who were still angry because of 
Sphodrias' raid. In Hellenika Agesilaos re-emerged as the key figure 
in Spartan affairs, before Leuktra, at the oath-taking ceremony 
(VI. iii. 19), when the Athenians had dissociated themselves from the ever 
more powerful Thebans, and had initiated another peace conference in 
Sparta. 
&V ýV T6 nEpt Tcydpaq PIYLOTOV, 6nou nPOTOV tK nOPCIT6EeG)q 
KpaTnOtVTEq On6 On5a((jv ýTTAOnGCIV. 
This Theban victory, which Xenophon does not mention, continues 
for Plutarch the theme of weakness, adding substance to the brief 
reference to the Spartan reverses. At Pelopidas -16-17 Plutarch not 
only claims it as the preliminary to Leuktra and, as he does here, as 
the first victory against Sparta won in a pitched battle, but also 
describes the failure of the Spartan tactical manoeuvre of creating a 
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path though their line, in expectation of letting the Thebans pass to 
the other side, as they had done at Koroneia. (See c. 18. n,; cf. 
Frontinus (Strat. 2.6.6); Polyainos (2.1.19); Xen. Hell. IV. 3.19). Pelopidas 
is said to have ignored the temptation to escape through the gap, and 
instead attacked nP6q TOOq CFUVEOTC)TQq, the cramped formation that 
resulted from the Spartans' manoeuvre perhaps explaining the cause of 
the rout. The same source seems to have been used by Diodoros, who 
also records Pelopidas' victory at Tegyra as the first against Sparta to 
be celebrated by a Theban trophy (XV. 81.2). Since only two morai 
were present, the importance of the defeat for the Spartans has no 
doubt been exaggerated in the Boiotian tradition, but this does not, 
perhaps, detract from its importance for the Boiotians' spirits and 
reputation. 
5 E5oEcv oOv ndoL HOOM np6q ndVTOq ECPýVnV* K011 ouvqXOov 6n6 Týq 
'EXX66oq npeoOEtq Etq AOKEbaCpova, nOLno6pEVOL T6q 5tOX6GELq. 
Xenophon (Hell. VI. iii. 1) suggests that the initiative for peace came 
from Athens, because they no longer approved of Theban actions 
against Plataia, Thespiai and Phokis. At VI. ii. 38 he reports that 
lphikrates was about to ravage Lakonian territory, and although a 
commendation of the Athenian now intervenes to obscure the timing, at 
VI. iii. 18 he reveals that there was pressure on the Spartans: ItVIj(PCGOVTO 
KOI Of AOKEbaLp6VLOL UYEGE)OL TýV r;. tPAVIIV. There is also a hint of 
Persian pressure at Hell. VI. iii. lZ, when, in denying Athenian fear of 
the King's money, he indicates that Antalkidas' arrival from Persia is 
imminent (S. Hornblower (1983) p. 217). 
6 6v EIq ýv *EnapVLV6V5Oq, 6Výp fv5oýoq InI not5e(91 KOI (PLXOGOCPCQI, 
GTP0TnY(Qq 51 netpav o6n(j 5E56)K(Sq. 
Thebes became the home of the Pythagorean philosopher Lysis of 
Tarentum, when he was expelled, and he may then have become 
Epameinondas' tutor. Plutarch seems to present a contrast with the 
Spartan system of education, as he described it in cc. 1,2. In c. 33 he, 
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like Aristotle (Pol. 1271b), notes the intellectual deficiency in the 
system, The usual picture of Thebes is not a valid one (N. H. Demand 
(1982. ) Chs. 1,5). The museum at Thebes reveals material and cultural 
riches, and noteworthy signs of the acceptance of innovatory 
techniques, including the contemporary and possibly unique black 
stones commemorating warriors$ who perhaps fell at Delion, and whose 
etched portraits are reminiscent of the decoration on Etruscan 
hand-mirrors (K. Ninou ed. (1981) pp. 74f. and PI. 39). 
7 O&To(; 6p6V TOO(; (5XXouq dnCIVTOlq OnOKC(TCIK*\tVOIJtVOU(; T45 *AVtjatX6Q, 
p6voq ZYPAGOITO (PPOV4paTL nctppnGLoaV EYOVTL, KaC 6LcEIXOc X6Vov oOy 6ntp 
Onpa((jv9 6XXI 6ntP TAq *EXX65oq 6POO KOLv6V, T6V ptv n6Xcpov 6nobctKVOG)V 
o6EOVTC[ TýV En6PTnV IE 6v 6naVTEq Ot XOLnol KOK(3q n6ayouct. 
In the first part of the sentence, recording Epameinondas' view 
with the participle, 6p6v, Plutarch has expressed indirectly, 'OP1JPLK(3r,, 
the suggestion that Agesilaos owed his predominance to the moral, 
rather than the military, weakness of the other Greeks. The double 
compound, OnOKaTOKXLVOPtVOU4;, with eight syllables, is one of the 
longest words in this Lffe, like ncpLCrTPCITone5EJG0VTa at c. 16, and, since 
it is also a very strong metaphor, it expresses, perhaps, a deeply-felt 
judgement, and may indicate, significantly, what was for Plutarch one 
of the morals of this work, the danger of submission to injustice, 
which the Theban envoys learnt at Perachora (c. 22). Then, in the 
second and third parts of the sentence, Plutarch shows his national 
pride as a Boiotian. He attributes to Epameinondas, first, the courage 
to speak frankly, involving an exploration of the inner landscape of 
the man's mind in order to determine the spring of his action, 
(PPOV4PC(TL, and then the patriotism, to speak for all Greece, 6POO KOLv6v, 
giving objectively an evaluation of the words about to be reported. 
Then, in the next part, Epameinondas employs the same piece of 
rhetoric that was used by Antalkidas against Agesilaos at c. 23, but the 
substitution of Sparta here suits the context, and makes the point more 
soundly. Xenophon, although he records the Athenian invitation to the 
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Thebans to join the conference, does not record their dispatch, but he 
acknowledges a Theban presence for the signature. He does not name 
Epameinondas, and mentions only the speeches made by three of tile 
Athenian envoys. At Ilell. VI. iii. 7-9 he has Autokles, one of the 
Athenians) express, in greater detailf the identical criticism of Sparta, 
in a speech showing sympathy with Thebes. Plutarch may be right to 
assign this statement to Epameinondas instead of an Athenian. The 
suggestion of Athenian sympathy is not wholly consistent with tile 
change in the Athenian attitude towards Thebes, which was given by 
Xenophon as the reason why Athens desired peace (Ilell. VI. iii. 1), and is 
also expressed by the third speaker, Kallistratos, in his objection to 
the Thebans' recovery of control over the formerly independent cities 
(Hell. VI. iii. 11,13). The Athenian speakers present, in orderf three 
arguments for peace: the friendship between Athens and Sparta from 
legendary times, the need to abandon Sparta's domination, and the 
renewal of the dual leadership. Diodoros agrees with Plutarch in 
giving the case against Sparta to Epameinondas (XV. 38.3), and Nepos 
also attributes to him the condemnation of Spartan tyranny: 
sic Lacedaemoniorum tyrannidem coarguit, ut non minus illa 
oratione opes eorum concusserit quam Leuctrica pugna. tum enim 
perfecit, quod post apparuit, ut auxilio Lacedaemonii sociorum 
privarentur (Epaminondas 6.4). 
Xenophon seems to have substituted a more acceptable Athenian, 
avoiding mention of the Theban. His, account of the conflicting 
ambassadorial views has been explained as an ingenious strategy 
designed "to make Athenian neutrality acceptable" (T. T. B. Ryder (1963) 
pp. 240-1). Autokles' speech is too frank: - 
"There could scarcely be a more offensive summary of 
Spartan duplicity and bad faith, and this by a member of an 
embassy dispatched to secure peace" MR. Grant (1965) p. 264), 
but that scholar's alternative suggestion of Greek individualism makes 
no room for the expression of the Theban view. 
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TýV 5' C! P4VT)V 1o6T1JTL KC(ý Tý) 6LKCICQ KT600CIL KE, \EO(A)V- OIJTG) Y(5P 
06TýV 6LOPEVEEV9 roov 6n6VTWV YEVOPtVWV. 
Epameinondas' rhetoric gives way to his implied criticism of tile 
selfish use of the autonomy clause in the Peace of Antalkidas by 
Sparta, in the interest of - and only of - Sparta. The proposed 
alternative, on the basis of equality and justice for all, is in line with 
the idealist interpretation of the principles of federation in the earlier 
Boiotian League (Ox. Hist. XI; IoA. F. Bruce (1967) p. 158) and later in the 
democratic elements of Theban leadership of Boiotia, and again in the 
attempted Theban settlement of the Peloponnese (J. Buckler (1980) 
pp. 23ff., 36ff., 220ff. ). The promise of an enduring peace seems here 
to rest on the philosophical theory of the perfect balance, as of a 
sphere, in contrast with the flawed, one-sided settlements that were 
imposed, but did not last. Epameinondas' suggestion is a more idealist 
expression of Kallistratos' proposal, requiring something more general 
than collaboration between Athens and Spartag for the Athenians and 
the Spartans had each had the military strength needed to enforce 
their will, yet failed. The Thebansl especially Epameinondas, had 
training in philosophy and advocated higher principles. Perhaps it is 
less true to say that the Thebans had no ideology to offer than that 
the other states could not respond. In practical politics, however, the 
need was for a combination of powerful enforcement with enlightened 
statesmanship. Neither Sparta nor Thebes could now provide both 
these needs. If Plutarch was thinking of his own times in these terms, 
perhaps Rome, instead of Sparta, could supply the element of power, 
while other parts of Greece offered philosophical enlightenment. 
Diodoros gives some support for Epameinondas' enlightened attitude at 
XV. 88.3. 
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CHAPTER 28 
Confrontation in conference and in battle 
1 'op6v o0v 6 'AyrjaCXooq t5nF-p(pu3q dyOllýVOW; Kai npoaeyOVTOq OOTC) 
TOO(; 'EXXilvoq, I)P(STqGCV Et VOP(CEL UKCILOV C? VOlL KQ! rOOV 06TOVOPEtCOOL 
Týv BOLG)TCCIV. 
The metaphor Oncp(pu6c,, from natural growth, perhaps suggests 
that Plutarch was trying to show that the Greeks were recovering 
their true nature, encouraged by the example of Epameinondas. The 
two adjectives, 5(KaLOV ... Kat 
roov, repeat the sense of the two 
nouns, la6TnTL KOt TO 6LKCICQ, in Epameinondas' speech in c. 27, in the 
reverse order, forming a chiastic pattern. "Without injustice to anyone 
and with the same treatment for all". Plutarch had recorded the Peace 
of Antalkidas at c. 23 without referring to Xenophon's account of 
Agesilaos' hatred of the Thebans and his refusal to allow them to take 
the oath as Boiotians (HeIL U. 32-33), apparently reserving the 
argument for Epameinondas, and avoiding some of the repetition. In 
Xenophon's account of this Peace (Hell. VI. iii. 19-20), the confrontation 
arises only on the day after the treaty has been made, when the 
Thebans ask that Boiotians be substituted for Thebans in the text, and 
Agesilaos, who is not named until now, refuses the request. Plutarch 
has consolidated his treatment of the events and used reported 
dialogue to display the characters of the two opponents. The Greeks' 
attitude to Epameinondas, also reported by Xenophon in the speech of 
Autokles (Hell. VI. iii. 7-9), perhaps presents Plutarch's judgement 
indirectly, *OP9PLK8q1 that Thebes' relationship with Boiotia 
corresponded to Sparta's with the allies, who were autonomous because 
they had a vote in the Peloponnesian League, rather than with the 
Messenians, who did not. The issue is complicated, perhaps 
deliberately, by Xenophon, in his choice of words. He has the 
Lakedaimonians take the oath OntP OOTOV KaC TG)V aw0yov, with no 
mention of Messenians (cf. HeA VI. iii. 7-9,19)t and it is not clear 
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whether he intends by "allies" to mean perioikic cities of Lakonia as 
well as members of the Peloponnesian League. For Thebes and the 
Boiotian Confederacy, "Boiotians" would be the parallel nomenclature, 
but the Athenians and their allies took the oath KOT6 n6, \ELr, EKOGTOL. 
Xenophon's opinion is also, perhaps, expressed indirectly, in the 
Athenians' words: of P2v WqvaCoL OIIT(A)4; CZYOV TýV YVOPqV 6r, VOY 
OnýOICOUq T6 XEy6pevov 5ý 5CKaTCUGfiVOIL tXntq an (Hell. VI. iii. 20). The 
hope for massive Theban casualties is repeated later (Hell. VI. v. 35), 
where it is attributed to one of the Lakedaimonian envoys in Athens. 
2 6VTEPG)TýGOIVTOq 69 TOO 'EnopCLV6V6OU TOYO KOIC TEOOPPnK6TG)q CC 
K6KEtVOq OrCTaL HKOLOV 06TOVOPEE000L TýV AOKG)VLK4V. 
As Agesilaos had, countered Epameinondas' demand by turning on 
Thebes, so Epameinondas replies by attacking Sparta with the same 
question to Agesilaos. It was, no doubt, the concern so strongly 
activated here that still motivated Epameinondas to secure the 
autonomy of Messenia after Leuktra. Plutarch perhaps compliments 
Epameinondas as Xenophon complimented Autokles: pdxa 5OK8V 
InLGTPOý0ýq ElVaL 64TG)P (Hell. VI. iii. 7). 
dvanY154am; 6 'Ayncr 
, 
CXaOq PET' 6pyfiq ýKtXEUGE XeYELV OO(P6q OOT6V CC 
Týv BOLG)TCOV 6(P(nCFLV a6T6vopov. 3 T6 51 QOT6 TOOTo n6XLV TOO 
'EnapELV6V5OU ý04GWTOC,, Et TýV ACKOYLKýV &P(nOLV OOT&opov. 
Plutarch uses tvOPYE(O to illustrate a characteristic action, 
repeating the participle 6vonijb4oaq from c. 22. There is no anger in 
Xenophon's account, where Agesilaos' words indicate irritation, but 
Plutarch perhaps interprets the hatred in Hell. VA. 33. He represents 
Agesilaos as exercising autocratic authority, contrasting Epameinondas' 
reasoned argument. 
O6UT(J Tpa)(g(Jq Coyev 6 'AytjaCXao(; K01 TAv np6(POIGLV ýy6nqacv, 6(; 
cWq tEaXet4)OIL T6 TOV OnPONV 6VOPOI Tfiq EIP4Vnq KQý npOELnetv n6XEPOV 
a6TOr4; - 4 TOOq W 6XXOUq OEXXqvaq 6LOXXOYeVTO[q WXEUGEV dnLeVOL, T6 PIV 
dIKCGTOI Tqq CIPýVnqt T6 61 6V4KEGTO TOO noXIpou nOLOOVTOq. 
The rage is so violent that action takes the place of words. 
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Agesilaos' delight recalls c. 9, dalievoq 6 'Ayrja(Xooq tUEOTO, when 
Tissaphernes broke the truce. Plutarch continues the characterization 
of Agesilaos by Antalkidas and Epameinondas as q)t, \on6XEpoq in cc. 23, 
27. Cf. Diodoros XV. 19.4. Xenophon does not record a declaration of 
war, but has the Spartan ýKKXTIO(a alert Kleombrotos in Phokis, and 
comments: ý511 Y6P, &Z EOLKE, T6 5OLP6VLOV ýYCV (Hell. VI. iv. 3). 
5 ETU)(E U KCIV tKErVOV TdV YpdVOV eV 4)6)KEO(ILV 6v 6 KXE6pPpOTOq PET(3 
5uv6pe(. )4;. 
Xenophon recorded Kleombrotos' mission to Phokis$ with four morai 
and corresponding contingents of allies, at Hell. VI. i. l. It was said 
there to be under attack from Thebes, but then Polydamas of Pharsalos 
reported in Sparta that Jason was expanding his influence in this area. 
Thebes was thereafter defending the passes into Boiotia, as reported at 
Xen. HelL VI. H. 1., It appears that the Lakedaimonians were separating 
Jason and the Thebans, declared to be allies (VI. iv. 20). Xenophon 
makes no further reference to Kleombrotosý until VI. iv. 2, when tile 
Lakedaimonians decide not to withdraw him along with their garrisons 
in other cities. It seems unlikely that the Spartans kept such a large 
part of their army in this area for so long, and at Pelopidas 16-17 
Plutarch speaks of two morai at Orchomenos replaced from Sparta in 
rotation (5taboylv), though it is difficult to see why the arrival of this 
replacement should have deterred Pelopidas, unless it was additional to 
the two morai in the garrison. These two were then on an expedition 
into Lokris, leaving Orchomenos without defenders, and it was on their 
return from there that they met Pelopidas at Tegyra. Xenophon (Hell. 
VI. iv. 10) refers to the war at -Orchomenos, in which the cavalry of the 
Thebans had had good practice. 
EOOOq o0v Cnepnov of C(POPOL KCXCOOVTEq OOT6V ent eqýOCOUq 6YELV 
T6 GTPdTEUPO* 
Because he has given the full account of Leuktra at Pelopidas 
20-23, and because Agesilaos was not engaged, Plutarch here records 
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only the result of the battle. Xenophon tends to obscure the Theban 
achievement, highlighting rather Kleombrotos' early successes and 
Spartan bravery in the battle. He reveals, however, that when 
Kleombrotos approached Boiotia he used a mountainous and unexpected 
route through Thisbail and then proceeded to Kreusis, where he 
captured twelve Theban triremes. This indicates that the route was 
along the series of valleys that runs along the Helikon range, below 
the main ridge, on the side towards the sea, from Distomon, to Steiron, 
Kyriakion' and Hagia Anna, which has been described as the 
"High-road" (A. R. Burn (1949) pp. 313-23 and PI. 42; followed by J. Buckler 
(1980) pp. 57-9). A country track now leads through a series of narrow 
passes which open on to high plateaux, enclosed on either side by the 
upper slopes of the mountain. The end of this route indicates the 
final approach of the Spartans, after their detour to Kreusisf up the 
valley of the River Libadostras, and over the low ridge, the eastern 
spur of Mount Korombili, into the plain of Leuktra. The routes have 
recently been discussed in detail, and it is likely that Kleombrotos 
reached the plain at a point just to the west of the modern town 
(C. Tuplin (1987) pp. 72-7). Xenophon has also revealed that the 
Thebans had been waiting for Kleombrotos at a narrow pass, perhaps 
at Koroneia (Diodoros XV. 52.7; cf. c. 16), so that when he turned to the 
mountain'route, they would return to Thebes by the direct route past 
Lake Kopais and across the plain. There is a road which they could 
then have taken to Leuktra past Thespiai, but the danger that 
Kleombrotos might be able to slip through in front of them, and to 
reach a position between themselves and Thebes, would suggest that 
they might prefer the longer march in order to protect the western 
approaches, to the city. 
Kat TOO(; cruppdyouc, neptnepnOVTEr, 40poLCov, dnpoOupow; ptV 6VTO(; 
KOt PaPUVOPýVOUq T6v n6XEpov. 
Plutarch seems to be making his own interpretation of the allies' 
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morale in the period leading up to the battle, after Xenophon, who, 
however, records their discontent only after the battle: 
TOO(; ouppdyouq ndVTOq PeV 60OP(A)q tYOVTOq npdq T6 PdYEGGOL, 
9CFTL 51 00q ObTC)V 0651 6YOOPtVOUq To YEYEVTjPýVQ (IlelL VI. iV. 15). 
6 noXX3v 59 GTIPECOV poyOnpC)V yeVopeVG)Vp 6q ýV TQ) ncpt 'EnapELV(SV50U 
yeyponTOL, We npoE)60U TOO A(3K(JVOC, tVaVTLoupevou nP6(; TýJV (YTPCITECOV, 
OOK dlVýKEv 6 'Avna(Xaoq, 6XXI WnpoEC T6v n6XEPOY. 
The gods' signs reflect the human unease and do not favour the 
Spartan enterprise. Xenophon also mentions that opposition was 
expressed by Protho6s, both on legal grounds and to avoid offending 
the gods, and that the advice was rejected by the assembly, but he 
does not name Agesilaos (Hell. VI. iv. 2). Protho6s is given no 
introduction by Xenophon, though the preceding phrase Td OrKOL TeXr) 
may include him. If Plutarch's description precludes his being a geron 
or an ephor, Protho6s will be an example of an ordinary Spartiate 
addressing the tKKJ\TJOCa, which had the right to decide but not to 
debate (Aristotle Pol. 1273all), a point raised in a discussion with 
J. F. Lazenby. Xenophon introduces the influence of the gods, too, albeit 
with some hesitation, in the form of an oracle warning of a 
Lakedaimonian defeat, and encouraging signs for the Thebans (HeIL 
VI. iv. 7). 
t, \n(CG)v OOTOrq PtV 6POD Tt TAq 'EXX65oq dXnq 6nopyo6aqq, tKun6v5G)v 
61 T8V OnPaNv yEyov6TG)V, KCXtP6V clvaL 5(KT)V XoDerv nap' 06TC)V. 7 
bnXOr 59 T6 GOV 6pyb PdXXOV A X0YtGP(5 YCVe000L TýV GTPCXTE(QV tKE(vnv 6 
KOtp6q. 
Plutarch attributes to Agesilaos the recognition that he had 
succeeded in isolating Thebes in the peace conference (Xen. Hell. 
VI-iii-19), and that Sparta was therefore in a position to win the coming 
battle. It has been suggested that Agesilaos was right, and that 
victory should have vindicated his policy for Sparta (G. L. Cawkwell 
(1976) pp. 62-84; id. (1983) pp. 385-400). For Plutarch, however, the 
human assessment of the opportunity was not all, as the repetition of 6 
KOLp6c indicates (see cc. 8,39), for Agesilaos was motivated by anger. 
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Plutarch again uses anger to motivate one of the successive stages in 
the decline of Agesilaos' character, and introduces the same 
combination of words at Pelopidas c. 32: 
6(; 51 vf6ev ent T013 5EELo() napa0appOVOVTCI KCIC OUVTdTTOVTCI 
TOOIý PLCFOO(PdPOUq, 00 KaTe(JYE To XOYLCPO TAY 6py4v, 6XX6 np6C TýV 
PXeLPLV dVaýOXEYOCIq KCIC To OUPq) nOPC(500q Td GOPCI KCII TAY ýYEPOVCOV 
Tfiq npdEE(, )c,, noX0 rIP6 T6V 6XX(A)V lEmOpevoc, tQIPCTO $00V KCIC 
npOKaXoOpEVOq T6V TOPCIVVOV. 
This phrase denotes tragic 6POPTCO, for which Pelopidas himself pays, 
but wins glory. Heret however, Agesilaos' 43POPT(Cl causes the deaths 
only of others. Plutarch implies that reason should have overruled the 
emotions. This is, perhaps, his interpretation of the way Xenophon 
records the rejection of the advice of Protho6s, that Sparta should 
abide by the terms of the Peace just agreed: A 6' tKK#\IJGCO dKO60000 
TOCJTa IKEtVOV pev (pXuaperv AY4GOTO (Hell. VI. iv. 3). This striking phrase 
indicates strongly the irrational nature of the Spartan reaction to what 
seems to be an orthodox proposal, and if Xenophon composed it to 
describe the atmosphere of the meeting, or to represent the views 
expressed and voted uponp Plutarch may have pin-pointed a veiled 
criticism of the leadership for provoking this response, so that 
responsibility for the defeat at Leuktra does not appear to rest only 
with the generalship on the battlefield. Agesilaos' misinterpretation of 
6 KQLp6,;, a rare occurrence in a military situation, compounds his 
responsibility, for the word clearly denotes everything which it is the 
duty of the general to take into account before committing himself to 
action: here anger has rendered his judgement defective. 
ýTTAOIIGOV IV ACOKTPOLq AWCP6V ErKOGL 5LQyEVOWjvwV. 
The precise Julian date of the battle seems to be incalculable, 
though mid-August may be acceptable, but the twenty days between it 
and the Peace must be suspected (C. Tuplin (1987) pp. 77-8,83). There 
seems to be no obvious significance in the interval of twenty days. 
The gods' anger would have to wait while the order reached Phokis 
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and while the Spartans then reached the battlefield, delayed by the 
diversion to Kreusis, but other victims of divine retribution have 
waited longer. Plutarch may simply wish to provide a temporal link in 
order to dispel doubt that there was a retributive element. 
The two armies were drawn up in positions resulting from their 
respective lines of approach. The plain of Leuktra is not wide at this 
point, and is bounded on the north and south by roughly parallel low 
ridges facing each other. Behind the Theban line, the road to Thebes 
would have offered little chance of further resistance once the 
Spartans had broken through. The Theban strength was concentrated 
on the left, to face the Spartans. The reason for this was surely the 
lesson learnt at Koroneia, where the Thebans did not themselves face 
the Spartans, and, despite their own victory$ had therefore found the 
Spartans behind them. If this had been allowed to happen at Leuktra, 
Thebes could have been taken, whether the Thebans won or lost. 
Their only hope of saving Thebes was to defeat the Spartans, and, 
after victory, remain in position between the Spartans and the city. 
The Thebans were not only the main strength of their fighting force, 
massed in unprecedented depth of phalanx, but were also fighting with 
the desperation of defending their homes and families from certain 
destruction. Their strategy, tactical formation and motivation will have 
contributed most to their victory, in addition to sound training, 
confidence and past battle experience. On the Spartan side, failure to 
learn the value of the development of the deep phalanx rendered their 
courage and reputation ineffectual, in addition to the confusion of the 
initial cavalry clash and of possible last minute corrective manoeuvring. 
8 dinl0avov be )((, \LOL AOKCbClLPOVC(JV KOý KXc6POPOTOC, 6 POGLXCOq KCIC 
nEpt 06T6V Ot KP6TLGTOL TrJV EnaPTLCITC)V. 
Xenophon also gives nearly 1)000 Lakedaimonian dead, but adds 
that of 700 Spartiates present, more than 400 fell. The identity of the 
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Lakedaimonian casualties is not stated. They cannot have been allies 
and mercenaries, for they were evidently on the Spartan left Well. 
VI. iv. 14) and, if Diodoros is correct (XV. 55), not to be engaged by 
Epameinondas' right wing. References in Xenophon to perioik-oi and the 
difficulties resulting from exclusive training of Spartans in the army 
suggest that these were not integrated into the Spartiate units 
(J. F. Lazenby (1985) pp. 14-16; though G. L. Cawkwell (1983) p. 385 
disagrees), unless there were arrangements for recruiting and training 
unknown to us. The decline in the number of Spartiates available for 
military service may well have been made good by recruiting those who 
had been disqualified, but had been fully trained (J. F. Lazenby (1985) 
P-17). The perioikoi will have been with the allies and the mercenaries, 
on the left wing, ' and may have had few casualties. The Spartan 
cavalry were the first to be engaged by the Thebans and were quickly 
routed (Hell. VI. iv. 13)) so that they suffered casualties. However, the 
cavalry were not all full citizens. At Hell. V. iv. 39 there is a reference 
by name to a cavalryman, Eudikos, one of the perioikoi. At' Ilell. 
VI-iv-11 the richest men rear the horses, and the description of the 
riders, who are assigned only at the call-up and have to be given 
horse and arms, seems to confirm that at Sparta these recruits did not 
have hoplite status. They will have contributed to the 600 casualties 
who were not Spartiates. Of the hoplites, the OnopF-Coveq will have 
contributed largely to this casualty list, too, those, that is, who, 
having been through the dY(jYA, trained and served alongside the 
Spartiates in the phalanx, although they were now without Spartiate 
status (J. F. Lazenby (1985) pp. 16-20). 
"Leuktra was decisive, not so much because the Spartan 
army had been destroyed ... but because it put an end to the 
myth of Spartan invincibility". (J. F. Lazenby (1985) p. 162)$ 
and this would make the position of the Spartiates insecure. 
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tV OUq KOIý KXe(5vup6v WOL T6V E(P05PCOU T6V KOX6V TPIq nEGdVTa np6 
TOO OOCYLXIfG)(; KCIý TOCYOUTdKtq tEOVCI(YT6VTa KOý PO)(6pEVOV TOIC, OnPaCOLr, 
6noOovErv. 
Like Xenophon, who describes the Spartans' heroism in defeat by 
recording the wish of some to fight again (Hefl. VI. iv. 14-15)9 Plutarch 
ends his account of the battle with praise, but he does it by enlarging 
Xenophon's brief notice of Kleonymos' death. After the deaths of those 
in the higher ranks have given the measure of the defeat, the loyalty 
of Kleonymos to his king restores the image of the courageous Spartan 
soldier. Kleonymos was fulfilling his promise not to shame his friend, 
but Plutarch had not mentioned that at c. 25. Xenophon, too, does not 
refer to this directly, but makes the link clearly by adding Sphodrias 
to the list of dead, now one of the king's council. 
See Endnote 8 for further discussion of casualty figures at Leuktra. 
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F-ARRI-TEN 
MRTA 
(ChaDters-29-30) 
CHAPTER 29 
Spartans great in adversity 
In cc. 29,30 Plutarch reveals critical assessments of Agesilaos and 
Sparta just before he reaches the eclipse of the city as leader even in 
the limited area of the Peloponnese, the subject of the next five 
chapters. 
1 EUP06VTOC, U TOUr, TE AOKE6atpovCotq nTOCCYPOTOq 6npOG5OK4TOU KOC 
TOt4; OrIpa(Mc, napdi 66&OV EOTUYýPCITOq, 010V 00 Y9YOVEV &d\00; "EXXnOL 
np6q 'EXXqvaq 6YWVLGOPtVOLq. 
The disaster for the Lakedaimonians is of course correspondingly 
a success for the Thebans. Xenophon had praised the Spartans' desire 
to fight again, but the mood changed to depression, and the dead had 
to be recovered under truce, while the Thebans marked their success 
with a trophy. Plutarch presents his comments on each in a single 
rhetorical expression, exploiting the element of surprise, which is 
common to both. It is expressed as if the Spartans were not expecting 
disaster and the Thebans were: both were unable to foresee that the 
reverse of their expectations would be the result. Plutarch also uses a 
rhetorical expression to describe the event as surpassing others of its 
kind, with which may be compared: 6yOva \aljnp6TCXTOV 6V "E, \XrlvEq np6r, 
'EXXqvaq AYCJVCGOIVTO (Nikias 27.9). This is an adaptation of Thucydides 
VII. 87: 
EUVtOll TE IrPVOV TOOTO ['EM\nVLK(5V] TOV KCIT6 T6Y nd, \i: pov 
T6v5E PtVLOTOV YEVeGOOL, 50KErV 51 9POLVE KOC 6V 6KOfi *EXXnVLKC)V 
rOPEV, KCIC TOCC, TE KPOTAGOOt Xopnp6TOTOV KCIC TOtC, 5MI(POOPEUCL 
6UGTUY&FTC1TOV. 
Here it is possible to see that recognizable rhetoric does not 
necessarily preclude the correct assessment of political significance. 
Leuktra was of unsurpassed significance for Greece, and the unique 
nature of the circumstance was that the supposed invincibility of the 
Spartan army had come unexpectedly and, with hindsight, 
unambiguously to an end. It was left for Xenophon's successors to 
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make this explicit. In Aristotle's view, one single blow was too much 
for Sparta (Pol. 1270a33). 
OWV 6V Ttr, fiTTOV tC4NOGE TfiC, (3pCTfi(; Kot I)Y(5(YOTI TI)V ýMIP9WIV 
n6XLV ý TýV VLK30OV. 
Plutarch now comments at greater length on the behaviour of the 
Spartans, with a paradoxical comparison that involves both cities. Here 
the events show that the character of a people, like that of an 
individual, is constant, and that the Spartans have behaved as 
courageously in their extremely difficult situationt true to their 
traditions, as the victorious Thebans behaved. The judgement, 
however, is presented, not as Plutarch's, but as a generalized one, that 
the reader is not expected to challenge. The commendation of the 
personal courage of the Spartans is, of course, in strong contrast to 
the increasingly widespread criticism of Agesilaos on other grounds 
which began in c. 22. Clearly Plutarch is drawing a distinction between 
the Spartans and the behaviour of their king, and is establishing at 
this stage his approval of a manifestation of what he saw as the normal 
character, developed in Lykourgan Spartan society. Not only, then, 
does Plutarch at this point combat any tendency to associate the rest 
of Sparta with the blemishes he has displayed in Agesilaos' character: 
he is also establishing a standard of community behaviour in the 
Sparta that he admired, against which he will set the later, very 
different, reactions of Spartans to another national crisis, to be 
described almost immediately, in c. 31 and again in c. 33. 
26 P" Yd'P ": CVO(POV (PnaL T(ZV 6YOOG)V dlV6PG)V tYELV TL KOI T(Iq tV OrV4) 
KOI nQL5LO WV6q KCII 5LCITPLD6(q 6&Lopvnp6vcUTOV, 6pOrjq xty(jv- 
For support in this judgement, Plutarch has turned to Xenophon, 
whom he regarded as important for his philosophical works, and to 
whose authority accordingly he had appealed at c. 20 as '-: r:. VOqZVTO 59 
T6V ao(p6v. The quotation, from Xenophon S. Ymposfum 1.1, is slightly 
modified by Plutarch. Xenophon refers to the behaviour of good men, 
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observing it in two different forms, the one a reversal of the other: 
TOV KOX6V KdYOOC)V 6V5PC)V IEPYO 06 p6VOV T6 PET(5 anou5flc, 
npCITT6pEva 6&Lopvnp6veUTa E? VOL 6XX6 Kai T6 tV TOrq nOLbLatq. 
Plutarch has done the same in the previous sentence, referring to the 
courage of two cities in different situations, observing it both for TI)V 
ýTTflpevqv ndXLv and for TýV VLK600V. In the quotation, however, he 
has narrowed Xenophon's reference, for he has omitted the first, 
serious, situation: T(5 PET6 onoubýq nPOTT6peva, and has retained only 
the second, lighter, oneo having inserted a new but similar situation: 
T6(; tV ON4). On the other hand, he has broadened the referencet for 
where Xenophon referred only to two contrasted aspects of the man's 
actions, Epya nPaTT6PEVO, Plutarch now mentions talk as well as 
behaviour: T031; ... qXJVdC, KaC 
5LaTPL06(;. The adjustments will be seen 
to be necessary for Plutarch's purpose in presenting his own argument 
in the next section. 
EUTL 59 OOY fiTTOVI 6XX6 Kal P6XXOV 6ELOV KQTaV0CCV KOC OC6000L TOV 
6yoMv 6 naP6 T6q T6yoq np6TTOUCL Kat XtYOUCL 6LCUGYnW0V00VTCq. 
Having established the paradox, that valuable observations are 
possible even in unexpected, unintended, places, Plutarch uses a 
rhetorical technique seen in some of Homer's similes, too, that what he 
compares does not match, but surpasses, the given standard. Ile 
claims that the display of qualities in circumstances which militate 
against them is an even stronger proof of character. The quotation 
enables Plutarch to create the contrast with what Xenophon had said, 
but with the changed form he can limit his discussion to the serious 
situation, the Spartans' behaviour "in the face of what has happened"$ 
and he can also include speech, and its absence, as well as action. 
3 ETU)(E pIv y6p ý n6XLq tOPTýV 6YOUGa K(It Elv(av 0000 PEaTA- 
Af ter digressing to establish his principle, Plutarch now 
re-introduces the event he had already begun to record, the conduct 
of the city. Apparently in planning Kleombrotos' expedition to Boiotia, 
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the ephors had disregarded the approaching festival. Plutarch has 
realised that the presence of foreign spectators will have added to the 
embarrassment caused by the disaster, for it was important for 
Spartans not to allow their internal problems to encourage enemies and 
potential enemies. Obviously better news would have been a different 
matter. 
4 01 5' -e(POPOL9 KaCncp EÜE)Ür, 
6VTO(; KCITCIWVOÜ(; 95TL 8L9(POOPTOU TÖ 
nP6YPCXTCX Kai TAV dpyýV dnoÄG)X9K0aLV, OÖTE YOPÖV MÄGEEV EtOCOV OÖTE Tý) 
CFYfiP01 TA(; ZOPTfir, PETOßOXEUV TAv r16Xtv, ÖXXÖ KaT' OIK(OV TCV TCOVL65TG)V 
TOtr, nPOCAKOUGL TÖ 6V6POTo ndP4UVTCC CXÜT0t Tö nept TAV 090V Kai T6V 
ÖYC)VCX TC)V YOP(ZV EnpOTTOV. 
At HelL VI. iv. 16 in the response at Sparta to the arrival of the 
news of Leuktra during the festival, Xenophon gives a brief statement, 
1XunoOVTO, of the ephors' distress, but goes on to refer Lo their 
continuation of the chorus, their communication of the names of tile 
dead, and their imposition of silence, GLV5 T6 ndOor, (pepF_tv, on the 
women. He concentrates on the self-control of the ephors, and the 
subsequent behaviour of the relatives is presented as obedience to 
their command. Here, due recognition of the ephors' self-control is 
also given by Plutarcho but their sense of shock, instead of grief, 
gives notice of the significance of Leuktra for the whole of Greece, and 
for Sparta, tooj in this wider context, This is not advertised in 
Xenophon's account, which is more sympathetic to Sparta. The ephors 
made no public announcement, in their desire for secrecy, but only 
circulated the news to the relatives, and continued with the festival. 
The city's reaction is given separately. Plutarch will present the 
behaviour of the Spartans also as a spontaneous response, as they 
themselves reacted with Spartan courage and composure, without the 
ephors' order for silence. The one version implies commendation for 
the relatives' obedience to the ephors' command, the other for the 
relatives' own self-control. Plutarch's extra phrase, T6 CFYIrIIJCI Tfir, 
tOPTý(;, denotes the programme of the festival, and the spectacle seen 
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by visitors. He thus describes the outer "form" or manifestation of 
their inner sense of decorum, which made possible the controlled 
Spartan reaction. The reference to form is continued in T6 ayfipa and 
G)(ýPCITL below. 
5 (5pc( 59 ýplpqi q)avcpG)v 45n ycvov6TQv n5GL T(5V TI (Y(JCOPIVG)V Kai T6V 
TE0VE6TG)V9 01 PtV T8V TEE)VE6TCJv nOTI! Ptq Kai K115ECFTCIC Kai OIKEtOL 
K0T0p0(V0VTCq Elq dVopdV d[XX4XOUq ME&LODVTO XLnopoC Td np6owna, 
(PPOVýJJOTOq PEUT01 Kai Vý00U(; p Ot 
59 TrJV cyG)Coptv(av, 6onep Int nlv0f. t, 
PET6 T6V VUVCILKG)V OrKOL 5LeTPLOOV9 El U TLq On' (3v6yKnq npoeXOOL, Kai 
CYY4POTL Kai WV5 Kai oXtPPOTt TomMq lq)0(VET0 Kai OUVEUTCIXPtVOq. 
Xenophon says that it was on the last day of the festival that the 
messengers arrived; visitors would soon be departing from Sparta$ and 
the news of the disaster was not made fully public, perhaps, until the 
following day (Tý 51 OCYTEPOCQI ýV 6P61V), when foreigners were going 
home. In the remainder of the chapter Plutarch, following Xenophon, 
records the Spartans' reversal of other, more usual, reactions to such 
news. He has, however, restructured the passage, making four parts 
instead of Xenophon's two, for where Xenophon has separated the 
relatives only as those of the dead and those of the survivors, 
Plutarch has further divided each of these into two categories, the 
male and the female, again showing his interest in all the members of 
the family. He has also introduced several expressions which are more 
concrete and specific. In the first place, the male relatives of the 
dead, of nPOCY4KOVTEc,, are expanded into naTIPEq KOI KnUOTO! KOC 
ONErOL, and IV TO (povEpO becomes Eb; 6YOPdv. Xenophon's wholly 
physical description, ALnapoO(; KOC q)OL5POd4;, is represented by Mnopol 
Tdi np&xano, a more explicitly external description than Xenophon's, to 
which Plutarch then adds the explanatory phrase (PPOVAPOTOr. PEOTOt KCIC 
Y4()Ouq, reverting to the inner response established above as Plutarch's 
main interest. Then, in the second place, the male relatives of the 
survivors are either out of sight at home, PETd1 TOV yUVCILKOV OrKOL 
5LeTPLROV, or, if anyone is constrained to go out of the house and is 
open to observation again, he is then described in more concrete 
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detail, GY4JJCITL KCIý WVý KaC $, VWPaTL Tonctv6q. For the condition of 
these relatives Xenophon has used two adjectives only, in the simple 
phrase GKu0pwno6q Kal Tonr:, tvo0q,, but his main point is that few were 
seen, 6, \(youc, av eMEq. Plutarch has taken this to refer, not to their 
total number, but rather to their reluctance to be seen, stressing their 
mood. Of course, if they were expecting that their men would receive 
the treatment described in c. 30, their mood would not be unaffected, 
7 ETL 69 P(5X, \OV TOV VUVCILK6V t6CtV ýV Kat nuGeCOaL TýV PtV COVTO 
npocFbeyoptvqv uf6v dn6 Tq4; Pdl)(Tl(; KaTln(Pj KCIC crL(jmjX4V, Tdr, U TOV 
nenTG)KtVaL XEYOPeVG)V IV TE TOC4; CEPOrq EOOOq dVOOTPCCPOPeVQq, KO! np&q 
6XX4XOq tXOP6q Kal QLXOTCPG)q RC(5LCOOCaq. 
Further expansion and heightening has been achieved by Plutarch 
with the treatment of the women separately from the male relatives 
already described. He has been careful to explain that verbal reports 
were available, so that he can describe the women who were said not 
to be seen abroad. The patterns of situation and response are similar 
for men and women, but the vocabulary for women is changed, 
becoming sometimes rather more striking, but also more appropriate for 
them. For the female relatives of the survivors, CKuOpwnobr, Kul 
TancLvok becomes KQTnCPA KOC GLwnn, \4v, introducing explicitly the 
silence, spontaneous here, but in Xenophon imposed by the ephors and 
not mentioned again. For the female relatives of the dead, IV T(ý 
q)avEPO is interpreted in two specific and highly relevant contexts, one 
religious: tV TE TOC4; (EpOt(; COOOC, dVO(JTPEq)OPevac., and one domestic: 
np6q dXX4Xaq CXOp3q Kal PLXOTCPWq 005LCOOGOq, where the adverbs 
denote inner feelings, replacing Xenophon's external appearances, 
XLnopOOq Kat Wt5pOdq. Plutarch has also carefully arranged the order 
of survivors and slain in a chiastic pattern, beginning and ending with 
the examples which correspond most closely to his starting point, 
behaviour in adversity, for it is the way the bereaved carried their 
grief that displays the unique Spartan character. 
The effect of these changes is to introduce a strong element of 
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tv6PVELO into the narrative, which, with the expanded length of the 
passage, gives due prominence to Plutarch's main concern, the subject 
of character. This attention to presentation is the function of rhetoric, 
which has been criticized as destroying the historical value of an 
author's work (A. J. Woodman (1988) p. 199). The comparison with the 
probable source passage in Xenophon indicates no distortion of his less 
rhetorical account, which itself appears to be that of an eye-witness, 
though not necessarily of the author himself. The problem for the 
historian in this case is to represent the significant impact of the 
event on the human level as well as the political, and it is only this 
impact which benefits from the use of evocative language to paint his 
picture. Plutarch has brought extra life to an already vivid 
description by visualizing the details. He has also extended the 
perspective from Xenophon's inward looking view of the Spartans alone, 
with a comparison with normal behaviour elsewhere. 
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CHAPTER 30 
A failure of nerve 
Plutarch has developed three themes on the problems facing Sparta 
after the defeat at Leuktra, introducing the consequences of the 
disregard of the oradle at Agesilaos' accession, Agesilaos' saving of the 
TPeGCXVTCC, 2 and the Spartan expedition 
to Arkadia. lie has used these 
to illuminate the political mood in Sparta at this time. 
1 06 PýV 6, \Xd( TOCc. noXXorq, (Sq 6TCGTOVTO PIV Of COPPOYOL, 
npoae5OKdITO U VCVLKrIK60, *EnopCLV(SV6a(Z Kai peyaXocppov8, v tpoaXE; tv EIq 
neAon6vvnaov, INVOLa TOV )(PTICFPC)V tvtnEGE T6Te np6r, TAV )(G)X6TIITC( TOO 
'AyTlot, Wou. 
Plutarch seems to have drawn his primary information from 
several references in Xenophon, butl unless he had another source, he 
has added what may be judged to be reasonable inferences from a 
wider knowledge of Spartan thinking. Diodoros' source had indicated 
the mood at Sparta at this time: ek noM\Av dwwav(ov 9nLnTOV (XV. 63.1). 
Plutarch perhaps represents as a tendency to defect, what the 
polemarchs perceived of the feelings of the allies at Leuktra, as they 
were recorded at Xen. Hell. VI. iv. 15: 
atc0av6pevot U TOL)(; (yuppd)(our, ndVTCX(; IJeV 6()OP(Jq IrYOVTOr, 
np6q T6 p6yeo0aL, ECFTL 61 00q GOT8V 0659 dY0OPtVOUq TO YCVEVnpdVQ, 
although at Hell. VI. iv. 18 Xenophon describes the high spirits, pd'\Q 
npooOpoq, of those Peloponnesians who joined Archidamos' rescue 
operation. This, however, was before the peace conference at Athens, 
at which the autonomy of the cities of Greece, including the 
Peloponnese, was reaffirmed (Hell. VI. v. 19 2-3)) and Sparta was isolated. 
Xenophon also records the threat of invasion, which was removed only 
when Jason of Pherae advised against it (Hell. VI. iv. 22)t although the 
name of Epameinondas is not mentioned. The importance for Spartans 
of keeping divine favour was mentioned before the campaign, by 
Protho6s (Hell. VI. iv. 22), and Plutarch may well have assumed 
subsequent recrimination, and that the Spartans would at this time 
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recall the oracle. No doubt his concern for the reputation of the god 
required that any disregard of the advice offered should later be seen 
to have been punished, and it may be supposed that he would explain 
the disaster in this way. Cf. Comparatio 1.2: T6V be )(PTIOP6V 
KOTEtpG)vEua6pEVOr, TOv nEpt Týr, )(G)X6TTjTOr,. Agesilaos' disability will 
always have been available for exploitation by anyone opposing him, 
but the terms of the oracle, 6np6V VdP VOOGO( CC KCITOGYýGOUGLV 
dEXnTOL 
(c. 3), limit the relevant harm to something serious enough to have 
effects of lasting duration. 
Kal bucOup(a noXXA Kat nTOCCI nP6q T6 OCCOVt 6q 5Ldl TOGTO 
npaTT060nq KOK6q Tfiq n6XcG)q, 6TL TdV 6PTCnObCl Tfiq RCIOLXE(Oq tKPaX6VTVq 
CrXOVTO yG)Xdv Kal nennpoptVOV, 6 naVT6q P(5XXOV OOTOOq 15(500KE 
(PP6CECOCIL Kat (PUX6TTEaOaL T6 5aLp6VLOVO 
That the interpretation of the oracle accepted at the time of the 
accession was wrong means that Diopeithes was right in thinking that 
the lameness was in the king, not in the kingdom, but the 
"man-destroying war" was rightly foreseen as the consequence which 
would affect the kingdom, as the battle at Leuktra did (c. 3). In his 
defence, Agesilaos could claim that not he, but Lysander, was 
responsible for the erroneous advice, but this would not relieve the 
city from its responsibility for having made the choice. The Spartans' 
tendency to see a disaster as the consequence of their guilt is 
exemplified at Thucydides VII. 18.2: 
tV Y6P To nPOTepQ noXepQ C(PeTEPOV T6 nopov6pnija pa, \Xov 
YEVICOOL9 
where, contrary to agreement, they had refused arbitration in their 
dispute with Athens. The indirect and often ambiguous expressions 
used in oracles, as here, always necessitated human intervention in the 
form of an interpretation of meaning, and the quality of the 
interpretation was, again as here, something to be ascertained. Diotima 
explains to Socrates in Plato's Symposium (203a) that there are two 
intermediaries in communications between gods and mortals, T6 
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botp6vLov, an inferior deity, and 6 00(0r, bat0vto(Z dvýP, a superior 
human who must have ý PaVTLKA Te)(VTI. In this case, the authority of 
Lysander had been accepted by the Spartans, in defiance of the 
authority of a recognized prophet. The orthodox view of Plutarch 
would make them collectively responsible for their misfortunes. 
2 5Ld 52 TAV (5XX1jV 50VOptV 06TOO KCIC (5PCTAV KCtC Wav oO p6vov 
IYPOVTO OOOLXCC KOL' OTPUTnYO TG)V KQTd n6xcpov, 6W KO! TOV nOXLTtK3V 
6nOPLOV IOTPO Kal 5LOLTnTfi. 
Throughout the Life, Plutarch has commended Agesilaos' qualities 
as king and as general, but although his'next employment makes other 
demandsý his authority would convince the citizens that his judgement 
was to be accepted, just as the same qualities also explain their earlier 
acceptance of Lysander's interpretation of the oracle. However, 
judgement is one quality that is not only missing from the list, but is 
manifestly being questioned by the critics, including Plutarch$ in 
Agesilaos' handling of Sparta$s relations with Thebes and the choice of 
Agesilaos as king. Plutarch uses two metaphors from medicine, the 
first for the search for a remedy, the second for the prescription of a 
regimen for the maintenance of health, &OLTýJJOTO. 
TOtq tV Tt Pdyn KQT06ELXtd000LV, 00q 06TOt TPIGOVTOq 6VOP6COUOLV9 
6KVODVTEq Tdq eK TOV v6pG)v 6TLP(Oq npoodycLv9 noXXotq o3ot i<ot 
6UVGTOtq, (POPOOPEVOL VECJTEPLC116V (5n' OOTOV. 3 ob Op PdVOV apyl)(; 
6ne(PYOVTOL n6onq. 
The first phrase explains what the men had done to deserve the 
status defined by the technical term in the second phrase. The title 
was given to a Spartan whose companion died without him at 
Thermopylai: 
6vct66q TE cZ)(c 6 TPICQq 'APLCYT65npOq KCIXE6pZVor, (Ilerodotos 
VII. 231). 
The information about this crisis comes only from Plutarch, and Apoth. 
Lak. (Afor. 191,214), though there the ephors first expressed their 
concern. Plutarch may have had in mind the similar situation which 
arose when the Spartans removed the rights of citizenship from the 
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prisoners from Pylos, recently returned by the Athenians, F)CCOMM; III 
TL... VE(A)TEPCOOCYLv. Thucydides reports that this involved debarring 
some important men from holding any command, although they were 
restored later (Thuc. V. 34). The other marks of degradation are 
recorded by Herodotos (VII. 231) and Lak-. Pol. 9. The men suffering 
the punishments listed could no doubt be kept out of sight for a day 
while foreigners were still in Sparta, so that only the "evidence" given 
by the Spartans themselves would reach the rest of Greece, to 
contribute to the myth that has come down to the present day. 
Plutarch records a remedy which would avoid discontent, rather 
than add to it. The large numbers of men involved seem to make the 
charge of cowardice less appropriate than in individual cases, but this 
was not to be made the issue, nor was the ýopportunity taken to 
propose reform. Plutarch, however, would probably not have seen 
change as desirable. Sparta, for him, was admired for the laws which 
were considered to be derived from Lykourgos, and in departing even 
once from strict observance the Spartans were now abandoning the 
very system that had made them what they were, and so, like 
Agesilaos, they were in decline -a new theme for Plutarch. Their 
respective positions have gone through several changes. In c. 20 
Agesilaos had been shown to be holding the Spartans to the traditional 
way of life, but was thereafter at fault over Phoibidas, Sphodrias and 
Thebes. The citizens had maintained the high moral standard in the 
crisis of c. 29, and at the beginning of c-30 they had realized Agesilaos' 
vulnerable moral position in the kingship. The citizens' present 
decline may, perhaps, start for Plutarch in their continued reliance on 
him, especially as VOPOE)eTriq, despite their awareness of the significance 
of the interpretation of the oracle) with which he has juxtaposed it. 
5 6ELVOV 03V ýV TOLOOTOUq ZV Tý n6xEL ncPLop(5v noXXod%Z, 06K 6X(Y(I)V 
0 
5COIJýV10 0TPaTL4)T8V. KCII VOPOOtTnV OtPOOVTQL T6V 'AYqG(XooV. 
The link with the numbers available to serve in the army seems to 
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be false. Service as hoplites would not be excluded by Plutarch's or 
Thucydides' phrase, for soldiers were recruited not only from the 
Spartiate class (J. F. Lazenby (1985) pp. 10-20), so that the loss of these 
men as Spartiates was not significant for the total military numerical 
strength of the Spartans. The problem created by decreasing numbers 
of Spartiates was rather, perhaps, the threat posed to the survival of 
the social system, which ensured their privileged position as the ruling 
oligarchy, if they were seen to be too few to enforce it, or if they 
could not fill most of the posts of responsibility from their own ranks. 
A perioikos held command at sea (Thuc. VIII. 22.1), and occasionally 
harmosts may have been non-Spartiate (Xen. HeIL 1.1.32,11.2.2,111.5.12). 
Plutarch had recorded that Agesilaos exploited Sparta's need for 
soldiers in defending Sphodrias, c. 25, preferringt no doubtq not to 
reveal the real reason, but he was perhaps right to refer above to 
social unrest. The fear of a revolt of helots had arisen after the 
disaster at Pylos (Thuc. IV. 80), and Kinadon had plotted soon after 
Agesilaos' accession. The large numbers of discontented men that 
would now be created, if the survivors of Leuktra were deprived of 
Spartiate status, would present an even greater threat to the state. 
6 EIGýXOEV E14; T6 nXfiE)04; TOV AOKC5atpOVCL)V* KOI (P400(; 6TL T064; 
v6pouq 5EC cr4pEpov ld(V KOOEJ5EtVO tK U Tfiq 06PLOV ýPePOq KUP(OUq EZVOt 
np6q T6 XOLndvg 6Pa TOJq TE v6pOUq Tt n6xct KCIC TOOq 6V6pOq tntTCPOUq 
t(PCJXO&E. 
It is not easy to see why the question of Spartiate status 
involved such a meeting. It would suggest that the rest of the 
population thought highly enough of their superiors to sympathize with 
their plight (G. L. Cawkwell (1983) pp. 391-3), and recognized the city's 
need to avoid imposing the regular penalties. If, however, Agesilaos 
made his proposal in a meeting of the eKKXTjCF(Q consisting only of the 
Spartiates, they would be sympathetic to the plight of the survivors of 
Leuktra. Plutarch makes no favourable comment on the proposal here, 
but at Comparatio 2.3 he says that it was an exceptional political 
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device: 00 YE! YOVC dXXO G&PLOPO nO, \LTLK6V. Without the epithet, O&PLOPO 
is in the military vocabulary of stratagems, meaning "a trick", and may 
be pejorative, like UO(PLOT4q, or commendatory, like GO(P(O (E. L. Wheeler 
(1988) pp. 18,27). That the opportunity was not taken for more 
sweeping change is said to be symptomatic of the failure of Sparta to 
engage in radical reform, in keeping with the needs of the times, here 
in the social sphere, as earlier in the military, and after the Peace of 
Antalkidas (P. A. Cartledge (1987) p. 179). Plutarch seems rather to 
approve the retention of the standards of Lykourgos, and, while he 
has avoided the issue of their implementation in the present case, lie 
leaves the impression that he regretted the means. 
7 POUXOPýVOq 61 Týv napoOcav 60UP(CIV KOI KC(TfttLCXV ftEXCIV TOV VJQVI 
tvIPaXcv Etc, 'APKQ6(OV Kat Pd)(11V PtV towp&; tcpuX6EaTO OUV(5410L TOt4; 
IVC(VTCOLI;, eX6v 5e noXCYVnV TLV(5 TOV MOVTtVtG)V KOC Tl)V y6pctv tnL5pOp(5V, 
IXQCPPOTtPOV tno(nOC TC(tq eXn(OL KCII ýVG) TAv ndXtv, 6c, oO noVTdnootv 
6neVvG)aljevnv- 
Just as, if the announcement was made to the Lakedaimonians, it 
was, perhaps, an astute exercise in communication, so the expedition to 
Arkadia would be a valuable psychological rehabilitation of the Spartan 
military machine, especially for the survivors of Leuktra. Their escape 
from the indignity of the customary punishments for cowardice would 
not wholly remove either the public stigma or the personal sense of 
shame. However, some military achievement to offset the shock of a 
Spartan defeat could also do something to restore the Spartan 
reputation among the allies, who 
Id 
not expect the Lakedaimonians to 
undertake any expedition for a long time (Xen. Agesilaos 11.23). That 
any risk of further depletion of numbers was removed by avoiding 
pitched battle seems to be indicated by Xenophon's other account of 
this campaign (Hell. VI. v. 11-21)9 which confirms that there was no major 
confrontation: Eutaia was captured, but purchases replaced plunder; lie 
plundered farms near Mantineia, but refused to be persuaded to attack 
the Arkadians and Argives, and, after the panic of a false alarm at the 
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approach of his allies, the Orchomenians, a brilliant manoeuvre was 
needed to extricate his army from a valley near Mantineia, which, as 
Xenophon says, he had entered by mistake at dusk. When Agesilaos 
withdrew rapidly to Eutaia, very late, Xenophon indiscretely reports 
that he wanted to avoid contact, so that he would not be seen to be in 
flight, and would show that no one had been willing to engage in 
battle with him. Plutarch's attitude seems to have been rightly 
influenced by Xenophon's comment: tK Y6P TIj(; np6(yOcv d0up(aq t66KEL 
TL dVELXn(PtVOL TAv nd, \LV (HeIL VI. v. 21). For Plutarch, too, however, 
Agesilaos' honour is restored in the military field. lie has often shown 
admiration for his generalship, but the last phrase in this chapter 
leaves the position of Sparta still in some doubt, despite the recovery 
of some of the citizens' self-respect. 
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PART ELEVEN 
LAKONIA AND EPAMEINONDAS 
(Chapters 31-35) 
CHAPTER 31 
Crisis in Sparta 
1 'EK 6e TOOTOu napil'v E14; TýV AOK(A)VLKAV 6 'Enopctv(Sv5a(; PETdI TG)V 
CrUPP6YG)V, OOK ZX6TTOVClq EYG)V TETPaKLGPUPNV 6nXLTC)V. 
The abrupt introduction of the new situation heightens the 
contrast with the brief elation of the last chapter. Plutarch, like 
Xenophon, does not explain the arrival in the Peloponnese of 
Epameinondas, the Theban national hero, since it was, no doubt, more 
fully treated in the Life which is not extant. The Boiotian Plutarch 
would be disappointed that Xenophon should make little mention of him 
by name, and he seems to have turned to another source, perhaps 
Ephoros, followed also by Diodoros at XV. 62-66. Xenophon mentions 
that, during Agesilaos' earlier campaign in Arkadia (C. 30)9 the Eleians 
were expecting the Thebans to come, having sent ten talents for their 
expenses (Hell. VI. v. 19). He omits the report given by Diodoros of the 
formation of the Arkadian League at this time (XV. 59), but its formation 
perhaps explains the events he does mention, that Agesilaos' campaign 
was a response to the threatened Theban intervention. The existence 
of the Arkadian League is recognized at Hell. VI. v. 22. 
The other main extant accounts of Epameinondas' invasion are in 
Pelopidas, the brief Epaminondas of Nepos, and Pausanias IX. 13-15. 
Diodoros records that the Arkadians, with the Argives and Eleians, 
obtained help from the Thebans, Lokrians and Phokianss after their 
request had been refused by Athens. The decision to invade Lakonia 
was then taken jointly. As usual, since Agesilaos takes no part at this 
stage, Plutarch omits the preliminary details of the expedition here, but 
he clearly had access to other sources. He alone distinguishes the 
40,000 hoplites here from the total, including auxiliaries, pupt65oq InT6, 
given here. He gives this figure also at Pelopidas 24: AyoOpevoq tnT& 
puptMov, and says that the Thebans formed a twelfth part. The same 
total figure is given by Diodoros at XV. 81, in the obituary notice of 
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Pelopidas: ftT6 PtV ýYýCYCITO PuPL65(av, but in the account of the invasion 
this figure is given as nXcLdv(jv ý nEVTOKLOPUPC(JV (XV. 62). Plutarch's 
consistency indicates that he used the one source in both places; 
Diodoros either followed two sources. or there is a simple error in his 
text. 
3 ýV P2V 5ý yp6VOr, OOK tX6TTG)V IT6V tECIKOa(G)V, 6(pl 06 KOTOKOUV TI)V 
AOKEbCI(POVCI AWPLE! qo IV U T06TQ noVT! T6TE nP6TOV &POnGOV IV Tfj Y(SPQ 
nOXIPLOL, np6TEpov 61 005CEr, ftUpTiclev, 6X, \d 656G)TOV KCIC (50LKTOV 0300V 
IpOaX6VTC4; Inupn6XOUV KaC 5LýpnaCov 15YPL ToO nOTOPOO [Kaýj Tfiq n6Xcwq 
pn5Ev6q tnEEt6YTOq. 
Plutarch is concerned to show the low level to which the condition 
of the Spartans had declined, by comparison with the immunity from 
invasion enjoyed in the past. Diodoros, too, explicitly refers to 
Sparta's decline: EIq noXXýv 6pnyav(aV InLnTOV (XV. 63), and the previous 
centuries of immunity: nEVTOK6(YLCI 
ITTI TAV AOKG)VLKAV TETfJPrJK6TEq 
6n6pOTITOV (XV. 65). Xenophon briefly mentions that the women had 
never seen an enemy: oWnOTE MODOCAL noXEp(ouq Well. VI. v. 28), but 
reveals the Spartans' isolation in the messages from Karyai: '\eYOVTEq. 
TýV tP1jjJ(OV Well. VI. v. 25. ). He attaches great importance here to the 
defections of the perioikol, perhaps explaining Agesilaos, anxiety when 
Epameinondas challenged him over the recognition of autonomy (c. 27). 
Plutarch's three expressions combine these references to invasion, 
devastationg and Spartan helplessness. 
46 ydip 'Ayrla(Xaoq OOK era np6q TOGOOTOV, (3q (PnOt Oe6nownoq, ýEOpa 
KOI KXj6G)VO nOX9POU PdYEGOOL TOOq AOKE60LPOVCOUq, dlWl Tfiq n6XE4)q T(3 
PtOO KOC KUPL(STOTa TOCC 6nXCTOtc nEptEcrnCLPQPIVOq, IKCIPTtPEL TeNq 
6nctX6q KOC T6q PEYC(XOUY(Gq TOV OnOONV, nPOKOXOUPtV(JV tKErvov 6VOPOGTý 
Kat btOP6YEGOOL nept TAq Y(Spaq KEXcu6VTG)V, 6q TOV KOKOV CIrTL6q tOTtV 
IKK0600q T6v n6XEpov. 
By his juxtaposition of the name of Agesilaos with pn6ev6(; 
InEEL6VTOq, Plutarch seems to indicate that his decline is in some way 
responsible for Sparta's weakness, and the metaphor of the waves is 
reminiscent of Diopeithes' oracle (c. 3). The important point, perhaps, is 
that against such overwhelming enemy forces the Spartans, now 
deprived of allies, had not been able successfully to take the more 
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aggressive action beyond their frontiers that had protected their 
territory before Leuktra. Agesilaos' generalship is not criticised by 
Plutarch, who approves of his restraint, mentioned by Xenophon 
(Agesilaos 11.24), in not fighting in the open. Diodoros further 
mentions that the Lakedaimonians had to be restrained, but the order 
came from the elders (XV. 64). Plutarch's description of the points 
occupied by Agesilaos as, "central and most important", corresponds 
more closely to the topography of Sparta than Diodoros' tYOVTrr, TýV 
T6V T6n(jv 6yup6TIjTO. Plutarch clearly follows the same tradition as 
Diodoros who records the Theban taunts: 
CIOTOI bt npoac, \06VTEq Tt n6XEL npoCKCXXOOVTO TOOq EnOPTL6TOq 
Etq nOPdTQECIV, I EUVOPO, \OyEr(; E)CIL npOCYITCITTOV ITTOU(; ENOL TOV 
noXEliCov (XV. 65.4). 
but he presents them indirectly ('OPIIPLKOC, ) by reporting Agesilaos' 
response to them, and in the same way uses them to establish 
Agesilaos' responsibility for the war. Xenophon's accounts of Agesilaos' 
diplomacy concerning Thebes and Arkadia (Hell. VIAH. 19, VI. v. 4) identify 
his responsibility. 
5 01))( fiTTOV 59 TOIjTG)V tX6nouV TOV 'AynaC, \aov Of KaTdl TAv n6, \tv 
06puPOL Kai KpaUYOC Kai 5L05POPOt TOV TE npEOPUTePG)V 6UG0fVOOYETO6VTwV 
Tdl VLv6pcVQ Kai TOV YUVOLKOV 00 6uvap6vG)v Aauy6CELV, 6XX6 noVTdnaatv 
tKTp6vG)v o6o3v np6q TE TýV KPOUVAV Kai T6 nOp T8v noXEPCCJV. 
The reactions of the men and women are expressed in the same 
three nouns, but the participles show, among the elders, a sense of 
outrage, no doubt over the military situation, which Plutarch makes 
explicit later in the chapter, and, by contrastq among the women, their 
loss of rational control on perceiving the enemy's shouts and fires, 
greatly contrasting their earlier disciplined response to tragedy (c. 29), 
and the quite different picture of Spartan women often presented in 
Sa, vings of Spartan Women (Afor. 241-2). Again, the one word, KPOUYOC, 
is used, not only of the Spartans, both men and women, but also of the 
enemy's cries, KPCIUYAV; the total sound was the same, but what it meant 
was different in each case. Xenophon provides indirect confirmation of 
112 
Plutarch's description of the scene, in recording the anxiety of the 
women seeing the smoke of the burning houses. The anxiety of the 
men is shown by the- action of the authorities, who, in recognition of 
the isolation of the Spartiates, called for the immediate aid of 6,000 
Helot volunteers (Hell. VI. v. 28). Both authors seem to exploit the 
imposed transfer of the women from their usual, predominantly domestic 
environment, to the unfamiliar world of war, as a device to portray the 
crisis of confidence. 
6 AV(CI 59 KOC TÖ Tfir, 664ng OÜT6V, ÖTt TAv n6Xtv PEYCGT9v napaXoßäv 
KOt E)UVOTG)T(JTIIV9 ZC)PCX CUVECITOXPZVOV GÜTfir, TÖ ÖENPO, KOý TÖ 05 uyllpcl 
KEKOXOUP9VOV, (Z KOt GÜTär, gYPAaaTo no, \, \(5KLr, Etn(bv 95TL YUVA AÖKCILVO 
Konväv oüy WPOKc noXiptov. 
Plutarch again uses the indirect method, 'OPIjPtK6C., to indicate a 
judgement about Agesilaos' responsibility for Sparta's decline, this time 
quoting the supposed effect on Agesilaos himself of his realization that 
the situation has this special significance for his reputation. The 
validity of this judgement is not increased by attributing it to 
Agesilaos himself, since the attribution is not capable of authentication. 
Plutarch has also suggested that Agesilaos had often boasted about 
Lakonia's immunity from invasion. It is perhaps not easy to find 
suitable historical contexts for the boast, but it is likely that the form 
of the anecdote is developed from Xenophon's account. Plutarch has 
modified Xenophon's point slightly: at PtV YUVaCI<Eq OW T6V Konv6v 
6PC)OOL ýVECYOVTOP 6TE oWnOTE t 5000CI L noXEp(ouq Well. VI. v. 28). 
Aristotle's remark, that two-fifths of the property was owned by women 
(Pol. 1270a23), perhaps suggests that their concern was only for the 
property, and that would account for perhaps a minority of them, but 
since Xenophon goes on to explain that this was their first right of an 
enemy, it is clear that if the information was available to the Spartans, 
its relevance did not give it a place in his version. 
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1 
7 *Hpcr(; PeVTOL noXX6KLq 6p5q 6n6 TOO Kn(PLOOO MLC)ýOPCV, ... 'AXX' 
iýým-rq yE obbgnOTE 6pdir, dn6 TOO EOP&O. ... 8 noxx oe (JP3V 
eV To 
'ApyoX(bL KEEVTOL, ... 'YW3V U YE OMECr. 
tV Tt) AOKG)VLKCI. 
Each of the three anecdotes proves that Spartan territory 
had 
never been violated before, but the last two, which are included in 
Apophth. Lak-. Ofor. 217,233), carry more conviction as part of the 
tradition, than Agesilaos' boast, and show how the defence of Sparta 
had previously been effected by establishing military superiority 
beyond its borders. This chapter marks the lowest point in Plutarch's 
account of Agesilaos' reign. 
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CHAPTER 32 
Epameinondas threatens Sl: )arta 
T6TE PeVTOL TdV 'AVTOXK(50V (POCFýV &POPOV 6VTO TOOq notboq Elq 
KOOnpa OnEKOtCOOL mp((poýov yEv6pevov. 
The contrast with the earlier confidence of Antalkidas is perhaps 
intended to indicate the depth of despair to which even such a 
prominent Spartan had sunk. Kythera had been de-populated by 
Konon and Pharnabazos and occupied by a garrison under an Athenian 
commanderg but Sparta will have recovered it under the terms of the 
Peace. It has been suggested that perhaps Antalkidas' relatives had 
been concerned with the re-occupation. That Plutarch explicitly does 
not name his authorities here, and two or three times later in the 
chapter, may indicate that he draws from irregular sources. 
26 51 'Ayna(Xao(;, tnLYEtPO6VT6)V 6LOPO(VELV T6v nOTOP6V TOv noXEPCG)V 
Kat OLdCEoOat npdr, Týv n6, \Lv, tKXM& T& Xotnd nopETdEQTo nP6 TOV P9G(JV 
Ka I 6q)rjX(aV. 
The natural defences of the city of Sparta are extremely limited, 
apart f rom the river Eurotas. Xenophon refers to the occupation of 
passes and high ground (Agesilaos 11.24), which seems to indicate 
outlying defences, but he also mentions inner defence positions, west 
of the Eurotast such as the sanctuary of Athena Aleal where the 
hoplites had been drawn up facing the enemy near the bridge, the 
cavalry on the race-course at the sanctuary of Poseidon, and an 
ambush in the sanctuary of the Tyndaridai (HeIL VI. v. 28-31). Plutarch 
does not name the sanctuaries, but gives general locations. 
3 IPPOn 59 nXECUTOC, tOUTOO Kat PýYLCFTOC, T609 6 EOP(STO(Z, YL6V(A)V 
YCVOPtVWV, Kal T6 6Eripa pd, \, \ov On6 tvuyp6TIjTOr, ý TpayjTrITOq ZYýVETO 
GKXnP6V KOt yaXen6V TOtq OflPa(OLq. 
Immediately to the east and north of Sparta, in summer, the 
Eurotas now has not enough water to fill the stony, bed. In a wet 
winter, however, to the north it can be fast-flowing and formidable, 
and a considerable obstacle even where it widens a little, below the 
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present road bridge, and a pier of an ancient bridge (Sparta: General 
Plan, BSA XIII (1906-7) P1.1; P. A. Cartledge and A. J. S. Spawforth, (1989) 
P. 215). Plutarch has inserted this description, perhaps having noticed 
Xenophon's reference to the winter as a reason for the departure of 
the invaders (Hell. VI. v. 50). 
4 nOPEu6pr:, vov 59 np6TOV TA(; Qdt\QYYO(; T43V 'EnapELV(SV50V tE)E(Kvuo6v 
TLVEq To 'AynatX6Q, K6KEtVOq, (5q XtYETOIL, noXOv yp6voy IPOX1410q 06TO KOL' 
aupnapanýP4X)q TAV 6tPLV, 0069V A TOCFOOTOV p6VOV Elney, "0 TOO 
peyoxonp6ypovoq Mp(5nou. 
A piece of rhetorical tv6pyew, in a Homeric miniature, as in the 
confrontation of Achilles and Priam at Iliad XXIV. 482-4: 
06lj0o(; 60 9)(EL Elcop6c)VTOq, 
(3q 'AYLXXEbq 06pDnoEv t6G)V rip(OPOV OCOCLUO. 
06pPnaov 61 KOI 6XXOLO tq 6XX4XOUq 61 U60VTO. 
The reputation of a foe is thus enhanced, as Caractacus' is in Tacitus' 
Agricola, 29ff. Agesilaos makes a guarded statement, which may be 
interpreted as an expression of disbelief in the audacity displayed in 
the attack on Sparta, or of admiration for a worthy foe. 
5 tnet U q)LJ\OTtpoOpEvo4; 6 'EnopELV6V5O(, ' IV Tb ndXCL PdyqV OUV6WL 
KOI OTýGat TpdnaLOV, OOK rayucev tEayayErv o661 npOKOXeOOGGOL Te)V 
'Ayna(Xoov, IKEtVOq plv 6vaCEOEaq n6XLV ln6pOEt TAV YC5paV. 
Plutarch reverses Xenophon's judgement that an attack on the 
city was abandoned for lack of courage: 45T) TL 166KEL OoppaXWTEPOV 
ENM (Hell. VI. v. 50), suggesting that Agesilaos refused the challenge. 
It is very likely that Epameinondas may not have had any serious 
intention of occupying, or have wished to destroy, Sparta 
(P. A. Cartledge (1987) p. 235). Certainly, later events showed that 
Thebes had not the resources with which to garrison it permanentlyt 
or to maintain permanent control of the Peloponnese, and Epameinondas' 
restraint is clearly represented elsewhere in the tradition (Pausanias 
IX. 15). He perhaps saw the need to retain Sparta as a counter-balance 
to Athens and to rivals in the Peloponnese. The destruction of 
Sparta's reputation for territorial inviolability and military invincibility 
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was perhaps a sufficient achievement, and a demonstration to the 
Spartans themselves of the change in the balance of power. Xenophon 
records that the devastation of the countryside extended to the South 
coast at Gytheion. Agesilaos had on occasions demonstrated the reality 
of his military superiority in the same way, in Asia Minor and in parts 
of Greece. Epameinondas' demonstration was no less effective, and will 
have impressed not only the Spartans but also the rest of Greece, 
without the risk of casualties in another battle. The effects would also 
be felt at the next harvest time and beyond, in the case of olive trees. 
6 IV U AOKE5a(POVt TOv ndXot TLVeq OnoOXWV KOC novqpG)v (Sq 
6LOK6(3LOL CFUCFTpa(PgVTE(; KaTgXOPOV T45 '1006PLOVI 06 T6 Tý(; 'APT9PL50(; 
(Ep6v IOTLVp EftpKý Kal 5UOEKOCOCYTOV T6nov. 
The medical and political metaphors for "disloyal" suggest citizens 
who have lost their full status, to be distinguished from perioikoi and 
helots on the one hand, and the Spartiates specified later by Plutarch. 
cf. P. A. Cartledge (1987. ) p. 164- This unrest demonstrates, as did 
Kinadon thirty years earlier, the fragile harmony of the Spartan 
community. ' The depth of the present crisis led to the recruitment of 
6,000 helots recorded by Xenophon, but this further increased the 
Spartans' anxiety' when they were assembled together (Hell. VI. v. 29L 
and presumably some realized their opportunity. Perhaps the timing of 
the defection was determined by the expectation of immediately linking 
up with the enemy, and the ready surrender perhaps followed the 
arrival of allied contingents, and the Theban withdrawal, when 
Agesilaos could make his unarmed approach without danger to himself 
from the enemy. The temple of Artemis is in the territory of the 
Pitanatai (Pausanias 111.14.2) which extends to the west from the 
Spartan acropolis. Fimmen (RE (1950) Kol 2247), on Issorion, puts it to 
the north of the acropolis, on one of the hills marked Mondouna (BSA 
XIII (1906-7) General Plan L-N 11), hence not far from the enemy on 
the other side of the Eurotas. 
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7- Ot)T6C 60 tV fpaTCQ KOC PE01 tV6C OCKeTOu npocrýEt, Ro6v 
6KTIK09VOL TOO nPO(JT6ypOTOq a6TO6q* 
Agesilaos typically avoids precipitate action and prefers to operate 
by deception, thus displaying, for Plutarch, two admirable traits of 
generalship. 
9 T8V 5e GUOT6VTG)V tKE(v(jv nept neVTEKaC6EK6 TLVDq fJUXX006V VUKT6q 
6niKTELVEV. 
Summary execution indicates the gravity of the Spartan citizens' 
regard for their position. Herodotos says that Spartan executions 
always took place at night (IV. 146-2). 
10 6X, \rl 5e pe(COV tpT)v6GTj OUVG)pOGCCI Kat advo5oc, dvbp(Zv EnOPTLOT6V 
Int nPdYPOUL VEG)TtPOLq Etq OIK(QV KPdq)Cl (JUVEPYOPýVOVI 00q KaC KP(VELV 
6nopov ýV tV Tapayb TOGajTlO Kat nEPLOPCXV inLoOUXE6OVTOq. 11 
6ntKTELVEV OOV KOC TOOTOUq PET6 T6V ICP6PG)V POUXCUGdPEVOq 6 'Ayqo(Xooq 
&KPCTOUq, 005EV6C, 6()(a 6(Ktlq TEOC(VCITG)Pgvou np6TEPOY I: napTLCIT(3V. 12 
Inct U noX, \oý TG)V OUVTETCIVIJ15VG)V El(; Td 6n, \a nE; PLOCKG)V Kat EtX(STWV 
dinEMPOOKOV IK Tfiq n6Xc(jq np6q TOOq noXcp(ouq. 
There is no other report of this conspiracy, and the execution 
without trial of "a greater number of Spartiates", more than the 200 
mentioned above, in the circumstances following the heavy losses at 
Leuktra, is extremely doubtf ul (J. F. Lazenby (1985) pp. 166-7). 
Desertions of the perioikoiq however, are confirmed by Xenophon at 
Hell. VI. v. 25 and 32. These may have come into the tradition along 
with details not found in Xenophon's account, such as the two revolts 
mentioned by Plutarch, but allowance must be made for the hostile 
nature of such a source, and the conveniently secret nature of the 
proceedings which exposes the tradition to such enlargement. The 
survivors of the first revolt could, of course, provide their evidence 
with more reliablility than is to be attributed to reporters of the 
second, which was unlikely to be widely acknowledged and may be 
compared with the disappearance of helots at Thuc. IV. 80.4. 
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13 6VO)(WPýGOL be TOOq OnDOCOUC tK Tfiq AOKWVLKfiq Of PeV 6XXOL X9VOUOL 
YCLP(M. )V VCVOPeVG)V KCIC TOAV 'Apyd5(, )v dpýapevGw 6nLeVOL KCIe 6LOPPEEV 
6T6KTG)(Z, [OC be) TPEC(; PýVO(; ePPEPEVIjK6TOr- 6, \OU(; KOf Td nXENYTO Tfi(; 
y(Spaq 5tanEnOP0nK6TQr, * 
Xenophon gives the reduction of the army when the Arkadians 
went home, the lack of provisions now available, and winter, as all 
contributing to the desire of the Thebans to withdraw (Hell. VI. v. 50). 
Plutarch indicates that different reasons for the decision are given by 
the various sources he is ýusing, rather than assigning them all to 
those in command. This method allows him to introduce Theopompos' 
further suggestion of bribery. Diodoros says that Theopompos ended 
his Hellenik-a with Knidos (XIV. 84) and started his history of Philip 
after the Thasians settled Krenides (XVI. 3), so that this suggestion may 
not be part of his main narratives. Bribery is a frequent accusation 
(cf. Sphodrias in Xen. Hell. V. iv. 20) which understandably enters a 
hostile tradition, but is, not likely to be authenticated easily. The 
additional suggestion that the decision had already been made before 
the bribe was accepted enlivens the narrative. At this point Diodoros 
records the foundation by Epameinondas of the town of Messene'and 
the gathering of its new citizens (XV. 66), which Plutarch delays until 
C-34 and Xenophon overlooks. 
119 
CHAPTER 33 
The eclipse of Lykourgan standards 
1 ToDTO PtV ON OOK OZ51 dnG)q Ayv6qaav of 6XXOL, p6voq U E)c6nopnoq 
tGOETO. 
Plutarch casts doubt on Theopompos' report of Agesilaos' 
arrangement by bribery for the Thebans' departure from Lakonia 
(c. 32.14), claiming that it was uncorroborated, as he did at Perikles 28 
with Douris' accusation of brutality against Perikles and the Athenians, 
although at c. 3 he did not question Douris' testimony about Timaia. He 
thus hesitates here over a hostile account, but he quotes without 
qualification Theopompos' favourable attitude in another reference, 
recording his judgement that Agesilaos was PtYLOT04; ... KCIC TOV T6TE 
C(5VTOV InLq)aVýGTaT04; (C. 10). Corroboration was not to be expected from 
Xenophon, of course, who would have been reluctant to attribute 
bribery to Agesilaos, both on moral grounds and as indicating military 
failure. The rejected quotation was perhaps Intended to show 
indirectly that the plight of Sparta was considered serious enough to 
warrant such drastic measures. 
2 TOO U G(00AVaL TAV rndpTnV TdTE ndVTEq arTLOV 6POXOYOOGL YEWOOM 
T6V 'AynaCXaov, 6TL T4$V ep(p6T4)V 06T(S naO(3v, (PLXOVELK(aq KQI (PLXOTLP(aq, 
6nocrT6q IYP4GaTO TOIq np(SypaULV 6acpaM5q. 
Plutarch commends Agesilaos, as usual, for service In the military 
interests of Sparta (cf. Comp. 3.5). Although at Agesilaos 11.24 
Xenophon agrees with the judgement of Plutarch: BLEq)tJxaEE TAv ndhLV, 
in Mellenika there is no mention of Agesilaos in an active role in the 
defence of Sparta from VI. v. 22 to VII. v. 9. He appears there only once, 
at VILL32, to welcome his son back from war. Xenophon records 
Agesilaos' caution in the continuation of his comment at Agesilaos 11.24: 
6nou ptv Iv naVTI Wov av cZyov ot noXIPLOL, OOK t0ywv IVTaOOa, and 
confines himself to analysis of the military requirements. Plutarch 
relates this caution to a change in Agesilaos' way of thinking, which 
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determined the new policy. The word tP(PCJTG)V is important as revealing 
Plutarch's understanding of characterg consisting of both inherited 
traits and acquired. He shows that the caution which Agesilaos has 
here exercised is uncharacteristic, for he has abandoned the two 
important inherited traIts9 the competitive virtues of CPL#\OVELK(a and 
CPLXOTLP(O9 displayed repeatedly In earlier chapters. They regularly 
met with his approval, except when they were taken to excess9 and 
Plutarch, had shown before that they were further fostered by the 
Lykourgan system. He now implies that Agesilaos had at last been 
forced into a changeg for the strong word, dnoaT64; j indicates that, in 
the uncharacteristic circumstances that had been brought aboutg Sparta 
could not be saved by his own properl characteristic qualities. 
Paradoxicallys Agesilaos' personal interestg his reputation for adherence 
to Lykourgan principles as he would see them, must be sacrificedg if 
he is to act in the interest of Sparta. 
3 OÜ PiVTOL TAV YE ÖJVC(PLV KOC TAV Wav dbUVI09 Tjr. n6Ärcaý; 
6Va, \Oß£tV gK TOil nT(X(CrP(XTO(;, ÖMM Conep CYGýJCXTOO; ÖYLELVOG, ÄCaV 6' 
ÖKPLß£t KOt KOTCXCKnP9VU KCXPnPZVOU bLCXCTU napc% ndVTCX TÖV yp6V0V9 
ÖIJCXPTCCX PCC( KOC bonA TAV naCFCIV IKÄLVEV EÜTUYCaV Tn(; n6Xco.; - 
Agesilaos ensured the survival of the city, but "the power and 
the glory" of Sparta were lost. They had been founded on the 
practice of the characteristics which were now abandoned. Plutarch 
introduces a medical simile to contrast the two states. The body at the 
start is healthyl so, too, Lykourgan Sparta is considered to have been 
healthy in the beginning. Plutarch regularly praises the Sparta which 
he attributes to the period when the Lykourgan way of life prevailed. 
The difficulties now being experienced are attributed to the failures of 
individuals to understand and maintain the early principles. By 
following "strict asceticism of regimen" the Spartans had made their 
education too narrow. Excessl even of praiseworthy qualitiesp is now 
demonstrated to be destructive (cf. Aristotle NE 1.1098al6, ix. 1166al2, 
Pol. 1295a389 c. 5, and the Delphic PnSly dyav). The quarrel between 
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Agesilaos and Lysander at c. 8 had illustratea the danger to the state 
from unrestrained desires for achievementg T6 45YGY Pý wXoEdpEvat, 
Here It is the narrowness of the Spartan way of life that is excessive. 
Only by having had a broader, more philosophical element in his 
education, could a Spartan -or anyone else - recognize the point at 
which excess begins. The parallel with medicine points to the ability 
of a doctor to regulate the excesses In bodily functions by the use of 
TýYVTJ, the value of which is recognized by Plato at Svmposium (186-8). 
Like Plutarchq Aristotle (PoL 1271bl) also criticizes the narrowness of 
Spartans' education, for through having had regard for one virtue 
only, they did not know how to live a peaceful life, and concentrated 
only on the art of war (cf. c. 26). Spartans were, for Aristotle, also 
wrong In their- practice even of this single virtue (Pol. 1334b), for 
while training In war rightly provides against enslavementl they used 
their military-power to create an empire, and to rule despotically over 
their neighbours, instead of ruling for the good of the governed (Pol 
1333b4l-1334a). Plutarch's phrase, "a single failure and the 
(consequent) critical turning point", suggests that he had In mind the 
statement of Aristotle: "The city sank under a single blow"s but he 
does not continue with Aristotle's train of thought about the cause, 
that it was inequality under its property laws that had led to a 
reduction in the number of citizens WoL 127003-b). 
OOK d, \6yG)c.. 4 npdq ydip EtP4VIIV KCII 6PCTýV KQC 6p6VOLCIV 6PLCTTO 
OUVTETCXyptvq) noXLTEOPOTt npo(yayoy6VTEqýdPY6q KCXt 5UVOGTE(Gq PLOCOUCt 45V 
066EV6q Aq)EtTO bErGOaL ndXLv c66aLp6vG)q PLWOPIVnV 6 AUKOOPYOqo tacpd, \Tlcrav. 
Plutarch implies, by his own interjected comment (cf. 6pOk AIYWY 
at c. 29)9 that with training in sound reasoning the Spartans would 
have recognized the. mistaken course they were steering, and would 
have corrected their over-concentration on a limited objective. 
Narrowness of education prevented the true understanding of the 
lawgiver's alms.. Plutarch here presents two views of the constitution. 
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The first is his own favourable judgement of the earlier condition of 
Spartaq in which prosperity is defined in the Lykourgan terms of 
Lykourgos, especially 30-31: obedience of the citizens, and enjoyment 
by all of the city's self-sufficiency, without hegemony. He contrasts 
this with prosperity in a more material sense, depending on empire and 
power, as the Spartans had come to understand it, and as the author 
of Lak. PoL presents it in his first sentence: Ot3GC1 15UVaTCaTdTT) TE KC11 
6VOPQGTOTdTn IV Tb 'EXX65L. 4 
Plutarch and Aristotle agree in giving narrowness as the cause of 
Sparta's decline, but there is a difference in their interpretations of 
the intentions of the lawgiver, and hence of his responsibility. 
Aristotle interpreted the Spartan constitution as designed by the 
lawgiver only for military excellence: for Plutarch, empire and the 
special power denoted by 6uvaaTcCa have been added by the Spartans 
themselves, later. The admired objectives are here summarized In the 
following phrase n6XLV EO6aLP6VG)r, PL(jaop1vT1vq dissociating Lykourgos 
from the criticism Implied in the adjective Otatouc., and presenting him, 
consistently with Lyk. 23, as a man of peace. In so far as Plutarch's 
praise for Agesilaos centres on his military activityp it may be thought 
that Plutarch holds him largely' responsible for continuing the 
misinterpretation of Lykourgos' intentions. However, his approval is 
given mainly for the defence of the city and for Panhellenist 
enterprises, not for aggression against Thebes (Comp. 111.2). A cluster 
of ornamentation indicates the importance Plutarch attaches to this 
passage. 
At this point he has completed the development of Xenophon's 
Injunction to consider the behaviour of those in adversity (c. 29), the 
first courageous response to disaster contrasting with the later loss of 
nerve- and the decline (cc. 30ff. ). In the rest of this chapter he 
considers further decline In Spartan behaviour In other circumstances. 
It Is clear from modern discussions of the "decline" of Sparta that 
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several factors were involved: social, concerning the fall in numbers of 
the Spartiateso though not of the Lakedalmonian population as a whole; 
military, as regards the Spartans' limited innovation in organization 
and tactical developments; political, as In Plutarch's review of Spartan 
hegemony. The aggressive policy has been defended (G. L. Cawkwell 
(1976) pp. 62-84), but the position of Sparta in the years following 
Leuktra (J. F. Lazenby (1985) pp. 165-70) shows that this policy failed 
(P. A. Cartledge (1987) P. 407). There is, however, another factor 
underlying these, which is suggested by a remark of Xenophon: 
(5q yop ... YPTIPdTG)V 
61 t6pa Týv ndXtv 6coplvnv, cl PiXXOL 
adppaY6V TLva fECLV, tnt T6 nop(CELV TOGTO taUT6V fTaEE (Agesilaos 
11.25). 
Xenophon refers to Agesilaos' service abroad at the end of his career. 
Sparta, like Thebes and Athens, never had the resources, either of 
manpower or of moneV9 needed to maintain hegemony of Greece for long 
(cf. G. L. Cawkwell (1972) P. 275), and it seems that Xenophon might just 
as well have put his remark at the start, for Sparta's frequent resort 
to war throughout Agesilaos' reign was perhaps required, and 
designed, to make good the lack of money by extensive predatoriness. 
5 aft6r, ptv ON 6 'Ayna(Xaoq 45n np6q TCIC. CYTPOITECCV; dnELPAKEL 5LCI 
I T6 Yqparl *A, 0)((5apO4; 51 6 U(6q a6TOO TAY tK ELKCX(Oq 4Kouaciv naP43 TOO 
TUp6VVOU 0040ELaV EYOV tV(KflGEV 'ApK66aq TAY ACYOPIVnV 66QKPUV p6ynve 
o66Etq yclp fnEGE TOY PET' C16TOOl GUYVOOq 61 TOY tVaVTCG)V 6VCTXEV. 
Agesilaos' retirement at the age of about 74, not announced by 
Xenophon, but to be assumed from his long absence from the narrative, 
allows Archidamos, the heir to the kingship, to be given the 
opportunity for experience of military command before becoming king, 
unlike Agesilaos, so far as is known. Plutarch usually passes over 
events in which Agesilaos played no part, and this campaign appears to 
transfer the focus from Agesilaos to his son, which would be 
inappropriate in his biography. However, the absence of the name of 
Dionysiosp and the lack of details about the assistance sent by him, 
and about the action itself (Xen. Hell. VILL28), perhaps indicate that 
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Plutarch is not recounting the episode for its own sake. The very 
need for Sicilian help clearly continues the theme of Sparta's decline, 
highlighting Sparta's lack of access to sources of manpower In the 
Peloponnese, which would require money and allies. Agesilaos' 
influence, and his responsibility for it, will be further revealed in the 
sequel of the Arkadian expedition under the command of Archidamos. 
Xenophonj too, has indicatedl by reporting the Arkadians' successes, 
the reality of *the military decline of Sparta andl if the MSS reading is 
correct, of the shortage of Spartiates: 
(ot 'ApKd5E: O; ) ... CrrpaTEUCYdPEVOL 69 KCIt Eb; 'Aa(VIIV Tfiq 
MKO(Vnq tVCKnGdV TE TAV TOV ACXKE6CILPOV(WV CPPOUPdV K01 T6V 
rcPdVOPCX T6v noXepapyov EnaPTLdTnV vevevnpevov dntKTELVaV Kat T6 
npo6crrLOV T(5AV 'AaLvatov In6porloav (Hell. VII. I. 25), 
though, with the emendation r-napTtdTTIY noXepapyov, Geranor was merely 
promoted, perhaps in unusual circumstances (J. F. Lazenby (1985) p. 203 
n. 7). The ability to mount a Spartan attack on Arkadia shows a 
distinct and separate use of manpower from the defence of distant 
parts of Lakonia itself against sudden attack. The expedition perhaps 
marks an attempt to return to the Spartans' economical policy of 
securing their defence against potential enemies by mounting attacks 
beyond the Lakonian borders. In the past, by establishing a 
reputation for invincibility in battles fought in favourable 
circumstances of their own choosingo they had been able to deter 
Invasion. Even Leuktra would have been In this categorys for, by his 
attitude to Thebes over the taking of the oaths at the peace 
conferencep Agesilaos had engineered the opportunity for a victory 
which would have removed the last threat to Spartan hegemony. The 
designation "tearless" gives all the Information about the battle that 
makes it significant for Plutarch's subsequent comment$ which explains 
in what way It was tearlessl though the true Spartan reaction to 
casualties did not normally involve tears either. 
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6 OCJTri Pdi\LCFTCX TýV 6GOtVCtQV AXEYEEV A VCKn TAq nAcoq. 
Xenophon's injunction might also have required examination of 
behaviour in favourable circumstances. The paradox, that victory 
should show up weakness, reveals that in Plutarch's view Sparta's 
problem is a matter of its own unique character, the weakness of the 
city, in his account, being moral, not military. 
np6TEPOV PtV YdP OGTG) GdVnOEq AY00VT0 KCII nPOCAKOV EPYOV 06T0% 
CTVaL T6 VLKdV TOOq noXEp(ouq (50TE P4TE OdELV TOrq OEorq nXAv 
6XEKTpu6va VLKnT4pLOV & TO n6XEt P4TE PEYOXnYOPErV TOOq dYG)VLCaPiV0Uq 
p401 OnepyatPELV TOOq nuv0avoptvoUq. 
Plutarch sets out - the earlier characteristics which provide a 
standard by which to judge the Spartans' current behaviour. The 
Spartan way of life had brought the continued success that gave rise 
to the belief that victory was "customary and natural" - the belief that 
was shattered at Leuktra, but was nowq they hoped, to be revived. 
This belief, unlike the dPaPT(a 11(a Kal Oon4 above, might have been 
said by Plutarch to be dA6y4)q, and so, perhapsq predictably unfulfilled. 
The resentment of the neglected gods does not appear to be the point 
herep and setting up the normal trophy of victory would not come into 
the category of excessive exultation. Only its excess# shown by t5nep-, 
was untypical. On this occasion the Spartans were guilty of all three 
forms of excess. The anaphora of 114TE with an infinitive adjacent 
enhances the emphasis on the three phrases. 
7 &Udl KCXC TAC. & MCXVTLVCCQI PdYnq YCVOPeVnqp flY OOUKU5C5nq YeYPO(PCI 
TO nPdTQ CPPdCFaVTL TAV VCKIIV Ot 6P)fOVTEC, tK CPL6LTCOU KPeOr, EnEpWav 
E0aYYýXLOVq dAAO 6' O66eV- 
Thucydides gives the report at V. 64-75, but without reference to 
any reward for the messenger. The restraint shown after the much 
more important victory at Mantinela (418BC) illustrates the Spartans' 
earlier practice, but Plutarch also introduces it as the subject of the 
response to newsq which is to be made the occasion for his comparison 
of the Spartans' present behaviour. Plutarch seems to suggest that 
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the magistrates messed together. 
8 T6TC U Tfir, pci)(11r, 43yyCX0E(Onq Kat TOO 'APYLWou npOGLdVTOq, 
005CEI; tK0PTtPTjCrCVq 6XX4N np6T6q 01 6 naTýp 6nAVTa 5aKpdG)V On6 YOP45q Kot 
PCT' tKCtVOV Tdl 6PYEra, T(ZV 69 npEOPUTtPG)V Kal TOV VUVaLK13V T6 nXfiBoq 
Int T6v nOTO[P6V KaT&L, Tdq TE yEtpaq 6pEy6VTG)V KOt OEOKXUTOOVTG)V. 
Plutarch has given an all-inclusive listo mentioning the gods 
invoked by the mortals, and dividing the latter into the representative 
of the warriors in battle and the adults at home. He, like Xenophon 
(HeIL VILL32), gives a comprehensive list of all the levels of adult 
Spartan society left in the city. The lack of restraint Is shown at 
first to be general in the city, but the party that went out to meet 
Archidamos is detailed, being led by his father, Agesilaos. He Is not 
named heres perhaps to introduce the alliteration of P, and to stress 
the irregularity of the personal nature of the greeting in a public 
event by the one whot of all people, had been to the fore, previously, 
in upholding the traditions of Spartan life. Plutarch completes the list 
of Spartans in the city with the officialsq consisting of the king and 
the magistrates, and the ordinary civilians, consisting of the elders 
and the women. Another paradox is perhaps Intended, in that the 
so-called Tearless Battle now causes tears; and whereas in other cities 
both kinds of tearst expressions of joy and sorrows would not be 
exceptional, tears in Sparta now reveals not Spartan strengths as they 
did by their absence in the sorrow after Leuktra, but, by their 
appearance In joys Spartan weakness. The particular abnormality of 
Spartans thanking the gods for victoryt which they had earlier 
regarded as theirs naturally, betokens both their great sense of relief 
and their present lack of their former composure. 
The topography of the Spartan residential area Is imperfectly 
known. Four of the five villages were enclosed within walls in 
Hellenistic times, but there is no significant descent to the riverp 
unless the procession started from the low hill to the north which 
served as Sparta's acropolis. 
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(Zoncp dnewujj&Tj4; Td nap' d&(aV 6VECE)TI Tfl4Z I: ndPTT)r. Kal XCAPnP6V 
C(bOLq t& dpyfiq T6 qZq 6P(SCFnql Inel np6TEp6v ye cpaGLV 0061 TaCq YUVaLEtV 
dlVTLPXtnELV TOOq 6V6Paqs atGYUVOPýVOUq 42 Ok fnTaLoav. 
Xenophon records Archidamos' address to the troops before the 
battle: 
6Vao, \14X)peV 45POOrr, 6PPCIGLV .9. nauc(Spe0a atuyuv6p&vot KOC 
naZ5Clq KCII YUVOtKaq KOt npeCOUTIPOUq Kat Etvouq (HeIL VII-1.30). 
These words clearly have been adapted by Plutarch and set in a 
different context. He is not illustrating Archidamos' generalshipp but 
instead describes the position achieved after the battle, in terms of 
what the troops had been urged beforehand to achieve. This use of 
(PaCYLV, with its subject not expressed, is a fiction, no doubt9 though 
Plutarch could assume that someone would notice the fulfilment of the 
general's exhortation. The Spartans display self-deception in 
supposing that after Archidamos' victory the city will avoid the 
consequences of Leuktra. Plutarch has them refer to the disaster as 
an unmerited disgrace, perhaps revealing their arrogance in Ignoring 
the more usual political and military consequences of defeat. Mention 
of T004; 45V6PQ4;, the warriors who had been in Arkadia with Archidamos, 
and who were not part of the procession referred to, completes the list 
with the only remaining members of the adult citizen population. Each 
of these constituents, those in the city and the arriving warriors, has 
a verb denoting vision as predicateg in the case of those in the city, 
an imagined ability to see something which did not exist, and in the 
case of the meng their newly-recovered ability to look their wives in 
the face after the period of shame. The start of the next chapter 
shows the true position, and reveals that the relief was an illusion. 
The chapter ends with a reference to the disaster of defeat at 
Leuktra, using the verb fnTGLCFaVj which is cognate with the noun 
nTaCupaTOq used in the earlier part of the chapter. Another reference 
to disaster, &FOXTIcrav, occurring in a significant position at the end of 
that sectionj had marked the end of Plutarch's analysis of the citizens' 
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collective responsibility for Sparta's decline, resulting from their 
departure from strict Lykourgan principles. Plutarch's analysis is 
reminiscent of Diodoros' censure of the successors of the earlier 
Spartans who, for the five hundred years before Leuktral had 
preserved the city's hegemony (XV. 1.1-5). In this traditions the 
downfall is attributed to the Spartans' own folly in treating their allies 
harshly. Diodoros comes closest to Plutarch when he says that they 
had deserved the contempt they experienced: 6oTjv eli(6c, IGTL YEVICFOCIL 
KaT6 TOV d1VaLP0dVT(aV TC)r, TOV , npoy6vwv 6PCTd(; l an unmistakable 
reference to the Lykourgan values which Plutarchl too, claims were 
abandoned. That Agesilaos was held responsible is made clear at 
XV. 19.4: 6 61 'Aytja(Aao4;, OV q)dGEL 5paCFTLK6o;, (PLXon(5. \Epoc. ýV 1<01 Tflq TOV 
'EXXAvov buvacrreCaq dVTECYCTO. Plutarch's attitude seems to be 
consistent with the hostile tradition. 
The second half of the chapter deals with the city's moral 
weakness, following on its military weakness. By beginning this 
section with his name, Plutarch seems to have assigned Individual 
responsibility to the leadership of Agesilaos In this respect, illustrated 
by his heading the uncharacteristic emotional procession. His 
individual responsibilityl howeverg is finally extended to the military 
decline, with the reference to Leuktra. The chapter began with 
Plutarch's commendation of Agesilaos for saving Spartat though he did 
it only by renouncing the qualities which had led to the success of the 
militarily aggressive policies, but which had finally brought about the 
disaster denoted in the phrase with which it now ends. Thus in the 
first part of the analysis Plutarch had dealt with the military disaster, 
foreshadowing Agesilaos' responsibility for the resulting moral 
weaknessp and at the end he returns to the military disaster, linking 
its too, into the chain of Agesilaos' responsibility. 
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CHAPTER 34 
Epameinondas again threatens Sparta 
1 OCKLCOPeVTI(; 61 MeacrAvinq On6 TOv nept T6V 'EnapELVCSV5QV Kal TOV 
6PYaf(aV nOXLTOV naVTCly60ev Etq CXOTAV CFUPnOPeUOPtV(JV. 
Plutarch has made his reference to the foundation of Messene 
after his account of the Tearless Battle. Diodoros 
(XV. 66) Indicates 
that Messene was founded after Epameinondas' campaign in Lakonia. 
Xenophon does not mention the foundation of the city at that point 
(HeR VI. v. 32), but indirectly confirms its existence, and Diodoros' 
chronologyq by his references to the Theban and Persian demands for 
its autonomyj and Sparta's refusal to accept it (Hell. VIIA. 27,36; iv. 9). 
Plutarch indicates no firm relative dating, and its mention has been 
delayed, perhaps, to form the bridge over a period of several years, 
leading to the reference below to Agesilaos' failure to recover Messenia 
during Epameinondas' last invasion of Lakonia, when the attack on 
Sparta serves-to mark the Spartans' deepest resentment of Agesilaos. 
During this period, Xenophon at Agesilaos H. 25 records Agesilaos, 
active concern only over Sparta's finances, and assigns no active role 
to him in Hellenika. 
6LOPdYCGE)CIL tJIV OOK IT6Xp(jv 0651 KCi)XOCLV IE)dVCIVTO. 
Plutarch follows the analysis of the Spartans' moral decline in the 
preceding chapter with a demonstration of the effect on their military 
situation - loss of courage for battle and loss of power to control 
events. Plutarch shows that the revival under Archidamos was only 
imagined in the Spartan minds. The campaigns mentioned by Xenophon 
at this time were undertakenj without Agesilaosl for the recovery of 
Karyal (Hell. VIIA. 28) and Sellasia, (Hell. VII. iv. 12)9 and for the placing 
of a garrison in Kromnos and its later relief from siege (Hefl. 
VII. iv. 20-27). He does not put these into perspective as regards 
Sparta's real strength, though he mentions outside help sent at these 
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timesp for example, from Sicily and from some Arkadians. A balanced 
view of the military strength of the Spartans has suggested that their 
courage remained intact, and, although they were contained within 
their boundaries and could no longer be a great powerg they were still 
a formidable force (i. F. Lazenby (1985) pp. 165-9). The isolation of 
Sparta by the foundation of Messene and Megalopolis will have 
restricted its imperial recovery. 
yoxenor, U Kal paptG)q npdq TdV 'AyncyCXaov EtYOV, 6TL ydpav OOTE 
nXAOEL Tfi(; AaKCi)VtKfi4; tJ\(STTOVa KCII np(A)TCOOUGCXV 6PET6 Tfir. 
'EXXinvtKfl4; 
EYOVTEi; KCII KapnotllievoL yp6VOV TOCYOOTOV, int Tý4; tKE(VOU PaGLXEC04; 
6noMaXtKOCIL. 
In the last chapter, Plutarch recounted directly the personal and 
individual emotional responses of the Spartans to the events. Here he 
makes explicit the criticism of Agesilaos that was merely implied before, 
when he now describes, though indirectly, *OP1JPLK45Ct Agesilaos' 
responsibility for the Spartan weakness and decline, as recognized by 
the Spartans themselves. Plutarch's judgement of Agesilaos is not an 
unreasonable one here, stated in terms reminiscent of Diodoros (XV. 1). 
His description of the land of Messenia adequately suggests the 
significance of the loss to Sparta of much rich agricultural productiong 
but to what extent this contributed to the financial difficulties, which 
Agesilaos later tried to relieve by offering himself for mercenary 
service overseas (cc. 36ff. ), cannot be assessed. The loss is described 
as "a serious blow that condemned - Sparta to take a second place" 
(P-Oliva (1971) p. 196), though no direct connection can be made since 
the state as such did not own land anywhere and the working of 
Sparta's treasury is unknown. Plutarch9s highly Intricate, elaborate 
structure reveals careful composition, and careful composition indicates 
the importance that the author attaches to the passage. This is 
clearly, therefore, his considered judgement of Agesilaos at this point 
in his narrative. 
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2 BL6 KOC nPOTELVOPIVrIV W TOV 0110a(COV TAV etp4vijv 6 *AvT)aUaoq. 
OOK IUEaTO. 
Xenophon refers to three peace initiatives, by Ariobarzanesp 
Pelopidas, and Corinth (Hell. VII. I. 279 33-40, iv. 8-12). The Thebans 
naturally always demanded acceptance by Sparta of the independence 
of the newly founded city of Messenel perhaps recollecting Agesilaos' 
repeated insistence on the autonomy of Boiotia in similar circumstances, 
and Ariobazarnes' support for Sparta did not deter them. Pelopidas 
had negotiated peace terms with Artaxerxesp but failed to obtain 
ratification by any of the other cities of Greece. Plutarch's remark 
most clearly fits the third initiative, which marked the end of the 
Peloponnesian Leaguet with only Sparta abstaining in the hope of 
regaining Messenia. 
Pý Dou. \6pEvoq U TO X6YQ npOeGOOL TOrq EPYQ KPOTOOM TAV Y(SpaYt 
&XXCN 4)LX0VELK45Vt tKENTIV PtV 00K dneXoPE, PLKPOO 51 TAV rndPTnV 
npoaantDCAE KaT0CrTPC1T1jYTJ0C Cl;. 
Though the contrasted datives are not parallel grammatically, the 
usual opposition between word and deed Still Stands, and is here very 
strong. The'Spartanst traditionally regarded as men of action rather 
than of words, are required to give their verbal acceptance of the 
actions of others, the Thebans, and the verbs npoeCOM, of the 
Spartans, and KPOTOLIOLt of the Thebanst clearly reverse the traditional 
norms of the previous era. The loss of Messenia will have cut off the 
income of the Spartans, whether Spartiates or inferiors, who still had 
land there, and reduced the number of lots available for distributiont 
but compared to the time when the population was most numerous, the 
land required to supply the domestic needs of Individual Spartiatesq 
now numbering perhaps only one tenth as manyl will not have been as 
extensive as before, and the nature of the financial benefit of private 
possessions in Messenia would presumably have changed before now. 
Perhaps most essential needs could be met In Lakonia,, and the large 
accumulations of estates (Aristotle PoL 1270a33-b) may have been 
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hardest hit. 
Of more Immediate importance was the proximity of enemy territory 
on the boundaries of Lakonia$ prohibiting assistance from any friendly 
states. Agesilaos' attitude towards Thebes is, as usuall attributed to 
personal hatred and hostility. Plutarch perhaps Implies a retributive 
connection between the excessive pursuit of Thebes and the penalty 
for Sparta: it was no doubt too late at this time, for even a change of 
heart there to modify Epameinondas' determination to preserve 
Messenian autonomy. Agesilaos is said not only almost to have lost 
Sparta besidesq but to have done so through being outdone In his main 
field of competence, generalship. Plutarch goes on to refer this to the 
defenceless state of the, cityg when Epametnondas unexpectedly marched 
South overnight from Tegeat while Agesilaos was marching north to 
help the Mantineians in response to their request. The verb 
K(1T00TPCXT1JYN has developed a technical sense in Diodoros: navoupycQ 
KaTCGTPaTAYqGaV (XV. 16.1; cf. XVI. 11.4; E. L. Wheeler (1988) p. 10 n. ) 
Xenophon described Sparta as 45onep VF. OTTLCNV naVTdnactv EPnPOV TOV 
6PUvOPýVov (HeA VII. v. 10), which provides some support for Plutarch's 
judgement. 
3 Ine t YOP 0C MCIVTLVEr4; 03OLr. dnicYTTjaav TOV Oinpa C(OV mat 
PETentpnOVTO TOOq A(XKE6atPOVCOUC, atoo6pevoq 6- 'EnapCLV(SV5aq T6V 
'Ayna(kaov tEECrrPaTCUP1VOV PETC1 TAq 6UVdPEL)q KOC npoaLdvTa, X0106V TOOq 
MaVTLVCtq dvICeuEe VUKTdq 1K TEytaq dyov ln"OOT4V TAV AaKEBOCPOVCI T6 
GTPdTCUPO, Kal PLKP6V Mince napoXAdEaC TdV 'AYna(xaov gPnpov tEa((Pvnq 
KOTaXOPEEV T4v n6XLV. 
Plutarch moves on to the fourth Theban, invasion of the 
Peloponnese, and the second attack oný Sparta. Xenophon, who 
recognized that the Arkadians and others had Instigated the first 
Incursion into Lakonia (HeA VI. v. 23), now gives prominence to the 
Arkadians' charge that the Thebans' aim was to dominate theml 
indicating his own approval by referring to them as Ot KTj5(5PCVOL TAC. 
neXonovvAaou (HeIL VII. v. 1). The Thebans 'sadly were disappointed in 
their reliance on the voluntary unanimity of their, Arkadian allies. 
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They had not the resources to do anything else but- trust their loyalty 
to the alliance. The Mantineian Lykomedes, Xenophon suggests (HeR. 
VII. I. 23), had encouraged some Arkadians to become hostile to Thebest 
though there was also long-standing conflict between those with 
oligarchic, often pro-Spartan, sympathies and the commonly democratic 
opposition to Spartal in addition to old antagonisms, Mantineia against, 
Tegea, Arkadia against Elis. The Athenians, after Theban occupation of 
Oropos, had accepted the Arkadian offer of allianceg and Theban 
Inexperience had led their representatives Into diplomatic errorst in 
Achaia and at Tegea (Hell. VII. I. 43, iv. 36-40). Perhaps these tensions 
inevitably condemned the incipient federation to failure from the start, 
but more general resistance to the idea of federation has also been 
observed (D. J. Mosley (1971) pp. 319-30). The dominant tradition 
attributed only the worst of motives to the Bolotians, who shouldl 
perhaps, be judged no more harshly than others, if they seem to have 
acted at times In their own perceived best interests. 
Plutarch has set the scene brieflyp and has Epametnondas leave 
Tegea before any Lakedaimonians have reached the areaý but are only 
on their way in response to the Mantineian request for helpp as also 
mentioned by Xenophon (He1L VII-V-9). In Diodoros' accounto on the 
other-hand, Epameinondas sets out to Sparta on learning that they are 
already plundering In the vicinity (XV. 5-6). There are thus clearly two 
differing versions of these events. Diodoros gives the. name of the 
commander as King Agist which has been emended to Agesilaos 
(C. Tuplin (1979) pp. 347-57)# with the later reference to Agesilaos 
changed to Archidamos, putting Agesilaos' whereabouts in question. 
4 cMdvou 51 Oeanttwq, 6q KaXXLaO1vnq (pna(v, (S(; U Zcvoq)OY1 KPTIT6C. 
TLVOr,, 1EaYyr:, CJ\aVTOC TO 'Ay1qGLX6Q. 
Xenophon reports that Agesilaos was marching to Mantinela by 
way of Pellene in the Eurotas valley (HeIL VII. v. 9)j and received 
warning there from the Cretan only "just in time to avoid the capture 
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of Sparta. Plutarch indicates that he knew of another version here, 
and since Kallisthenes was from Olynthos, he may have had access to 
independent sources from northern Greece. Thespiai had a 
pro-Spartan party, and Spartan garrisons, including one under 
Sphodriasi, had been there before Leuktra, which may explain the 
desertion of a Thespian from Epameinondas to Agesilaosp perhaps even 
by arrangement beforehand as a Spartan sympathizer. The passing of 
this intelligence by the deserter was crucial for Sparta's defence, and 
Xenophon even-suggests possible divine responsibility for the Cretan's 
message to Agesilaos (Hell. VII. v. 10). Diodoros mentions Cretan 
messengers, in the plural, and their function Is very different. His 
"Agesilaos" is not informed about Epameinondas" marchl but guesser. 
what he will do. The Cretans are then sent to Sparta to alert those 
left behind. This is an unconvincing piece of generalship, and it is 
hardly acceptable to replace the "guess" by introducing the 
"suppressed" Euthynos from Kallisthenesp as C. Tuplin (1979) suggests 
(P-350). Diodoros' later reference to Agesilaos, as 6 61 Int T14; CPUJ\OKj4; 
MoAcXetpývoq, contradicts the earlier suggestion of his whereabouts, 
and may simply distinguish him from the cavalry, the mercenaries, and 
the three lochoi, all of whom seem to have continued on their way to 
Arkadia after the arrival of the Cretan message, while Agesilaos 
returned to Sparta (Xen. HeR VII. v. 10). 
There are two other factors which help to clarify the situation. 
(1) Confusion over the Cretan participation may be removed. Plutarch 
records the dispatch of Agesilaos' Instructions by mounted messenger 
sent on ahead to Sparta by Agesilaosq which Xenophon omits, and 
perhaps Diodoros transferred the function of the Cretan(s) to the 
conveyance of this communicationp which for him contained the 
commander's Inspired "guess". 
(2) Topography presents problems for the movements of the two 
armies in Diodoros, who does not explain whether they used the same 
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route or not. In Xenophon's version, howevert while Agesilaos was 
travelling via Pellenel Epameinondas would have marched from his camp 
at Tegea by a more direct route along the valley of the river 
Sarandapotamos, to reach Sellasia, on the northern side of Spartal to 
the east of the Eurotas. His intention may have been, partly at leasto 
to force the'Spartans to limit their aid to Mantinela by retaining troops 
to defend their own territory, but he may also have exploited the use 
by Agesilaos of the western route, necessitated by the Theban 
presence at Tegea. 
KOE OOT6c. napýXftv CtC. TAV Z: ndpTIJV. 5 6X(YQ 61 IJCFTEPOV Of 
OTIR(AtOL 6LIPaLVOV T6v E6PCSTaV Kal npooipCIXXOV Ta ndAEL, PdXl tPPG)PtV(jq 
TOO 'AynGLX60U Kat nap' AXLK(CIV InapdVOVTOq. 
Plutarch maintains high praise for Agesilaos' military judgement 
and activities. He consistently distinguishes his generalship from other 
aspects of character. Agesilaos is judged by Diodoros, on several 
occasions and in several situationsq and his judgements are perhaps 
similar to Plutarch's. He condemns the abandonment of the early 
Spartan virtues (XV. 1-5)9 and Agesilaos' fondness for war (XV. 19.4)9 but 
praises his generalship in the defence of Sparta against Epametnondas 
(XV. 83). The judgement at XV. 31.3-41 howeverl also In praise of his 
generalships is not necessarily an inconsistencyl to be explained by a: 
change in source: "The villain of a few pages earlier (19.4) has now [at 
XV. 31.3-41 been transformed into a hero" (H. D. Westlake (1986) p. 269). 
There is a key word, 5PaOTLK6rq in both passages, which indicates the 
same consistent character assessment, and commendation of the 
achievement should not be mistaken for approval of the man. 
6 ob ydp, (5q, np6TEPOV9 dGWXCCOr. t6ý T6V KCILPOV 6VTC1 KCIC (PUAOKJr., 
&W pOXXov dnovoCaq KOt T6Xpnq, Orq T6V 6XXOV YP6VOV oWnOTC 
nEaTEdoaq oW YPnG6PEVOqq T6TE pdvotq 6nCdCaTO T6V KCVbUVOV* 
Plutarch had used the word doWAOq in describing Agesilaos' 
previous defence of Sparta (c. 33), - and now he has taken over 
Xenophon's word for the Spartans' desperate efforts, Torc 
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6novcvonp&otq (Hell. VII. v. 12). Thus, in each of his successful 
defences of Sparta, Agesilaos Is said to have departed from his 
established practicel indicating the two extremest the over-cautious and 
the over-daring, between which there could have been an Aristotelian 
mean. Perhaps the exercise of their natural characteristics could not 
sustain the policies which led to the decline of the Spartans, although 
his ability to recognize 6 KOtp64; seems to be, for Plutarch, one of 
Agesilaos' strengths as a general, except at Leuktra (c. 28; cf. c. 39). 
The successful defence of Sparta, In the reduced circumstances of the 
timep restores the position which Plutarch supposes the Lykourgan 
constitution to have been designed to maintain. The rest of the 
chapter reveals thato in the new circumstancest the traditional Spartan 
characteristics of fitnesst courage, selflessness and maintenance of 
discipline, still flourished. "Rumours of the death of Sparta ... are in 
fact seriously exaggerated" (P. A. Cartledge and A. J. S. Spawforth (1989) 
p. ix, after M. Twain). 
IK TOV YELP15V TOO 'EnopCLVC5V6OU TAv n6ALV tEopndcoic., KOC GT4CFar. 
Tp6natov, 7 1<01 Torq naLOC Kal Torq YUVOLEN tnLE)CCEM; TC1 KdXXLCFTa 
TPOCPCrC1 Tt nQTPCbL TOOq AaKC6aLPOVCOUq dtno5t56VTOq, IV U nP(STOLq T6V 
'Ap)(Mapov ... 8 *1GC6O1V 51 5009 T6V (POLP(60U ut6v ... 
Xenophon does not mention Agesilaos -as taking part in the 
defence of Sparta, after the Spartiates had posted themselves on, guard 
following his return from Pellene. He describes Archidamos' vigorous 
leadership of a small band of one hundred mens and gives him the 
honour of the trophy (HelL VII. v. 12-13). In a "euphuistic" passage 
reminiscent of the style of the orator Gorglass Archidamos, and Isidas 
carry on the fight as substitutes for Agesilaos, who could not really be 
imagined as taking so active a part at his age. Homer substituted 
Diomedes' 45pta-reta for the absent Achilles (Iliad -V). The episodes do 
not involve Agesilaos directlyl but allow Plutarch to portray some of 
the traditional Spartan characteristics that he continued to admire, in 
particular by carrying the attention back to the upbringing of citizens, 
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in the service of the city. 
10 ITP(SE)II 6' On' o6ftv6q, erTE OEOLI 60 43PETýV cpuXdTTOVTOq, aft6v, CrTC 
PEtC6V TL Kat Kpet-rTov dv9p(Snou CPCXVCE4; TOrq IVCXVTCOLq. 
Plutarch here introduces the possibility of divine intervention, to 
which Xenophon refers at four different stages in his account (Hell. 
VII. v. 10-13,26). The first and last of thesel the saving of Sparta and 
the balanced outcome of Mantineia, correspond to the position described 
by Plutarch. The paradox of both reward and punishment for Isidas' 
action reflects the paradox that Agesilaos' leadership gave the 
I nspiration for an action which he, as one who made It a principle not 
to risk soldiers' liveso should not approve, but might welcome, just as 
he had disapproved but accepted that of Phoibidas, father of Isidas. 
Plutarch has ended the series of three incidents with the one In which 
the ephors re-Instate that samep traditional, Spartan virtue of strict 
discipline. 
The successful defence of the unwalled Sparta Is impressive. 
Perhaps Epameinondas, who knew the topography from his earlier 
attackj and had visited Sparta again for a Peace Conference, had 
undertaken the attack only in the expectation of finding few vigorous 
d efenders. His task-force was not his full strengthl and had had a 
long overnight march, with the disappointment of having failed to 
achieve the full surprise they needed. Attackers had a difficult task 
in the narrow streets of the four villages, against a desperate defence 
(Xen. Hell. VII. v. 11), in the knowledge that the main enemy army 
remained intact at Mantineia. There was, perhaps, little to gain in 
winning an indefensible base at great costp when the psychological 
effect of the penetration of Lakonlat in addition to the victory hoped 
for in the north, would leave Sparta powerless for the future. The 
main requirement for Epameinondas, howeverg would be to return to 
Mantineia without further waste of time, In order to take advantage of 
the absence of the force sent for its relief. 
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CHAPTER 35 -ý 
Mantineia: Sparta isolated 
I 'OXCYOW; 69 LICrTEPOV Apýpmq nept 
T6V 'Encq1ELV(SV5aV ý&) KpaTOt3VTCI TOV 
K(ATaanrd6OVTQ TAV b(G)ELV9 'AVTLKPdTnq h 
Since Agesilaos was not involved 
not give an extended account of the 
TAV MCIVTtVVtaV 'IP01)(tGaVTOO Kal 
np(STcav, IrTL 61 tyKCCPCVOV KC11 
5KG)V OnocrT6q EnaLCIC, 
in the fighting, Plutarch does 
battle. He has selected from 
Xenophon's account of the complete action, only the few facts of the 
final engagement essential for his purposes yet omitting nothing but 
the preliminary details and the subsequent movements of the two sides. 
The three brief participial phrases correspond almost exactly to the 
three stages in Xenophon leading to Epameinondas' death: 
KPaTAGar, ydp b npoaePaXcv 6, \Ov InoCtlac (PEOYCLV TO TOV 
IVCXVT(G)V. Inef YC PAV IKEIVOq tncacv (Hefl. VII. v. 24), 
but gives prominence to the Bolotian hero by placing the direct object 
before, the subject and verb. 
66PCIT L... lja)(Cl CPQ 
The variant accounts of the weapon used enable, Plutarch to 
establish the importance for the Spartans of the removal of the 
much-feared Epameinondasg by Introducing the evidence of; the family 
name, McxYatP(cjveo; t which was apparently claimed to have been bestowed 
In honour of the man responsible for his death. This Is a notable 
example of Plutarch's use of Indirect description, QOPTjPLK04;, to give 
independent authority to an evaluation or judgement. His generous 
treatment of the Spartan hero contrasts with Xenophon's disparagement 
of the Dolotians. At HeR VII. v. 12 he had discredited the victors of 
Leuktra, and here says of their cavalry: (Sonep 69 ATTIIPtVOL ne(poPylptwar. 
bLdt TOV Qeuy6VTwv noXcp(wv Wncaov (Hell. VII. v. 25). Xenophon's 
Hellenika ends with Mantineia. 
ALOGKOUpC5Tl(; 
Plutarch mentions him at Lyk. 11, again in connection with an 
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injury, the Possible blinding of Lykourgos with, a stick. (FHG it. 192ff. ) 
2 O0T(J YCIP l0at5pClOOV Kat Oncpqy6nnoav OOT6V WPQ TOO 'EnapELV(SV50U 
C&$VTOr,. 
The strong wording further highlights the passage dealing with 
Epameinondas and the relief of the Spartans to be free from him, after 
the troubles he had caused - over a periodl In fact, of at least ten 
years, from the peace conference before Leuktra (c. 28) until his death 
here at Mantineia. 
YIVEL 61 dTUCtCIVj AV ETL Kal KC101 Apdq Eyet KaXXLKPdTnql Erq TOV 
'AVTLKPdTOUC, 6noy6voy. 
Clearly family traditions survived into Plutarch! s time and may 
have been a source of informationg as herep relevant to his work, 
though not therefore infallible. Plutarch has used this, information to 
illustrate the excessive relief felt by the Spartans in their crisis (cf. 
their relief after the "Tearless Battle"). The family's pride -in their 
ancestor's exploit may, perhaps, excuse the possible exaggeration. 
3 6n4, \GUVOV Of rIEPC TdV *Ayn(YC*\OOV T013 45PKOU TOO(; MCCIGTJVCOU4; 9 
n6XLV OOK IYOVTOq. 
Diodoros (XV. 89) records this attempt to deprive Messene of, its. 
recently acquired independence, but he - attributes It to the 
Lakedaimonian representatives at the peace conference, without naming 
Agesilaos, and perhaps Plutarch assigns to him only an Indirect, 
though influential, role. Since Epameinondas had established the 
independence of Messenia in his first invasion of the Peloponnese, one 
year after Leuktral the grounds for exclusion must be a piece of 
Spartan rhetoric. The Spartans no doubt wished to avoid universal 
recognition of Messene, as they had before (Hell. VII. I. 27), In the hope 
that they would more legitimately be able to claim the right to recover 
the area by military reconquest, or evenj perhaps, to c&ll on the other 
signatories to help In the recovery of the territory, that Ist without 
violating the terms of the Peace. 
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4 Kat p6VOLq 06TOrq n6Xcpoq ýv IXnCCOUOLV 6VCIXýqPCGOCIL TýV MCOOnV(OV. 
As a further consequence of Leuktral the Spartan domination even 
of peace conferences was ended, but whereas the failure of the earliest 
attempts to agree peace terms resulted in continuation of warsp the 
present peace was not aborted by the withdrawal of Sparta (Diodoros 
XV. 89. ) Sparta alone remained in a state of wars but Messenia was 
never recovered. 
5 OCaLo(; o0v t66KEL KCIt dnTIVAr. KCII noXtpcjv dnXTIaTor, 6 'AyiIaCXaoq 
EZVOLl TdIq PtV KOLV6q btaAdactq ndvTa Tp6nov OnOPOTTCJV Kat 6tOpdXX(JV. 
Agesilaos is once more being judged adversely by Plutarch as 
(PL, \on6Xcpo(; (Diodoros XV. 19; cf. cc. 231 28). From here to the end of 
the chapterl Plutarch reviews the problems created by this aspect of 
Agesilaos' character. His policy of isolating Thebes had led to costly 
hostilities, for which the finance at first, no doubt, came from the 
tribute paid by the former subjects of Athensl and the plunder he had 
captured in Asia Minor. Since this was no longer available, Xenophon 
refers to Sparta's financial needs at this time: )(pTIIjdTG)V 51 t(h)o TAV 
n6XLV 6copi! vrIv, ct JJI! AJ\OL GdppaY6V TLVO ifEeLv (Agesilaos 11.25)9 and 
records that Agesilaos did all he could at home to raise money. 
Plutarch perhaps describes the means necessary to do this, and the 
consequent resentment, forl as Aristotle comments, the Lakedaimonians 
were unwilling to pay taxes (Pol. 1271blO). He seems to have seen that 
the opportunity to end these difficulties had come with this latest 
peace conference. The empire had been lost and there was no 
possibility that the Spartans could easily recover Messenia: to 
contemplate this was, for Plutarch, fruitless militarism. Perhaps his 
admiration for the Lykourgan constitution led him to wish that the 
Spartans had embraced the universal peace and revived their early 
principlesq to become the moral leaders of Greece once more. 
His judgement here of Agesilaos as (PLkon6, \cpoq may be compared 
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in part with Aristotle's criticism of Sparta: 
The charge which Plato brings, in the Laws [i. 625E9 6301 
against the intentions of the legislator, is likewise justified; the 
whole constitution has regard to one part of virtue only - the 
virtue of the soldier, which gives victory in war (Pol. 1271bl). 
Elsewhere he advises the military training of citizens for defence$ not 
for conquest (PoL 1333b38; see R. A. de Laix (1974) p. 21; G. L. Huxley 
(1979) pp. 51-2). On the other hand, Plutarch, at L7kourgos 31, denied 
that the main aim of the lawgiver was "to leave his city as the leader 
of so many other cities". The measures he attributed to Lykourgos 
(5ff. ) concerned good order and happiness, in the city and In the 
individual. The reason for Sparta's decline was, for Plutarchl not 
embedded in the constitution. At Ljykourgos 30 he complained of the 
undermining of the laws of Lykourgos by Lysander. So herep Plutarch 
defend& the provisions of Lykourgos, and regards Agesilaos as 
responsible for the decline. 
On6 YPlIP61TG)V 6nopfaq. 
A selection of references to finances during this period indicates 
the scale of this problem. Agesilaos brought back from Asia Minor 
1,000 talents in booty (c. 19), as Lysander had brought 11500 talents 
before him (Diodoros XIII. 106.8). Timokrates brought fifty talents from 
Tithraustes to encourage the Greek cities to make war on the 
Lakedaimonians (Xen. Hell. III. v. 1). Sixty talents were raised for the 
wages of the Athenian fleet under Iph1krates by selling the captured 
crews of the triremes sent to Kerkyra by Dionysios (Diodoros XV. 47). 
Agesilaos' reward for his services in Egypt was 230 talents (c. 40). 
üngp TC)v IV MECFOAVU KTflpdTG)V KOL nP0a6&, )V CYq)OZ4C£LV. 
Plutarch again Indicates the mercenary requirement of Sparta's 
policies, confirmed by Xenophon at HeA VII. v. 10. The chapter ends on 
a pessimistic note, and with a striking infinitive, strongly metaphorical 
and derogatory, which is used of the vain struggles of unbroken 
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horses by Aeschylus (Persae 192)p and, by Plutarch, of Antony's agony 
in death (Antonv 76). However, no further Spartan military activities 
are recorded for this time. In Xenophon's Agesilaos, after the defence 
of the city (11.24), Agesilaos undertook no more campaigns in Greece, 
because ok his age. Diodoros gives no Spartan involvement until almost 
ten years later, when Archidamos promised money and mercenaries 
secretly to the Phoklan, Philomelos, and gave him fifteen talents. 
Xenophon appropriately ended Hellenika at this point, but it was not 
yet the end of his Agesilaos. 
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PART 3: WELVE 
EGYPT AND DEATH 
f Chapters 36-40) 
CHAPTER 36 
The humiliations of mercenary service in Egypt 
1 "ETL 61 pZW\ov h56Eqae TdY0 T&5 AtyuriT(Q CTP0TnY6V InL500q 1QUT6v. 
There are five references to the Egyptian campaign In Apophth. 
Lak. (Mor. 210,214,215), the first of whichq howeverg contains a 
doubtful reading for the name. Other authorities treat this episode in 
different ways. Plutarch continues the criticism of Agesilaosp the 
comparative adverb making a connection which clearly indicates that 
Agesilaos is involved In further loss of reputation among the Spartans. 
Plutarch suggests that his surrender of Independence and autonomy in 
undertaking service even as commander was thought unworthy. 
Xenophon ended his Hellenika before coming to this episodet but in 
Agesilaos 11.26-7 he records that after saving Sparta Agesilaos was 
paid for non-miltary services in Asia Minorl having rescued 
Arlobazanes three times from siegel on the last occasion receiving 
payment even from the besiegerl Mausolos, who contributed money to 
Sparta 6Ld TAV np6aftv 'AyncYLA6ou Eev(ovs perhaps in return for some 
provision of mercenaries (S. Hornblower (1982) p. 202; id. (1983) p. 231). 
Xenophon continues (11.28-31) with Agesilaos' expedition in the service 
of the king of Egypt, without naming Tachos or any other Egyptians, 
though where the manuscripts give TOY&n, editors have changed this 
to Ta)((Sql creating historical problems of chronology, for the king at 
the time was Nektanebis I (S. Hornblower (1982) pp. 174-5). Xenophon 
(Agesilaos H. 25) commends Agesilaos for attending to the financial need 
of the state, and suggests that the offer of command was the 
opportunity for Agesilaos to liberate the Greeks of Asia Minor, and to 
punish the Persians, especially for their hostile attitude over Messenian 
autonomy. Later, at H. 319 he again refers to moneyl in reporting 
Agesilaos' urgent need to obtain pay for the Greeks, which forced him 
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to choose to serve one or other of the two sides. Since Agesilaos did 
not survive the expedition, it is clear that from this point Xenophon 
could not have had the privileged, direct communications he seems to 
have drawn on earlier. Nepos (Agesilaus 8) treats only the arrival and 
departure of Agesilaos, omitting all details of the campaigns, but 
Diodoros, recording the Satraps' Revolt against Artaxerxes (XV. 90), 
provides the context for Tachos' decision, at the same timet to rise up 
against the Kingt using Greek mercenaries. He mentions only the 
Spartans' resentment of Artaxerxes' wish for Messenian autonomy as 
the reason for their willingness to participate. His account of the 
campaign (XV. 92-3) Is complimentary to Agesilaosq and also ends very 
differently from all the others, with the restoration of Tachos to his 
kingdom. 
2 06 Yeip AE(ouv dV6PCI TA(; 'E, \, \dBo(; 45PLCITOV KEKPLPeVOV KCII 66Eln(; 
tpnEnXnK6TOI TAV OIKOUPtVnV, dnoaTdTO POOLAAK, 6vOp6n4) ooppdpQ, YPACOaL 
T6 CF6pCl KaC TOOVOpa Kat TAV 66Eav dno66aOat YpnpdTG)Vp IPYG PLGOO(PdpOU 
Kat EEvayoO bLanpaTT6pevov, 
This description of Agesilaos' reputation recalls the report 
attributed to Theopompos: PIYLCrrO4; ptv ýv 6po)%oyoup1vcjq , KOC 
1ntcpav&rrC1T04; (C. 10). The - unexpressed subject here is the 
Lakedalmoniansg understood from the aboveg so that Plutarch again 
gives the adverse judgement indirectly, '01111PLKOC., and the indirect 
speech following this verb reports the current thoughts of the 
Lakedalmonians. The Greeks' contempt for non-Greeks stems in part 
from the belief that long subjection to the despotic rule of eastern 
monarchs had made them naturally servilel while luxury in living style 
weakened the spirits of their rulers, too (Herodotus VIII. 1029 Lysias 
Oljympic Oration, Isokrates Fanegyricusq Aristotle PoL 1255a28). Tachos, 
before his revolt, had been a subject of the Persian king. The 
contempt for him Is compounded by his treachery, though Agesilaos 
had previously encouraged desertions from, the King (c. 12). 
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3 KEt ydip Oritp 6y5O4KOVTCX YEYOV6q fTq KCIC ndv 6n6 TP(XUPdTG)V Td Clopa 
KCITOKEKOPPIVOC., tKC(VnV ClOOLq dvebtECITO TAV KaXAV Kal nepCoXenTOV 
ýycpov(av Ontp TfiC, TOV *E, \, \4vcav t, \cuOcp(aq, o6 ndpnav 6pepnTOV EZVCIL 
ThV (PLXOTLPCQVO 
Plutarch has reversed the word order found in Xenophon, and has 
strengthened the rhetorical value of the expression by his choice of 
preposition: ETTJ tyey6vCL 6p(pt Td 6Y6OAKOVTC1 (Agesilaos H. 28). Ile has 
also added the reference to Agesilaos' wounds: n0v On6 TPOUP6TQV T6 
C(Zpa KaTOKEKOPPIVOC., so that what was a commendation In Xenophon now 
becomes the grounds for a twofold criticism. The only motives 
attributed to Agesilaos by Plutarch are the references to money 
(YPlIJ16T&)V) above and to mercenary service here. The Panhellenist 
motive, the achievement of the freedom of the Greeks, Is presented 
only as a suppositions incompatible with his age. The reader might 
have expected that objective to meet with approval from Greeks in all 
circumstances, and the paradoxical criticism gains In intensity. By 
including it, Plutarch indicates that he has noticedt and rejectedo 
Xenophon's favourable interpretation of Agesilaos' motives. 
4 TOD YdIP KCA013 KCILP6V OCKCrOV ENCIL KCIE (3PCXVI 1115h, \OV 61 6AK Td 
KQXdl TOV CAGYPOV TO PETPCQ 6LCI(PtPELV. 
"The good and honourable has its own appropriate circumstances 
and proper time", perhaps requiring a sounder body and a younger 
age, but more broadly in terms of the -activity a man of such high 
standing should undertake. In practical achievement the mission was 
not without some success, despite these handicaps. The criticism is on 
the theoretical grounds of the need to observe the bounds of 
moderation by rational considerations, rather thant perhaps, to follow 
personal desire and political expediency. (cf. Aristotle NE 1.1098al6, 
ix. 1166al2g PoL 1295a389 quoted above, c. 33. ) Plutarch has faulted 
Agesilaos for his failure truly to appreciate 6' KaLPdq before, in 
choosing to go to war with Thebes (c. 28). There he gave anger as 
overpowering reason, and he now goes on to explain in what respect 
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Agesilaos failed to meet this requirement here. Lysander, too, and by 
association Agesilaos, in the quarrel (c. 8)9 had failed to understand 6 
KOLp6r,. Although Plutarch has not enlarged on the subject, here or at 
cc. 28,37,39, it seems to have been a fundamental part of his thinking. 
Only when we see Agesilaos come into his own in the military field, in 
Egypt, does he begin to understand its requirements again. , 
5 ob pAv tcpp6VTLCC TOdT6)v 6 'Ayna(Xaoq, 0069 (; ETo nap' dE(av ENOL 
AEtTOdPYnPa 6np6atov oWv, 6XXcN pdXXov dvdEtov tOUTOO Td Cfiv dnPOKTOV 
IV To n6XcL KCIt KOOfiGOat neptptVOVTa T6V OdVaTOV. 
Plutarch implies that Agesilaos was consciously neglectful, and 
should have accepted the criticismt but was Incapable of making a 
rational assessment. That he Ignored these considerations indicates 
that he had been aware of what people thought of him, perhaps as 
early as the criticism made at c. 35.5, P(atol; ot3v U&Ct KTX. This is a 
direct refutation by Plutarch of Xenophon's claim of universal praise of 
Agesilaosp specifically for his judicious selection of the services he 
should perform after Sparta had been saved: nOr, OOK aV CPCICTI TW; 013T6V 
c6yvwp6vG)q YP400CIL tOUTO; (Agesilaos H. 25). Xenophon himself goes on 
immediately to suggest that Agesilaos was beyond the age for active 
military campaigning: dnctpyev 4671 T6 YAP04;. Plutarch has evidently 
seen the logical inconsistency of Xenophon, when he then records 
Agesilaos' delight in accepting the Egyptian offer at Agesilaos H. 28. 
He presents this as Agesilaos' disregard of what came to be known as 
the Aristotelian mean, in judging that there was no service which he 
should not have undertaken in this demeaning way. Plutarch 
expresses it In terms of Agesilaos' own thoughts on lifelong public 
service, which he saw manifested in Xenophon's rhetorical question 
(Agesilaos H. 25), and in the similar comment on Agesilaos' character in 
old age with which he ended the encomium (Agesilaos XI. 14-16). 
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f, I 
6 KOt nXora nXnp6car, dV4yE)Ij, TpLdKOVTCI OUPPOIAOU4; E)((JV PCO' tO[UTOO 
EnaPTLdTCI(;, 6q np6TEPOV. Inet 59 KC[TtnXeUGEV Cb; TAv AryunTOV, E600q Ot 
np0TO L T0V P010 LXL K0V AyEp6V6)V KO t 6LOLKqT0V IP65tCov int vcxOv 
OepanedOVTEq OOT6v. 8 ýV U Kal T63V 6XXG)v AtyunTCG)V anoUS4 TE PEYdXq 
Kat nPOG60K(CI 6t& T05VOPCX Kal TýV 66EcxV TOO 'AynCLX6ou. 
Xenophon gives no detailst except the offer of the chief command. 
The Egyptian campaign resembles In some ways the campaign in Asia 
Minor, and Plutarch may have assumed that advisers accompanied 
Agesilaos as in c. 6.4. Here he represents the honorific reception that 
Agesilaos was entitled to, in preparation for the contrast with the 
eventual, very differentq Egyptian reaction. 
Kat OUVCTp6yaCov dnaVTEq tnt TAV OICXV. 9 6q 51 tdpwv Xapnp6TnTCX 
PIV Kal KC[TaCYKEUAV o66Epfcxv, dvOpG)nov U npECYPOTnV KCITOKECPCVOV CY TLVt 
n6qi naPdl TAV OdXC(OCYaVi EOTCXý Kat PLKP6V Td GOPCII TPOY13 KCIC CPOOkOV 
tPdTtOV 6pnEy6pevov, CYKc5nTELV CIOTOtq Kat YEXG)TonotEtv IndEt. 
Nepos describes Agesilaos' appearance, furnishings, and dress, in 
very similar terms: 
nam et statura fuit humili et corpore exiguo et claudus 
altero pede; terra tecta stramentis; vestitu humili atque obsoleto 
(Agesilaus 8). 
He, like Apophth. Lak. (Afor. 214), reports the Egyptians' contempt. 
What they sawg contrasting their expectations of regal grandeur, was 
the deliberate Spartan simplicity of life-stylep for which Plutarch so 
firmly commended Agesilaos at c. 12 in describing the reaction of 
Pharnabazos when they met, and again at cc. 14 and 19 in Sparta. 
However, Agesilaos has now been shown to have lost the approval or 
admiration of friends, enemies, Spartans and allies -a comprehensive 
list. That the Egyptians regarded his simplicity as contemptible does 
not necessitate Plutarch's concurrence in their judgement, and, while 
Nepos includes Agesilaos' lameness as a cause of contempt, Plutarch, 
having recorded this at c. 29 concentrates on inoffensive features, using 
the word npEG0dTTJV - perhaps a substitute for "king" in the other 
authorities to point to a recognition on his part of the Incongruity. 
On the other hand, Plutarch does not wholly approve of the flexibility 
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of Alkibiades who could adapt to the company he was Ing for it could 
be good or bad company (Alk. c. 23). Disapproval of these two extremes 
would suggest that, for Plutarchi there was again an acceptable mean, 
in Aristotelian terms. In the following chapters, Agesilaos ultimately 
wins recognition, even from the suspicious Egyptians for his military 
ability, as in Apophth. - Lak. (Aldr. 214). Plutarch's purpose is clearly 
not simply that, but the complex one of showing that success in the 
military field is not inconsistent with the simplicity of the Lykourgan 
system which he admired. The misguided interpretation of it has 
already been shown to have destroyed the prosperity that the 
Spartans had enjoyed while they adhered to it. 
KCIt XýYCLV 45TL TOOT' AV T6 PUOOXOYOOPEVOVO MCVCLV 6POqj CITO POV 
6nOTEKEEV. 
The proverb is recorded in Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum: 
66LVEV 6PO4;, efTa priv 6ntTEKEV 
(1.378.41 11.733.4); 
and is used by Horace at Ars Poetica 139: 
parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. 
Athenaios XIV. 616d attributes it to Tachos: 
MWEV 15PO4; p ZEO(; 
61 I(POPEtTO9 T6 61 ITCKEV POV. 
In these Greek forms, like Plutarch'st It has a, chiastic pattern, missing 
in Horace's translation. (See also Phaedrus IV. 23; Lucian. Hist. Conscr. 
23 and Quintilian 8.3.20. ) A Hellenistic source has been suggested 
(C. O. Brinkg Horace on Poetrv (1971) p. 215, but he does not cite 
Plutarch). This anecdote strictly presupposes an Egyptian proverbq 
and perhaps it was brought for the first time into Greek literature in 
connection with Agesilaos, but, alternativelyl a Greek proverb may have 
been introduced into this Egyptian context. Since Plutarch goes on to 
present a highly ornamented and expanded account, it may be that he 
introduced it. Horace's version is the earliest of those listed above. 
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10 ITL 5eP aX X0V CIOTOO TAV CITon Cav IOOOPQGOVI 45TE Ecv((A)v 
nPO(YKOPLGOIVTG)V KCII npocyayOeVTWV dl, \EUPC( PtV KOC PdG)(OUC. K01 )(fiVO4; 
EXOPE, TPay4PCIT(I U Kat nelJpaTa K(Xe Pdpa E)t(, )GeCT09 KCII PLaColjtv(, )v 
XOPEtV KCII *\LnopodVTG)V, 
tKt*\EUCYE TOr4; ErXWUL 50CIV(XL KOPCCOVTCIC,. T4 
PtVTOL CITEq)aVG)TP(6L PODXQ (Pn(YCV aOT6V AaE)tVTa E)c6qpOGTOr,. 
An almost identical list of gifts is given at Apophth. Lak. (Mor. 
210). There Agesilaos accepts only the cereal, the rest being suitable 
only for the helots. The gifts are arranged by Plutarch in two lists of 
threeg using the two verbs, fAaRc and 6LOOErTO, to portray the regular 
simplicity of the Spartans, by the acceptance-of the wholesome natural 
foodstuffs and the rejection of the elaborate luxuries. Nepos tells of 
the gifts offered: ' 
-- ille praeter vitulinam- et elus modi genera obsonti, quae 
praesens tempus desiderabat, nihil accepit: unguental coronas 
secundamque mensam servis dispertlit, 
and explains the renewed contempt for boorishness at this point: 
quod eum ignorantia bonarum rerum Illa potissimum 
sumpsisse arbitrantur (Agesilaus 8.4). 
Plutarch, of course, omits the criticism of Agesilaos' simple taste here, 
and does not use Td dqX5VLOV (6Wv, (Mopat), a word which is found 
commonly in papyri, meaning the salary paid In money to an employee, 
and he also avoids Td 6wov, which perhaps gave rise to Nepos' 
transliteration, obsoniuml commonly used also in Roman comedy. The 
crowns are more correctly, perhaps, the flowering head of the papyrus 
plant (L9J s. v. OdOkoq; cf. Theopompost Hist. 22)9 which Plutarch also 
describes as acceptable by Agesilaos for their simplicity and neatness, 
though later, as a parting present. Theophrastos, also cited at c. 2, Is 
not named by Nepos, but may be their common source, unless Plutarch 
found only this part of the reference there. The correct authority 
may have been Theopompos, however (K. Ziegler ad loc. ). This fuller 
version of the anecdote, containing the attribution to the source and 
the reference to papyrus crowns, perhaps indicates that it belongs 
here in Egypt (cf. c. 16; M. A. Flower (1988) pp. 124-5). 
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CHAPTER 37 
Agesilaos is accused of betrayal 
1 o6y, (Soncp 4XnLCCV, dn6cyilq CYTPOITTlYd(; dnc6cCY0Tj Tfiq E)UV6VECJ9;, dJ\XCN 
TOV PLoOocp6p(A)v P6V(JV, TOO 61 VCXUTLKOO XOPPCaq 6 *AOTlvaEoq- 
Plutarch continues to record the indignities suffered by Agesilaos 
in being -given less responsibility 
than he had expectedt and makes 
this appear to be the reason why he did not accept Chabrias' 
proposition. The mercenary force from Greece was of 10,000, Including 
11000 Lakedaimonians dispatched with Agesilaos, and Tachos' army was 
of 80,000 Egyptian troops (Diodoros XV. 92). That such factors of 
prestige were important Is shown in the speech of Kephisodotos (Xen. 
Hell. VILL12), who pointed out to the Athenians that their command of 
the helots and mercenaries, in the combined fleet of the allies, would 
not match the Spartan command of the citizens in their combined land 
forces, but at Agesilaos H. 28-30 he does not record that Agesilaos took 
Spartans or mercenaries with him, or that he retained any part of the 
command, that he had been deceived into thinking had been offered to 
him. Athenian participation is not relevant in Xenophon's Agesilaos, 
but for Plutarch the loss of the navy is part of the indignity, in 
contrastq for example, with the supreme command he had held earlier In 
Asia Minor. Diodoros speaks only of the appointment to the command 
of the mercenaries, and does not mention any deception. 
2 EnELTCI TAV d, \, \rlV o3XCICOVE(CIV KCII KEVWPOGdVnV TOO AtyunT(OU 
papuv6pEvoq AvayKdCETO (PIPELVO KCIC ouvEEen, \Euacv tnt T004; 4)OCV&Ka(; 
OOT&5t nClPd TAV 6ECCIV TAV tOUTOO KCAt TAV (POOLV CinE(K(A)V KOC KOPTEPaVj 
6YPL 06 KGLPdV fAaRc. 3 NEKTdIVEDLq YCIP dVEtPL6q IBV TOO TClYI5 KCIC PýpOq 
f)((A)V LI(Pl ZGUT&S T14; 6UV6PE(&)(; l 
dntOT11- KCIC Daat, \Et)q On6 TOv AtyunT((I)V 
6VOYOPEUOEtq &EnipmTo np6q T6V 'Ayqa(Xaov, 6ELOV OOT&$ POnOEtV* 
To follow another leader was clearly a new experience for 
Agesilaos, having previously enjoyed sole military responsibility, full 
recognition of the successes of his leadership, and respect for the 
value of his ascetic way of life, as shown by Pharnabazos. Plutarch 
illustrates here, however, the decline of Spartan influence, and of the 
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myth of Spartan invincibility. - The Spartans would have to earn afresh 
their place in the changed world, and Plutarch seems to have seen that 
the situation made for himself by Agesilaos on this occasion was 
unsatisfactory. Like Xenophon (Agesilaos 31), he shows that Agesilaos 
and his mercenaries must' accompany their paymaster, regardless of 
their own wishesq unless they have, or can obtain, the resources 
needed for survival, and that their standards of loyalty have to be 
less secure, if more attractive terms of employment are available. 
Diodoros (XV. 92), like Plutarch, has Tachos lead an expedition to 
Phoenicia, against Agesilaos' advice, and records that in his absence 
Nektanebos (sic), the son of the general who was left In Egypt, is 
persuaded by him to return from his campaign in Syria and take the 
kingship, Tachos' ensuing flight being to beg forgiveness from the 
King. In this account, after winning Artaxerxes' suppport, Tachos 
returns to Agesilaos: Agesilaos does not change sidest and eventually 
helps to recover the kingdom for Tachos (XV. 93). Xenophon records 
that it was the occurrence of a revolt of the Egyptian troops which 
caused the-flight of the king to Phoenicia, without indicating that it 
was to the King that he fled or that Agesilaos also left Egypt. In 
Xenophon's account Agesilaos is not presented, with an Invitation to 
change sides. When his employer, the reigning king# has fled to Sidon, 
the Egyptians are divided by internal strife, and there are then two 
kings, who are not named, and Agesilaos is committed to neithert unless 
Xenophon has deliberately withheld that one was Tachos. Plutarch 
alone records Agesilaos' dilemma. 
CI1G()OPtVOU U TCIOTa TOO Tay(3 Kat Tpanoptvou np6q UnGLV 06TOV9 6 
Ptv XQPP(aq tneLP61TO KaC T6V 'Aynafkiov tV To (PLACQ TOO TayO ne(Oov 
Kat napopUOOOPEVOq KaTt)(ELV, 56 6' 'Ayila(, \ao4; cZnev 15TL ZOE PiVl G) 
XORPCO, KaTcl GCCIUT6V dtq)LYjAVQ )(pflo0aL TOCO; taUTOO *\ovtoporl; fEEGTLV, IY6 5' On6 Týq naTP(60q U66nv AtyunTCOLC, OTPOITTlydo;. 6 OOKOUV 15V f)(OL 
Pot KOX3q or(; lnlpcp0nv adppayoq noAcpcrv, Uty pý nd. \LV A nOITPIC, 
KCAU301a. 
There is no identifiable place for the mercenary Chabrias in the 
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action recorded. Unlike Agesilaosl he went to Egypt in a private 
capacityv because Athens, with the other Greeks, obstructed the 
satraps' request for mercenaries. "They are not aware of the existence 
of any state of war between the King and themselves" (P. A. Cartledge 
(1987) p. 328,. -citing Hicks/Hill (1901) no. 121; and p-201, citing Tod 145). 
Chabrias retains what is, for a mercenary, obsolete terminology in 
urging that ties of friendship should determine choice of service. 
Agesilaos Is also made to use loose moral expressions in order to 
justify his attitudes and to avoid revealing his true intentions. 
Morality has not in the past been an argument weighing heavily with 
Agesilaos, and it is not the ground reported later in the chapter, 
either for his action, or for the ephors' explicit instructions, His 
phrases imply a Spartan state initiative involving the Egyptian people 
directly, although at c. 36 the arrangement was made with Tachos, and 
apparently at his own suggestion, tnt6o0c, tOUT6v. However, It was 
perhaps endorsed by the state with the appointment of the thirty 
counsellors. Agesilaos' previous deceptions have been approved by 
Plutarch, and have succeeded, but his manoeuvres are now presented 
in, a bad lights and in an unconvincing form: in the past, of course, 
Agesilaos has deceived enemiest but since, In Chabrias' phrase, Tachos 
was a friend, this case was different. 
7 TODTa 61 etn6v EnEpq; ev etc. EndPTIIV dV6PClC., Or TOO jJtV Ta)(0 
KaTnYOP4GCLV,, -ftOLV90EG0aL U Tdv NEKTdVEOLV EPC*\*\OV. 8 fnepWav U 
K6KEEVOL 6e6peVOL TOV ACIKEBaLPOVC(JVp 6 ptv (Sq, ndXaL adppayoq ycyov6q 
Kat (PC, \01;, 6 51 &; EOV06GTEPOq Kat npo0up6TEpoq nept TAv n6XLV lo6pevoq. 
With this hostile message, Agesilaos prepares the Spartan 
authorities for his eventual decision to abandon Tachos. Neither 
Xenophon nor Diodoros reports any consultation with Sparta. In 
Xenophonj Agesilaos must choose to serve one or other of the kings in 
order to obtain pay for the Greek troops, and he is said to have 
considered which of the two seemed more truly to be (ptA9MMjv. Since 
Xenophon links the willingness to undertake the expedition with 
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Spartan hostility towards the King (Agesilaos 11.29), the Egyptian 
CPLXtXXflV should also be required to be no friend of the Persians. In 
that case, - Diodoros' account is flawed, since he has recorded the 
reconciliation of Tachos with the King. In Plutarch, Tachos was at the 
start a friend of Sparta, and since, his flight comes later as the 
consequence of the- desertion of his mercenaries at c. 38, he retains a 
formal claim on Agesilaos' loyalty,, but the Egyptians have themselves 
forced a choice on Agesilaos, by Aransferring their allegiance to 
Nektanebis. Both contenders for Agesilaos' services are still available. 
Plutarch presents an analysis of the choice facing the Spartans in the 
form of the contrasting appeals of the envoys of Tachos and 
Nektanebis, expanding Xenophon's simple criterion of friendship by 
setting the known record of past alliance against a promise of 
good-will in the future. The insult caused to Agesilaos by the failure 
to appoint him as supreme commander apparently tells against the 
sincerity of Tachos, and is the only recorded Issue relevant to the 
matter of principle here mentioned. Repeated statements of the 
Spartan interpretation of justice as the Interest of Sparta predispose 
the reader to expect the eventual decision, for the conflict is between 
loyalty to the "discredited" original agreement and the dictates of 
practical diplomacy. 
9 6KOLJGCIVTC(Z Ot3V Of AGKE6ClLp6VLOL TOrq ptv AtyunT(00; dnCKPCVGVTO 
WvEPQ, q 'AyT)CrLXdg nept TOdTG)V PEXAGELV, tKCCVQ 6' iniaTeLAciv 6p5v 
KCXEOOVTEq ftaq npd&EL T6 Tt EndPTU CYUPCPýPOV. 
A similar response from the home government to a suggestion 
made by Agesilaos, not mentioned at the time by Plutarchq was 
described by Xenophon: 
ýKOV tK TIC; AOKC5aCpovoq dnayytXXOVTCq 6TL A n6Xtq 
InLTpinOL 'AyrjaLAdq bLayv45vaL TCN tV 4)XCLOLIVTL 45nwq GOT45 50KOCrI 
(Hell. V. 1ii. 25). 
This example may have been the model used by Plutarch here. The 
Spartans have involved themselves in the authorization of a possible 
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change of loyaltyp -specifying self-interest as the criterion for the 
determination of policy, and leaving the definition of this to the 
commander on the spot. The expression T6 Tfi EndPTU CFUP(PIPOV is 
repeated below, first in the form TO GUP(PI! P0VTL Tjq, n0TP(6oqp and then 
as TO Tfiq naTP(60q UUPCPIPOVTL. This accumulation of references to the 
concept shows Plutarch's desire to stress his criticism of the Spartan 
principle of self-interest, which operated earlier in the Phoibidas and 
Sphodrias affairs. The Spartans' hope of punishing the King of Persia 
is now aparently ignored. 
10 O0T&) BA \006V TOOq PLCIGOq)6POUq 6 'Ayna(Xaoq dn6 TOO TayO PETeGTn 
nP64; T& NEKT&ERLV, dT6noU KQ1 diXXoK6TOu npdypaTO4; nopoKaXOPPOTL To 
CYUP(PiPOVTL TAq nOTP(60q YPnG6PCVOq* tnet TOdTnq YE TAq nPOWCEL)q 
6q)C1LPE0ECGTj(; 
j T6 5LKaL6TC[TOV 
6VOP0 Týq npd&ewq ýv npoboo(a. 
Tachos is thus robbed of the mercenaries that at c. 36 Plutarch 
had said were obtained by Agesilaos, using money sent him by Tachos. 
If Diodoros was correct In saying that Nektanebis now came to Egypt, 
Agesilaos was choosing the easier option, to Join the man In possession, 
rather than to have to recover for Tachos the territory lost to him. 
Xenophon (Agesilaos 11.30-1) obscures Agesilaos' moral difficulty: his 
original paymaster has fled, and the main consideration he has in mind 
is the need to impose an obligation on a new employer In order to 
ensure financial rewards. The need to choose the one more likely to 
be a friend of Greece seems to be an afterthoughto and Xenophon 
further suggests that by choosing this one Agesilaos had ensured his 
friendship with Sparta. By expressing the choice in this way, 
Xenophon has concentrated on the apparent interest of Sparta in 
having friends, but has not presented it as fulfilling one of the 
objectives of Agesilaos' mission, punishment for Persia. Plutarchl who 
has expressed his unfavourable moral judgement of Agesilaos' conduct 
in strong terms, seems to have some justification for seeingt in 
Xenophon's presentation, the evidence for his accusation of treachery. 
There is, however, more justification for thinking that Xenophon may 
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not have penetrated to Agesilaos' real grounds for his choice. 
Although Diodoros has recorded the restoration of Egypt to Tachosp he 
later shows Nektanebis as king, and more importantly shows him as 
hostile to Persia, and in alliance with the King's enemies: noXiPLOV 15VTa 
nr:, PG(5V KCII ne(CCIVTEq nopaXaOerv 010TO04; C6; TAV CUPPCI)(CCIV (XVI. 41.3). 
The revolt of the Egyptian army, the flight of Tachos, and Agesilaos' 
choice of service with Nektanebis, may all have to do with their 
respective attitudes to the King. 
11' ACIKEbaLp6VLOL U TAv np(STIIV TOO KCIXOO PEP(6Cl TIZ TAc, nCITP(60C. 
CIUP(PtPOVTL 6L66VTEqt OOTC pavOdVOUGLV OLIT' inCCITaVTCXL 6CKCILOY dAAo nXAv 
8 TýV ZndPTnV a6ECLV VOP(COUCFLV. 
Plutarch's verbs draw attention to a deficiency, both in the 
Spartans' education and character developmentl and in their natural 
intellectual ability. Previously he has defined the Spartan view of 
justice in abstract terms as Td GumePov, but he now expresses it in 
terms of expansion of self-interest. Indeed, the claim Is here given 
even more extreme expression than before: "nothing else is just", 
rather than one thing is more Just than others. ThIsq thereforej Is 
Plutarch's powerful condemnation of Spartan Imperial policies. Their 
power In war wasl as Aristotle said, used for wrong purposes (PoL 
1324b2l 133305-W). 
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CHAPTER 38 
Agesilaos' generalship is not recognized 
1 40 JAV OOV 'tCXyL%, g dpllpG)OEC(; TCV ptaüoQ6pG)v l(PUYCVI gK 59 M9V5qTO(; 
ETEP04; -gnav(CrT(XTOL Tkl NEKTCXV1fßL5t ßC1CYL*\£04; CNVGYOPEUE)ECý; 9 Kai OUVOYOYGýV 
59K0 pupt65aý; 6v0p(3nov InAct. 
Xenophon also records the desertions from the king, first of the 
Egyptians who were campaigning separately, then of all the rest 
(Agesilaos 30). The king fled, and division among the Egyptians led to 
the appointment of two kings: BLTTOOI; RCOW\104; O(POOVTaL, neither of 
them named. These events follow immediately after Agesilaos began to 
consider what his response should be to his having been deceived over 
his appointment. Plutarch's sequence is identical at this point, if 
Agesilaos is to be included in Xenophon's "all the rest", but In 
Plutarch's account the rivals for the kingship are specified as 
Nektanebis and the Mendesian. Both Xenophon and Plutarch have 
neglected the reconciliation of Tachos with Artaxerxes reported by 
Diodoros (XV. 92.5), which would no doubt have offended Agesilaosq and 
would motivate his desertion. Diodoros has recorded neither the third 
contender nor the desertion of Agesilaos to Nektanebisp but Agesilaos' 
continued service with Tachos is even more unlikely to be true, In 
view of the report of his appointment as Artaxerxes' commander in 
Egypt (XV. 92.5). 
2 E)(XPPÜVOVT0r, 69 TOO NEKTCXVdßt50(; TÖV 'AynaCXC(OV9 KOC XiYOVT0r, dTt 
nOXÄOC 09V EtaLV 0( DOX9PL0L9 PLY(J5Er, 59 Kot ß(SV0tUCOL KOC 50 änELP(OV 
£ÜKC[Ta(pp6V1IT0L9 3 Kot PAV Oä TÖ nÄAO0r. OÖM3V9 6 'AYnaCÄCXOý; £Zn£Vg ÖXXÖ 
TAV änELp(CIV (POß00pat Kot TAV äPOOCCIV L«n bua£EcindTnT0V. 
Plutarch continues to present Agesilaos as deprived of the chance 
to take the initiative, but attention is directed away from questions of 
morality as military strategy comes Into the centre of focus again. 
Nektanebis' observation is reminiscent of Agesilaos' own comment on the 
non-Spartan troops at c. 26. In his reply, Agesilaos begins to re-assert 
his superiority in military wisdom, with the emphasis on deception, 
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selecting as a reason for fear, the very quality which Nektanebis 
thinks encouraging. Diodoros, toot shows Agesilaos instructing his 
employer, who is still Tachos, not to fear numerical superiority, but In 
his anecdote he advises fear only of outstanding bravery. 
4 Ot Y6P dndTCIL T6 napd6oEov tndYOUCL TOVq np6q 6puvav <6v> 
6novooDaL mit nPOO50KOUL TPcnopeVOLql 6U pý npoG5oKOv pil6l Onovo0v 
Pn6lV 06 6(6WL To napaXOYLCOPIV(P Xao4vg (3onep 0651 To noXci(OVTL oonAv 
6 pA KLVOOPEVOq. 
Deception of the enemy in war is outside the moral standards of 
peacetime, according to Agesilaos' view reported at c. 9, and by 
Xenophon at Hell. III. iv. 11, and so is acceptable here. dndTTI IS one of 
the main terms for stratagem, denoting "the creative activity of 
changing an object or situation into something else" (E. L. Wheeler (1988) 
p. 31). It was an important feature of many victories on the battlefield, 
at a time when the gathering of military intelligence and 
communications over long distances, between commander and troops, 
were difficult, and mobility of armies was so much restricted. 
Deception played an important part'also in many successful assaults on 
fortified cities. Agesilaos gives Nektanebis, who has commented only on 
numerical advantage and lack of experiencep a superior account of the 
complexity' of strategic considerations, using several technical terms 
and the metaphors from wrestling. Plutarch may be developing the 
ideas on strategy listed by Xenophon at Agesilaos VI. 5-6, and following 
the advice at Hipparchikos V. 9: SVT(A)(; YdP 0061V KCPBCI)%ECSTEPOV tv no, \epQ 
6ndTlll;. 
5 tK TOdTOU Kot 6 Wvb4atoq Enepne neLPOV T& *AynaCXoov. The LoCV 
o5v 6 NCKT6VEPLq. 
That there is now a third contender for Agesilaos' services 
corresponds with Xenophon's report of the appointment of the two 
kingsp but Diodoros retains Tachos as the only reigning king. 
Nektanebis' anxiety is understandable, perhaps, since Agesilaos had 
already deserted one employer. 
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ETL pd, \. \ov tv t5noW(Q KCIC (p6p(, a yev6pevoq npdq OOT6V dney(SpTIOEv z1q 
n6XLV COEPKA Kat ptyav Eyoucrav nepOoXov. 66 51 'AynaCXaoq AYCIV6KTEL 
p1v dnLCrTOOPEVOq KC11 papewq EQEPEV, cx1cYyuv6pcvoq 61 KCI I ndXLV 
PETa(YTqVCIL nP6q TdV ETEPOV KCIC TEX&Jq MeAfttv dnPOKTOq, AKOXOOOnGE KCIE 
CTUVELGýXOEV Etq T6 TEtYOq. 
Agesilaos is still powerless to influence his employer, since his 
allegiance is now in doubt. He seems to be tempting him to a course 
of action which conflicts with his own earlier cautious analysis, though 
at Sardis early engagement had been to his advantage (c. 10). All three 
authorities have recorded disagreement at this stage between Agesilaos 
and his employer. In the accounts of both Plutarch and Xenophon, 
Agesilaos has to consider which of the two contenders for the throne 
he should serve, while in both Diodoros and Plutarch Agesilaos has to 
decide whether to change sides again, or to accompany his nervous 
employer into a large city. Plutarch continues to portray the 
difficulties that Agesilaos has created for himself, and the hostile 
attitudes of others to his leadership. He again uses the Homeric 
technique of revealing judgements through the characters themselves, 
continuing his account of Agesilaos' uncomfortable situation because of 
his employer's distrust, which was another new experience for him (cf. 
c. 37). Since Agesilaos was too ashamed to change sides again, 
evidently hel too, was aware of the shame of having done it just once. 
Fear of failure to complete the Asia Minor campaign was suggested by 
Plutarch, after the interruption of the sacrifice at Aulls (c. 6.11: c5q 
6TEXOV 06TO TOv npd&Ewv YevnGoPevQv)q and, in the events completion was 
forestalled by his recall. Here Agesilaos is made to realize for himself 
the danger that there may be nothing gained for Sparta from this 
expedition. Agesilaos has to suffer humiliation, and accept an 
unwelcome move. The unfavourable account continues to the end of 
the chapter, giving the impression that, once the first unworthy 
decision had been taken, the downward spiral was relentless. 
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CHAPTER 39 
Agesilaos reasserts his military superiority 
1 'Ene. \E)6VT(JV U TOv noXEp(G)V KC(I nEpLTC1(PPEu6VTG)V Týv n6XLY, odOLq. 
OL) 6ECGClq Týv nOXLOPK(av 6 MyOnTLOC. tPOIACTO JAYEGOaL, KaC T004; 
'EXXqvoq pdXa aupnpo0upoup&ouq EZYCVO 06 Y6P ýV IV To YWP(Q GtTOq. 
In the first part of the chapter Plutarch refers to Nektanebis 
only as the Egyptian, perhaps bringing Agesilaos into greater 
prominence, now that the clash with the enemy Is imminent. 
Nektanebis' loss of nervet brought on by his fear of siege, leads him 
to wish to break out, although it was his earlier fear of fighting it out 
that had decided him to enter the city (c. 38). This reversal of policy 
discredits Nektanebis' military wisdom, and the anxiety infects the 
Greeks, who are worried by the shortage of provisions, and now 
support Nektanebis. 
26 6' "AYTJoCAQ04; OOK t0Vj 6XX(N KG)XO(JVt 4KOUC PtV CTL PdXXOV KOKOq A 
np6TCPOV On6 TOv AtyunT(G)V KOC npo66Tnq dneKaXetTO TOO PC1aLXe6)qp ECPEPC 
U npg6TEPOV ý6n T(Nq 6LOPOX(lq Kat npOCCEYC T(5 KaLP0 TOO GTPQTnY6P0TOq. 
Agesilaos is now isolated, and in opposition to the Greeksq to 
Nektanebist and to the Egyptians. Plutarch had himself judged 
Agesilaos' action to be a betrayal (c. 37)t and he now attributes this 
judgement also to the Egyptians. The trough has now reached its 
nadir in preparation for a dramatic neptneTELO. However, the reason 
for the bitterness is misunderstanding of Agesilaos' military skill and 
the value of his advicet but generalship is his main strength and the 
two participles reveal firmness and confidence in the correctness of his 
judgement. Nevertheless, even at the point where he will prove his 
supremacyl Plutarch intensifies the theme of Agesilaost declining 
popularityt and, while he judges the strategy differentlyq and 
recognizes that Agesilaos' plan is that of a wise generalt he does not 
retract his judgement of this betrayal. The reversal of the downward 
momentum in Agesilaos' reputation and fortunes is signalled by a 
difference In his responses to the opposition. Whereas previously his 
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reaction was described in PaPUV611r:. Vo(; (c. 37), and Pop&r. f(prPev (c. 38)9 
it appears that his confidence in the stratagem now enables him to 
endure the criticism more patiently, f(pepe U nPQ6TEPovj and his skill in 
deception serves him well in his handling of his employer, as he bides 
his time. Plutarch has made 6 KCILp6r. the criterion againg butj in 
contrast to the other occasions, Agesilaos* the general, is now 
beginning to be intellectually alert to the requirement. The phrase T4$ 
Katpo TOO GTPaTTjY4PaTOc. denotes the two qualities most required, the 
creative activity and knowledge of exact timing (E. L. Wheeler (1988) 
P. 26). 
3 T6(ppov EE(jOcv 4YOV ot noXIPLOL nept T6 TEryOq RaOCrCIV, (5C, 
naVT6nOGLV &nOKXECOaVTEq OOTOJq. 
Dlodoros reports (XV. 93.3) that the enemy's attempt to take the 
fortified city by storm, was costly: noXAoL)r, & TOrC, TCL)fOPCX)f(OW; 
&OaXov, but that the large resources of manpower available made 
circumvallation feasible. His phraset 6Ld TAv noWYELP(OV, is similar to 
that of Agesilaos, as reported by Plutarch, no, \uyELPCQ U nEPLCXOErV 
KCIL nEpLTCKPPCIOGaL (c. 38). The stratagem will prove the very point that 
Agesilaos has made regarding the enemy's numerical superiority. 
4 (54; 013V tYY04; ýGaV at TEAEUT01 TOO 6pdypaTOq, dnOVTOVTOq 06TO Kat 
nEpLr6VTOq tV KdKXQ TAY n6XLv, tcyntpav dvapE(vaq ycvecOaL KOC KEXEdGaq 
I&onXCCEGOCIL TOOq *EXXqvaq. 
All circumvallations must reach this point, and offer the same 
opportunity to the besieged. Like Plutarch, Diodoros records a night 
enterprise as the work was being completedg but the timing seems to 
have been determined by desperation (6 ptv Tay6q dnOY(a TAY 04)TnPCGV) 
because provisions were exhausted (XV. 93). 
EÄEYEV IXO(ýV flPÖ(; TÖv AtydrlTLOVO *0 PtV Tn(; CG)Tlrlp«2(;, (3 VEOVCCX9 
KOLP&; OÜT6r, icrrtv, öv tydý 5tc90erpcxL q)OßOtlPEVOr. CÜK IEWOCOV rlPCV 
UOF-tV. 
Agesilaos' speech displays the quality of his generalship, 
analysing the military situation, concealing plans even from his 
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colleague, and encouraging the faint-hearted. His admission of having 
deceived the young man, still not named, and the reason given for 
doing so, establish his superiorityp and he teaches the lesson that a 
general must look out for 6 KaLp6q. 
7 10adpaacv 6 NCKT6VEpLq TOO 'AynGLA6OU T4V 6ctv6TnTa. 
The Egyptian is now named, juxtaposed with the Spartan for 
effective contrast, at the point where the difference of opinion between 
the two is resolved in Agesilaos' favour, and his skill is generously 
acknowledged. Plutarch again expresses the judgement Indirectly, 
40P1jPLK0(;, by recording the admiration of Nektanebis. 
npoonecy6v ITP6PaTO 095CK TOOq (IVTLCYTdVTC[q. 
Agesilaos' part was to plan the enterprise, leaving the younger 
Nektanebis to carry it out. The description of the action Is 
accordingly brief, as it is in Xenophon's version: 
T6V PIV PLUXATIVO PdyU VLK40CIq YCLPOOTOL (Agesilaos 11.31). 
8 164; 6' dnaE Uopc nEL06PEVOV aftD T6v NCKTdVCDLV 6 'AyrlaC, \cxoc., 
000tq InnYE T6 OOT6 GTPOT6YnPCI K006nep n6XatUPCI TOlq noAcpCotq. 
The Egyptian is again named, repeating the juxtaposition with the 
Spartan, but with the grammatical relation reversedt confirming the 
rehabilitation of Agesilaos' military reputation with the repetition of the 
successful stratagem, again using the technical vocabulary and 
metaphor. 
9 Td ptv ydp dno(pedyw KOC On(SYG)V, T& 5' dVTtncpLyG)p45v tPDdXXCL T6 
n. \ýOoc, 013TOV C14; T6nov EyovTa bt(Spuya PoOeEav tE tKaTipac, n, \EupOr. 
napapptoucrav. 
If the canals were fed from a river, there was evidently water on 
three sideal making escape difficult for the enemy. This plan runs 
counter to advice attributed to Lykourgos (c. 26), not to force an enemy 
to fight with desperation for survival (cf. Lyk. 13,22). In Diodoros, 
accountl the enemy's numbers are countered only in the second 
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engagement, and it may appear that the double use of the stratagem, 
in reverse situations of escape and capture, Is a later embellishmenL 
Plutarch's version, however, is the more acceptable, for Diodoros shows 
his own confusion in recording that, when, after escaping from the 
city, Agesilaos was being pursued closely, and was in danger of being 
surrounded, he himself took his men Into the space between the two 
canals in order to restrict the enemy's numerical advantage (XV. 93). 
Xenophon does not mention a second engagement. Plutarch marks the 
final military success of Agesilaos with the ornamentation which occurs 
in this chapter, particularly in Agesilaos' speechl and then again in the 
exciting account of the second stratagem, especially at the close. 
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CHAPTER 40 
The final honours for Agesilaos 
1 'EK 59 TOIJTOU KaXrJq PIV CZYC Td npdypaTCX KaC PEOCINq TiZ AtyunTC4) 
np6q 6G(Pd, \ELOV- &yani5v U KCIC (PLXOýOPOVOdPCVOC. IbEtTO PECVCIL KOt 
OUVBLaYELPdCFOL PET' CIOTOO T6V 'AyncyCXciov. 
Plutarch at last adjudges success to Agesilaos' mission, as he does 
at Comp. 4.7-8. He has not named Nektanebis, perhaps to avoid 
drawing attention at this point to the abandonment of the original 
employerl Tachos. Just as the Greeks of Asia Minor showed 
appreciation of Agesilaos' services at c. 15 (cf. Xen. Agesilaos I. 38)f so 
here he has won affection and friendship (cf. c. 13.2: TO (PLAO(PPOCYJVIO TOO 
na t 66q). 
26V 6PPTITo np6r, T6v orKOL n6Xepov, ct56(; )(pTlpdT(j)V bEOPeVTIV TAV 
n6ALV KCI t EEVOTPOq*i3OClV. npoLlneptpcv 013V OOT6V I VT ( 110C. KCI I 
peyaXonpEnOq, 6XXCXq TE XaP6VTCX TLPClq KOI 6COPCClq KCXI np6q T6v n6XEpov 
6PYUP(OU 6LCIK6aL(l KCIE TPL6KOVTCl Tdt\CXVTCX. 
Plutarch, like Xenophon (Agesilaos 11.31), presumably refers to 
projected campaigns for the recovery of Messenia, but they appear to 
have come to nothing, and Sparta played no major role in'Greek affairs 
for the next few decades. Diodoros (XV. 94) recalls the foundation of 
Megalopolis, which hemmed the Spartans in, and attracted a further 
Theban invasion under Pammenes. He also records the attempted fining 
of the Lakedaimonians, in the Amphictyonic Council, for their seizure of 
the Kadmeia; the gift of fifteen talentsp which Archidamos made to the 
Phokians to help them seize control of Delphi; more active co-operation 
with themp after the fine had been doubledl to have it annulled; and a 
campaign under Archidamos against Megalopolis (XVI. 23,24,29,39). 
Dionysios of Syracuse (Xen. HeIL VIIA. 20,28, and iv. 12) had sent help, 
which may have had to be paid forp but pay for five months was also 
sent (Diodoros XV. 70). Here, Agesilaos receives only a small sum, 
compared with what he had brought back from Asia Minor (c. 19), and 
with the 1,500 talents brought by Lysander (Diodoros XIII. 106.8). (See 
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c. 35 for other financial references. ) Nepos records the sum of 250 
talents, but Xenophon and Diodoros give no figures. 
3 nCIP6 T4v Atodi1v C(r, YG)PCOV EP11POV KOPLOOCCC., 8 KOX013CIL MEVEACSOU 
XtPeVOI OV40KELl PL(SGCXq PIV 6y60AK0VTC1 KC11 TIOCYOPCI fTn, PC1CFtXCJ0aq U 
Tfi(; EndPT114; iVE TIDY TECYCFaP6KovTa nMfov, KCIC T0JTQV t3ntp TptdKOVTCX 
ndVTG)V PeYLGTO(; KC11 5UV0T(STaT0q YEVdPCVOq, Kat OYE66V dXnq T4q *EXX65oq 
ýYCP6V KCIE 00CTLXE0q VOPLOWq, 6[YPL T4q 1v AcdKTPOLC PdYnq. 
The ending of Agesilaos' last foreign campaigning, at Menelaos, 
Harbour, which Nepos also names, balances the Homeric reference to 
Agamemnonj at Aulisq on his departure for the first (c. 6). The death of 
Agesilaos is described simplyq without mention of his name here. The 
figures for his age, and for the length of his reign, do not allow 
certainty in the calculation of relevant dates. Perhaps the most secure 
event is the battle of Leuktrag yet "more than thirty" gives a very 
early date for his accession. The Olympic year in which Agis was 
insulted would then be 404, followed by the Elelan wars and his death, 
and Agesilaos' accession, before 402/1. If he died forty-one years 
later, which seems to be a more clearly documented number, there 
would be insufficient time after Mantinela for the Egyptian expedition. 
A better chronology follows from the report of Artaxerxes' death at 
Diodoros XV. 93, at about the time of Tachos' flight and the accession of 
Nektanebis, which has been placed at about 361/0 (S. Hornblower (1982) 
p. 174). The death of Agis would then be close to the 40OBC Olympic 
gamest allowing time for the Elis campaigns after Pausanias' settlement 
of Athens in 403BC. (For a full discussion see D. H. Kelly (1975), 
although he puts Artaxerxes' death at 359/8. He suggests that It was 
in the absence of the successor, Orchos, after his father's death, that 
Agesilaos was able to defeat the Mendesian. ) Plutarch's assessment of 
Agesilaos' reign here is a generous one, and should be compared with 
that in the Comparatio 4.7ff. 
UOW; 61 6VTOC ACXKG)VLK013. 
What happened to his body is biographically a part of the full 
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story of the life, giving a clue to the attitude of his contemporaries to 
him, in that they did not neglect their normal practice, even In 
circumstances of unusual difficulty. Although Diodoros says that the 
body was conveyed home in honey, Nepos mentions that wax was 
substituted. 
5 TAV U FýOMXECQV 'Apy(60POq 6 U(6q OOTOO naptXoPe, KOC 6LIPELVE TIZ 
YtVEL plypLq 'AYL60qj 6V tnLYELP00VTa TAv ndTPLOV dvaXaPetv nOXLTE(C)V 
WKTELve AEG)vfboq, ntpnTOV 6n' 'AyijaLXdou ycyov6Ta. 
The glory of Agesilaos lived on In his descendants and for 
Plutarch thisl too, is part of the full story of his characterg reported 
indirectly, *01. ITIPLK45c.. The final chapter has drawn the Life to a quiet 
close. Perhaps biography has the advantage over history in having 
clearly defined limits (J. Henderson (1989) pp. 649 66-85)p but Plutarch's 
interest here was also in the character of Sparta. He has set the 
finite Life in an extended, if not infinitel context9 by tracing Agesilaos' 
ancestry (c. 1), and, at the end, his descendantsp so that it is seen as 
an episode, incoming and ongoing, in a larger story. The Lives of 
Lykourgos, Lysander, Agis and Kleomenes have also contributed to the 
extended context. 
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EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION 
Before presenting my conclusions I turn to Plutarch's Comparatio 
for clarification of what he regarded there as his ultimate judgement of 
Agesilaos' character. Its mainly hostile tone is harsher than that of 
the Life, and quite contrary to that of Xenophon's works. 
Section One 
From the start at Comparatio, 1 he Indicates an independent attitude 
in his treatment of the accession. Xenophon clearly wished to validate 
Agesilaos' claim to the kingship, but not only was reliable factual 
evidence not made available for the reader to judge - even his 
arrangement of the arguments was seen to be flawed. The nature of 
the case made it impossible that Plutarch should introduce new 
evidence, but he arranged the arguments with greater cumulative 
effect, presenting the Spartans with some logical justification for their 
decision, yet withholding authorial comment on what was still a flawed 
procedure. Plutarch suspended judgement at that point in order that 
his account of Agesilaos' reign might proceed, as the reign itself did, 
without exposure of the fact that it was defective. That exposure came 
about when the Spartans themselves were made aware that the oracular 
prophecy was being fulfilled. 
2- 
The explicit judgement here in the Comparatio is that the 
accession was improper and that seems to be closer to the truth than 
Xenophon's view. Plutarch reinforces this judgement at Comparatio 2.2, A, 
where he makes the new and perhaps original observation that even If 
Leotychidas was Ineligible, the oracle required that his place should 
not be taken by the lame Agesilaos. I have argued in favour of 
Plutarch's view. 
2 The critical judgement at Comparatio 1.3-4 of Agesilaos' treatment 
of Lysander in Asia Minor seems to be less satisfactory. I have 
pointed out that since, for examplet Lysander continued to serve 
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honourably there and at home, Xenophon's account of the quarrel does 
not necessarily penetrate to the truth, and that while Plutarch's 
revision of the presentation serves his literary purpose in revealing 
blemishes in Agesilaos'- character, it does not bring improvements in 
historical accuracy. At Comparatio 1.3 the ingratitude manifested In 
Agesilaos' removal of Lysander's privileges is introduced to add to the 
criticisms made in the Life. Howeverg Plutarch had juxtaposed the end 
of the quarrel in Asia with the account of Lysander's proposals in 
Sparta for the reform of the monarchy and the two topics would 
appear to be part of some hostile propaganda used by Agesilaos in his 
handling of his political opponents by associating them with a 
discredited leader. Criticism of Agesilaos' Ingratitude would be equally 
relevant In the new contextq although In practical politics it would be 
equally unrealistic. 
3r The criticism at Comparatio 1.6 of Agesilaos' support for Phoibidas 
and Sphodrias in arranging their escapes from justice repeats the 
criticism made in the Life of Agesilaos' personal, motives. Xenophon's 
versions reveal no privileged access to information about discussions 
and negotiations at the level where the policy decisions were madel and 
Plutarch did not have the means to make up for the deficiency. He 
didt however, implicate Agesilaos in the initiation of the seizure of the 
Kadmeiaq perhaps Interpreting the admission by Xenophon (11eR ULU) 
that he had personally devised the defence of Phoibidas on the ground 
that the action was in the interest of the state. He also criticized 
Agesilaos for his part In the affair of Sphodrias' raid, and whereas 
Xenophon repeatedly stressed Agesilaos' condemnation of the man's 
action, Plutarch relieved Sphodrias of some of the stigma by delaying 
the accusation until the grounds for the acquittal were published. He 
now explicitly asserts at Comparatio 1.7 Agesilaos'ý responsibility for the 
war which ensued, and his assertion seems to be justified: Xenophon, 
on the other hand, attempted unfairly to lay the blame for ý the 
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outbreak of hostilities on the military preparations of the Athenians 
(HeIL Uv. 34). If allowance is made for the initial tendency to resort 
to, personal motivation here, Plutarch's judgement seems In the end to 
be more convincing than Xenophon's. 
4 The treatment of the TPCCFCiVTEC, is reconsidered at Comparatio 2.3. 
The designation of the device to allow the laws to sleep for a day as a 
G&PLO11a is ambiguous, evoking both commendation because of the 
element of croq)(a, and suspicion because of its connection with GO(PLOTAC.. 
That there is mild criticism here is indicated by the comparison with 
Pompey: ow orc, OOT6(; ITIOEL v6POLr, 4SETO 56EV tPPiVCLV (COMparatio 
2.3). Although Xenophon does not include this episode in either 
Hellenika or Agesilaos, after Leuktra. the question of a reaction 
consistent with Lak. Pol. 9 may well have been discussed in Sparta. it 
is unlikely that the Spartans would wish to create a major social 
problem for themselves at this time and the eventual disregard of 
Lykourgos' laws would have provoked the sort of comment that is 
found, at Lak. Po1 14. It is, howeverg possibly only a part of the 
creation of the Spartan image. 
5 
ý, - 
Plutarch agrees with Xenophon in his commendation of Agesilaos' 
obedience (Comparatio 2.5). He is equally strong in admiring his 
military achievements. Their views of Agesilaos' treatment of Thebes, 
howeverg are -totally opposed, for while Xenophon clearly shared the 
hatred which he repeatedly attributed to him, Plutarch blames his 
determination to crush Thebes and dominate Messenia for the decline of 
Sparta. Plutarch's strongest commendation of his military leadership 
(COmParatio 4.1,6) is accorded to his successful defence of Sparta In 
the years after Leuktra, in full agreement with Xenophon's judgement 
at Agesilaos 11.241 but while Plutarch's claim that Agesilaos was 
undefeated (Comparatio 4.1) is consistent with his own narrative$ apart 
from the uncertain result at Koroneiaq Xenophon records reverses in 
Asia Minor and Akarnania. Plutarch has not mentioned these, seeming 
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largely to avoid all criticism of Agesilaos' Panhellenist military recordt 
but it is more realistic when he admits at Comparatio 3.1 that his 
achievements do not match those of Pompey. 
6' The Comparatio ends with perhaps its harshest criticism of 
Agesilaos. His last campaign, in Egypt, is condemned. In the f irst 
place, its Intention was neither honourable nor necessaryg for it was 
undertaken only to obtain money, and furthermore the money was to be 
used only to make war on the Greeks; and in the second place, its 
execution was marred by breach of trust in deserting his allies and 
going over to the enemy. Plutarch has again rejected Xenophon's 
Presentation, for although Hellenika ends without the Egyptian 
campaign, in Agesilaos the quest for money for the city's needs is 
regarded as a most commendable enterprise and the change of employer 
is excused on the ground that it resulted from internal Egyptian 
problems, which forced Agesilaos to seek the more reliable Egyptian as 
ally for the future benefit of Sparta. However, the Egyptian episode is 
important for - the Life, where Plutarch approves Agesilaos' 
demonstrations of his Spartan asceticism and his generalship. 
Section Two 
For the Comparatio Plutarch has clearly omitted many of the other 
qualities for which he had earlier expressed admiration, no doubt 
because overt reference to Lykourgos was not appropriate on the 
Roman side. He approves of Agesilaos' respect for people and the 
value of lifev and his devotion to members of his family, as well as his 
obedience to the stateg its officers and its Lykourgan laws. The 
omission of these commendations from the ComParatio, however, is 
balanced by Plutarch's failure to include other deficiencies in his 
character which are mentioned In the Life. The most important of 
these are the excesses of desire for achievement and conflict, 
CPLAOTLJJ(a, q)t. \oveLx(a, and the implied shortcomings of Intellectual 
developmentg specifically in repeated failure to recognize the true 
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nature of justice and to comprehend the full import of 6 KaLpdc,. 
Although this last failing is more commonly mentioned in political 
affairs, its most devastating occurrence is in the assessment of the 
whole situation before Leuktra, which should have included even an 
awareness of the divine attitude. Self-knowledge, too, would have been 
relevant, for Agesilaos mistook 6 KaLp6c. because he was acting from 
emotion rather than reason, and as a result Sparta lost the battle. 
Section Three 
It remains to explain why these virtues and deficiencies are more 
especially relevant in the Life. 
1 ,, - Although the character of Agesilaos is Plutarch's major Interest, It 
also has importance for its bearing on the eclipse of Sparta as a power 
in the Greek world during his reign. The cause of the decline of 
Sparta is not directly addressed by Xenophon, but where he offers an 
explanation of a reverse, it is in terms of divine retribution. This is 
an explanation which Plutarchl too, has used, but his concern Is rather 
with the disregard of the parts of the Lykourgan constitution to which 
he has attributed the admired qualities of the traditional Spartan way 
of life. Aristotle's diagnosis of the influence of wealth Is noted as a 
cause of Sparta's decline by Plutarch In Lysander, but it is only 
Agesilaos' resistance to this influence-that is significant in this Life. 
He Is also aware of Aristotle's indictment of Sparta's shortage of 
citizens, but he does not stress it here. 
2, Plutarch's , main thrust is to identify failure of character. 
Aristotle drew attention to Sparta's intellectual shortcomings, which 
were revealedq for him, in the Spartans' concentration on military 
training. Plutarch has followed him in, recognizing this, but differs 
from him in not assigning responsibility for it to the lawgiver. 
Lykourgos had prescribed the regimen for the good life, which 
included provision for security, but excluded imperialist expansion. 
For Plutarch the roots of the problem lay in a general failure of the 
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Spartans to develop in their education the correct intellectual 
appreciation of the lawgiver's intentions. Their view was closer to 
Lak. PoL than to Plutarch's here and in Lvkourgos. 
Whereas Chance, too, was elsewhere assigned a causal role at 
times, for example by Polybios, perhaps Plutarch Introduces a more 
useful concept. The ability to recognize the nature of 6 KCILP6C. 
represents a fundamental requirement of a statesman which appears to 
be akin to the quality of CYdVECFLC, (OUVET64; ), attributed especially to 
Perikles by Thucydides. At the close Plutarch attributes the 
possession of this ability to Agesilaos as a general In Egyptq but it is 
one of his failings that he more than once mistook 6 KCItp6c. as a 
statesman, and once as a general, too. 
41ý , Plutarch has not revealed an explanation of the decline of Sparta 
which will satisfy modern historians, but he has, at least Indirectly, 
indicated where one may be found. All the factors mentionedo by 
ancient and modern analysts, must carry due weight, but ultimately 
Sparta, on its own, had not the resources to sustain an empire. To 
attempt this was contrary to the law, of Lykourgos (Lvkourgos 31.1). 
Sparta had survived by coercing and attracting the support of others, 
but in doing so aroused the resentment which overthrew it. Agesilaos 
himself displayed traits which contributed to the decline and identified 
him as largely responsible for diverting Spartan efforts to war, for the 
most significant of his excesses was revealed in his hatred of Thebes, 
and Thebes won the battle of Leuktra which was brought on by his 
failure properly to understand 6 KaLPdr,. Plutarch thus assigned 
perhaps excessive importance to the role of the individual in historical 
causationt and this has not always been fashionable. In this, howevert 
he was a man of his age; and in the case of Agesilaos, personality 
played a prominent part in the sources, especially in Xenophon's 
Agesilao& But Agesilaos was not alone at fault: the whole city shared 
the responsibility because it also made the wrong choices, notably over 
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the accession and the continued occupation of the Kadmeia. 
Section Four 
1 Illustrations of Plutarch's responses to his sources on a minor 
scale have been given in the text in detail and need only be 
summarized here. Some revealf for examplet Plutarch's use of a 
source's vocabulary or an episode for a purpose or in a context 
different from the original. Some have revealed rhetorical skills of 
ornamentation and arrangement which serve well to guide readers 
through the work and retain their interest. Traits of character have 
been abstracted by Plutarch from recorded events and visual 
impressions have been interpreted to reveal the mental or emotional 
states that lie behind the exterior. With rather more significance, 
Plutarch has incorporated details culled from his wide reading 
extending from the poets to medical and military stratagemic writers. 
These responses are the fruits of rhetorical training that have even 
given occasional hints of the insights of a modern psychological study. 
2 Plutarch's response to his sources has not been to copy them 
without careful consideration of their implications for his subject. The 
sources' judgements of Agesilaos are not taken at their face value, but 
are often subjected to shrewd analysisl and their significance is 
recognized In contexts remote from where they were found. Plutarch's 
own judgements are revealed directly when he comes to his final 
assessment, but he frequently records hints of them indirectly in the 
form of judgements made by people within the context of the Life. 
Although his main source throughout the Life has been the eulogist, 
Xenophonq he has taken an independent view of his interpretations of 
people and events, and has maintained his own attitude to Thebes. In 
this respect, rhetoric has not destroyed historyl for Plutarch's own 
contribution has been Interpretation and presentation, the function of 
rhetoric: history, in so far as it is the factual content of the sources, 
has been largely preserved intact and sometimes clarified. 
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3 The quality of the Life as literature is best judgeds perhaps by 
the continued interest it has attracted through the centuries (E. Rawson 
(1969)), but Plutarch's Agesilaos is not only a biography, it is an 
exposition of an ideology. He seems to want his readers to realize that 
properly understood and practised the Lykourgan way of life was a 
good way of life for the Spartans and it was only their deviation from 
it that brought on their troubles. After Messenia became independent, 
they were still able to maintain themselves within their own boundaries, 
and did so in Hellenistic and Roman times. Free from imperialist 
I 
overstretch and preserving their cultural cohesiveness they were to 
serve as an example of a way of life that would be good for others, 
too, in Plutarch's day, and for centuries beyond. 
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ENDNOTES 
1: 
-A survey of events 
leading to the choice of Agesilaos as king of 
Sparta (Chapters 1-3) 
In 427 Agesilaos, at the age of eighteen, may have become the heir 
presumptive, as the younger brother of Agisq who was, the absence of 
evidence to the contrary suggests, childless, unless Leotychidas was 
already born, though this is nowhere stated. Thereafter Agesilaos' 
succession would be straightforward, unless and until Agis produced 
and recognized a legitimate heirt for there is nowhere mentioned any 
trace of any other rival contender. If Agis, at the birtht openly 
believed the information about the paternity of Leotychidas, It is hard 
io - see how he could have avoided disowning the child, and if he 
disowned Leotychidas as his son, then there would surely be pressure 
on him to produce a legitimate heir. There might have to be some 
arrangement, as there was in other cases where the royal line was in 
danger. A childless Spartan was said to be able to invite the 
assistance of another Spartan (Lak. P61 I; Lykourgos 15), though a 
surrogate father would, of course, have to be a Heraklid In this case, 
since it involved the king. Herodotos records steps taken in the case 
where the king's wife was thought barren: 
OOTG) IJeV 6ý TAV TP(TlrlV eGtjY(5YCTO yuvari<a 6 'AOCGTCJV9 TAV 
6CUTtPqV 6noncptV6pEvoq (VI. 63). 
Anaxandrides was required by the ephors to take a second wife, who 
produced Kleomenes, the future king, preferred to Dorieus, the later 
son of the former wife. If Agis received the information later, or acted 
upon it laterl proof of paternity would be difficult, and the 
consequences of acknowledging the child would cause difficulties for 
Agesilaos as heir presumptive. If$ at the time of the death of Agis, 
Leotychidas was of an age to have his birth linked with an earthquake 
which happened during Alkibiades' visit to Sparta, he would be, 
perhaps, between twelve and sixteen years old, and the truth about his 
birth and parentage would be hard to find after such an interval. The 
birth at that time, if acknowledged immediately) would have surprised 
and perhaps disappointed Agesilaos, who would have been next in line 
for about twelve years before being displaced. This link with 
Alkiblades cannot be proved, and 425, marked by another earthquake, 
has been proposed as Leotychidas' date of birth. This would mean 
that Alkibiades was not Leotychidas' father, though leaving it open 
that he may have seduced Timaia. (R. J. Littman (1969) pp. 269-77; Id. 
(1970) p. 285). Lakonia Is subject to frequent earthquakes 
(P-A-Cartledge (1976) pp. 25-8) and the chosen earthquake and 
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consequently this date have been rejected (D. H. Kelly (1975) pp. 46-9. 
The works of these two scholars, D. H. Kelly and R. J. Littman, came to my 
notice after I had written my arguments. Some of their aims are 
similar to mine, but the latter's main conclusions are not accepted 
here. ) At this earlier dates only two years into Agis' reign, Agesilaos, 
immediate disappointment would be less9 but the truth would be even 
more difficult to finds if the dispute arose only at Agis' death, about 
twenty-five years later, and at whatever time Agis rejected 
Leotychidas, he would have had no recognized direct successor from 
that time onwards for up to thirty years or ý more. As the king's 
younger brothers Agesilaos would then have continued to be the 
undisputed next in line. 
This raises another problem, for if Agesilaos were the recognized 
heir, the challenge on the death of Agis would be made on behalf of 
Leotychidas. However, it is clear, from both Xenophon and Plutarch, 
that the challenge came not from Leotychidas but from Agesilaos. In 
Agesilaos 1.5 Xenophon says not that he was to be kings but that there 
were signs that he was judged more worthy, to, be king even before his 
reign; and in Hellenika Xenophon's version of Agesilaos' first speech, 
`Epl 45Y UOL OaGLAEdCLV, proves it only now to have become an open 
question, as does Plutarch's suggestion that Lysander had urged 
Agesilaos to claim the kingship -a suggestion supported by 
Xenophon's inclusion of the important part played by Lysander in the 
discussion of the succession, although he wasý not declared the 
instigator of the plan. Further support for this argument that it was 
Agesilaos, and not Leotychidas, who was the challenger, comes from 
Plutarch's statement, if, as seems likely, it is corrects that Agesilaos 
was unique in having undergone the Spartan dy(jy4, which Implies that 
Leotychidas did not have this distinction but had at the time been 
exempt as the recognized heir. Xenophon again-provides confirmation 
in Agesilaos I. 5-with his report of the grounds on which the city made 
Agesilaos king: 
-KpCvaca A n6, \Lc. dvcnLK*\lnT6TEPOV EZVOL 'Ayi1a(XC1OV KUC To 
Ytvet Kat Tb 6PET6 TOOTOV IOT40WTO POOLAta. 
Thus he became king, not as the undisputed heir presumptive of long 
standings but because he was "pronounced worthy of the highest 
privilege" - T6 ... KPLOeVTCI TOO KCX, \XCCTTOU Wpol; 6EtcoOAvaL. 
Finally, Plutarch seems to have been aware that Agesilaos was the 
challenger, for the Spartan public does not hear the brief statement 
about Leotychidas' birth from Lysander, 6VTL vdOQ9 which gives rise to 
the dispute, but later accepts the two aspects of the argument about 
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the law of succession mentioned together in refutation of Diopeithes' 
argument: ef pA yvAcuor, 3v IiTIU '*HPQKXC(6TJr,. This suggests the 
sequence: assumed normal succession of Leotychidast challenge from 
Agesilaos, defence by Diopeithes, ref utation by challengers. 
Leotychidas is therefore shown to have been the legitimate heir of Agis 
and Agesilaos was a usurper. 
The question arises of why the succession of Leotychidas was 
disputed. Whatever private discussions preceded the open debate, the 
Spartan kingship was not the prize of court intrigue, and if the 
normal, natural line of inheritance failed, there were, according to 
Herodotosq constitutional powers and -procedures which legitimated the 
choice of the new king, apparently by open vote or acclaim in the 
assembly of Spartan citizens or in the gerousia, as that of Agesilaos 
was in the end (Xen. HeIL IIIAH. Q. , The grounds of 
illegitimacy had 
been used before for removing a reigning king, and the same grounds 
could be used at the time of the succession for removing the unwanted 
legitimate heir. The means of effecting it may have been suggested by 
the earlier transfers of the Spartan kingship. Pausanias (111.8) 
compares Agis' refusal to acknowledge Leotychidas to Ariston's 
rejection of Demaratos, which Herodotos had mentioned (VI. 65). It was 
one of Agesilaos' ancestors, another Leutychides, who had brought the 
charge of illegitimacy against king Demaratosp because of two 
disagreements with Kleomenes over policy, one (Herodotos V. 75) at 
Eleusis, when he sided with the Corinthians, the other (VI. 50 and 64-5) 
over support for Kleomenes' demand for-hostages from Algina. The 
story of the deposition told to Herodotos would still have been familiar 
in Spartat and could have guided Agesilaos' procedure: a dubious claim 
that Demaratos* father had disowned him, made twenty years after his 
accession by his second-cousin, Leutychides, who was Agesilaos' 
great- grandfatherl and who then became king himself. 
, '- The disputed succession, since it was not simply a question of 
deciding who was the legitimate heir, as in a clear case of bastardy, 
was thus not a constitutional crisisl but betrays a division of political 
opinion or policy. Personal ambition is a necessary condition, but not, 
perhapst a sufficient cause for the success of the claim. To be 
successful the claimant needed powerful and ultimately majority 
support. There may well have been strong political reasons for 
replacing Leotychidas by Agesilaos, but since nothing is known of any 
participation by Agesilaos in public life before his accession, it is 
Lysander's career that provides evidence for the relevant political 
struggles of the time. 
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Attempts have been made to identify political factions in Sparta 
(C. D. Hamilton (1970) pp. 294-314; id. (1979) pp. 82-5). There had 
certainly been differences concerning Sparta's attitudes to mainland 
Greece and to Asia Minor after the Peloponnesian War: how Athens was 
to be treated, Spartan relations with the allies who had lately shared 
the, victory, whether to help Greek cities threatened by the Persian 
king and the, satraps, Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes, after the failure 
at Kunaxa of Kyros' expedition. Conflicting groups of supporters had 
associated themselves with one or other of the two kings, Agis and 
Pausanias, but, as a result of his major contribution to victory In the 
War, it was Lysander who had prestige and influence, for a time 
invincible. The alignments, however, need not have been permanent or 
fixed, but varying as the issues arose. The issues involved In the 
struggle for the succession are not specified, nor are the alignments of 
the candidates' supporterst except that Leotychidas was not alone (see 
above on no, \V5v iVaVT(ov) and Lysander clearly was Agesilaos' main 
strength, although Xenophon does not give him the credit for urging 
Agesilaos to claim the kingship. 
Lysander was first checked by the brief cooperation between Agis 
and Pausanias over the treatment of Athens after the Peloponnesian 
War, with the ephors divided three against two (Xen. HeIL H-iv. 29), 
though Pausantas was then brought to trial and acquitted by a 
majority which did not include Agis, apparently (Pausanias 111.5.2). 
Agis was again following a less aggressive policy in not pressing Elis 
in the campaign he was conducting just before he died, having 
previously withdrawn his armyt perhaps prematurely, after an 
earthquake. Pausanias was later to be condemned in absence for 
failing to keep a rendezvous with Lysander at Haliartos where 
Lysander was killed (III. v. 17ff. ). These are indications of conflict 
between unadventurous limited imperialist policies and Lysander's 
clearly expansionist alms in setting up-dekarchies and harmosts in 
cities and islands of Greece and Asia Minor after the warp aims which 
were opposed and stopped by ephors, perhaps preferring policies 
relevant nearer home. Lysander is reported to have taken steps to 
advance himself, intending to deliver the speech said to have been 
found after his death (below c. 20) in which he proposed a reform of 
the kingship. Such a reform, within the constitutions appears to 
involve only a limited upheaval, but he could not hope to persuade the 
citizens without strong support, perhaps including that of the oraclest 
which he was said to have approached unsuccessfully to win approval 
for his position. The transfer of the kingship to Agesilaos would 
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perhaps serve the same purpose after the attempt to reform failed. If 
this was the motive for the transfer of the monarchy to Agesilaos, it is 
also true that it was the will of the Spartans that prevailed. Again, 
that it was the city that chose Agesilaos, as Xenophon reports (He1L 
IIIAH. 4 and Agesilaos 1.3), indicates that the principle, that Justice was 
identical with the interests of Sparta, guided the Spartans' choice 
here, as elsewhere (e. g. c. 23). Strong and active leadership, 
sanctioned by the vote of the majority, seems to have been achieved, 
and this, perhaps, is the most significant aspect of the succession. 
1AI 
2: The proposed Karian expedition (Chapter 9) 
Karia was the natural objective if Agesilaos really wished to engage the 
enemy, for Tissaphernes had assembled his army to the south of the 
river Maiandros. Tissaphernes' purpose may have been, as mentioned 
by Xenophon (Agesilaos 1.15, Hell. III. iv. 12), to protect his own estates, 
but another would be to guard the approaches to the southl where the 
fleet base was, especially as he probably knew that the expedition had 
been sent as a response to the building of the Persian fleet, and that 
its purpose was to prevent a Persian encroachment into Greek waters 
of -the Aegeanq as stated at c. 6.1. He also knew of the Spartans' 
interest in Karla from the earlier operations of Derkylidas on the 
Instruct 
, 
ions of the ephors (Xen. Hell. IIIAL12) which the truce had 
interrupted. If that truce was continued by Agesilaos (D. H. Kelly (1975) 
pp. 25,80; also G. Grote (1869) P. 81), then his proposed Karian expedition 
will have been a resumption of those operations. The sequence of 
Agesilaos' decisions and movements regarding Karla need not be 
disturbed if deliberately planned ýdeceptlon is abandoned, but the 
change of plan should then, perhaps, be related more meaningfully to 
the arrival of Spithridates than the sources suggest. (See c. 8. ) 
I Plutarch makes Tissaphernes' gathering of troops In response to 
Agesilaos' threat to Invade Karla the signal for him to set out to 
Phrygia, as he perhaps intended. In Xenophon's accountl the verb 
5LEP(Oaaev denotes Tissaphernes' action at the earlier stage of setting 
, up 
his base, and it did not trigger Agesilaos' movement southwards, 
but created the state of affairs'- to which Agesilaos eventually 
responded by turning to the north. Deliberate deception by Agesilaos 
need not be invoked, merely a change of plan: Tissaphernes' army was 
reinforced and Spithridates had arrived. 
The satrapy of Phrygia, governed by Pharnabazos, whose 
residence was at Daskyleion, bordered on the Hellespont. Xenophon 
records suspicion between the two satraps (HeA 111.1.9). Pharnabazos 
had helped the Lakedaimonians in the Peloponnesian War (Hell. Liii. 5 
and Passim) and had also helped - the Athenians (Hell. Liii. 8). Then 
Thibron's successor, Derkylidas, who had earlier been "insulted" by 
Pharnabazos, transferred his activities to fight him in the northern 
satrapy (Hell. III. i. 9). Plutarch's reference to invasion is perhaps 
Intended to suggest serious hostilities, but there was no major direct 
engagement. He has summarized events brieflyg without naming 
Pharnabazos, and has devoted the rest of the chapter to moralizing on 
the results for Agesilaos. 
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The importance attached by Xenophon and Plutarch to Agesilaos' 
aims on his departure from Greece, and to the Aulis affairg is not 
matched by the military events following his arrival. Agesilaos does 
not appear to have taken advantage of Tissaphernes' lack of 
preparations, of his apparent weakness, or of the element of surprise 
for an immediate attack. The objective revealed In the treaty-making 
as autonomy for the Greeks is consistent with the initial requests made 
by the cities for Spartan intervention on their behalf, but Agesilaos' 
suspicion of Tissaphernes' promises, and Tissaphernes' declaration of 
war, would have shown him that autonomy was not going to be granted 
without a direct confrontation. Tissaphernes also seems to hold back. 
He had perhaps arranged every necessary counter-measure following 
the truce with Derkylidas, and could do nothing then but wait, but 
even when he had received reinforcements and declared war, far from 
mounting an attack an Agesilaos immediatelyg he seems only to have 
planned for the defence of Karia, although Agesilaos was keeping his 
side of the agreement and maintaining the peace. Agesilaos, despite 
his joyful reception of the declaration of war, still continued to avoid 
conflict with Tissaphernesp instead of making the most of the help of 
the gods which he was so confident they would- give him against the 
oath-breaker. There was evident reluctance on both sides for direct 
confrontation. Xenophon reveals the anxiety of the Lakedalmonians 
when they realized the strength of their enemy (HelL III-tv. 11), and 
once Agesilaost too, had realized, whether on the march or at an earlier 
'stage$ 
that in Karia he would face Tissaphernes and his strengthened 
forces, the strategically sound attack, on Karia had become too 
dangerous to contemplate. Spithridates' advice and topographical 
guidance Instigated or activated the change of plan, and Agesilaos 
turned north to go just about as far away from that enemy as he 
could, to precisely the area where Lysander had spent some time when 
in Asia Minor beforeq and close to where he had picked up 
Spithridates. It seems a logical decision, and it led to the success of 
taking cities and bootyl but it meant that Agesilaos made no further 
contact at all with Tissaphernes during this season. Plutarch perhaps 
saw the inconsistency here, and re-worked the episode to introduce 
the deception as a deliberate intention, and, by putting it at the start 
of the episode, not only gave it prominence, but made it the sole 
reason for Tissaphernes' decision to defend Karia. He seems to have 
adapted Xenophon's reference to deception at Agesilaos 1.17 for this 
purpose. 
The sources do not seem adequately to have explained the 
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thinking behind these moves, but a more rational account may be 
attempted. Agesilaos had made the truce - or renewed the truce made 
earlier with Derkylidas - for the time still needed to complete the 
consultations with the King on the major issue, which could achieve the 
Spartans' main stated purpose of liberatingý the Ionian cities and 
neutralizing the need for the Persians' new fleet. He respected the 
truce, hoping for a favourable reply from the King, and reluctant to 
meet a formidable enemy so soon after arriving with inexperienced 
troops. Meanwhile, Tissaphernes wisely took precautions for the 
defence of Karia (and no doubto although it is not mentionedg for 
Lydia) to ensure that Agesilaos did not take unfair advantage of the 
truce to surprise him. Then Agesilaos made use of the opportunity to 
give himself and his men time to become familiar with conditions in Asia 
Minor, to obtain provisions for the rest of the year, to avail himself of 
the intelligence and guidance of Spithridates, and to show his presence 
to the Greek cities and to the Persians in their rear. The story of 
deception would appear to have been made up for propaganda or 
braggadocio purposes, in retrospect, rather than currently related to 
military plans: Agesilaos could, at the later stage, claim credit for 
having deceived Tissaphernes in revenge for his treachery, and to 
cover his decision not to attack Karia. It in fact bears some 
resemblances to the events recorded again for the following 
campaigning season in the spring of 395. It does not affect the real 
work of the season in Phrygia, where the new objectives were carried 
out more or less successfully by Agesilaos. Even the minor cavalry 
defeatl which showed up a deficiencyp taught him a lesson which he 
turned to his advantage during the following winter. According to 
Diodoros (XIV. 79.3)9 Agesilaos went straight to the plain of the Kayster 
and even further on to lay waste Phrygia from a base at Kyme, with 
no talk of Karia or of deception, here or in XIV. 80 for the next 
campaign. If his source depended on the Oxyrhynchos Historian, 
perhaps the straightforward Phrygian campaign was all that he found 
there. Nepos interestingly also has no deception by Agesilaos, who in 
PhrYglam se convertit, although he has Tissaphernes' deception over 
the treaty and his misjudgement of Agesilaos' movements (Agesilaus 
2-3). Nepos puts Tissaphernes' movement of troops to Karia postquam 
indutiarum praeteriit dies (Agesilaus 3), which would not leave 
Agesilaos much time for more than a short campaign in Phrygia; but 
the fact that the later campaign of 395 (Xen. HeR. IV. 1.1) began at the 
beginning of the autumn and extended to Paphlagonia, before winter, 
indicates that there was sufficient time for the 396 campaign, even with 
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alate start. 
Xenophon and Plutarch offer their own interpretations - of motives, 
and the accounts possibly derived from Oxyrhynchos Historian offer a 
barer narrative. Agesilaos was perhaps not unwise in declining 
confrontation, but neither he nor Xenophon would wish to reveal any 
sign of weakness. 
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3: -The battle of Sardis (Chapter 10) 
The . following attempt to illuminate the 
background of Plutarch's 
account of -the Battle of Sardis is in three parts: (1) the topography 
of the area of the three rivers, (2) the routes reportedly taken by the 
two forces to their meeting place, and (3) the fighting that the various 
authorities report there. Much has been written on the last two 
subjectsq which are generally agreed to permit of no certainty. 
V-J-Gray (1979) p. 198, n. 1, lists scholars supporting each author and 
those uncommitted: D. H. Kelly (1975)p P. A. Cartledge (1987), and J. G. DeVoto 
(1988) may be added. Her own, conclusion (ibid. p. 198) is that either 
the Oxyrhynchos Historian's account of the battle or Xenophon's 
account of the whole campaign must be chosen, but the evidence is 
insufficient to allow any decisive arguments to be accepted by scholars 
generally as totally disproving the credibility of any of the ancient 
accounts. It Is not possible to claim certainty for any suggestion made 
hereabouts, but by making topography the starting pointf further 
discussion of the two other topics may be meaningful. Then the 
evidence from each author, considered on its merits and used in a 
reconstruction of the events, may show that possibly there was more 
than one engagement, one or other of which could be selected or 
omitted for the author's own reasons. 
(1) The plain between the R. Hermos, and the mountain range to the 
south is flat, broad and rich for the full length from Manisa (Magnesia, 
Kasaba) to well east, of Sardis. , By contrastq the citadel height of 
Sardis appears impregnable, likely to be a main defensive position and 
a threat to any attackers: not surprisingly$ it was free from attack by 
Agesilaos, as was Tissaphernes' earlier position on the R. Maiandros, 
where he was guarding perhaps not only his private land but also the 
approach to his fleet base. 
This plain seems to offer plenty of opportunity both for 
Xenophon's type of battle during the progress of troops plundering 
and for the ambush type, provided in the latter case that it took place 
near the foothills to the southt where apart from forest cover (not 
necessarily exactly as now), the low ridges and secluded valleys 
available would easily hide men and horses. Conditions for a 
successful ambush would appear to be: (a) the main force should keep 
close to the south edge of the plain, perhaps where a river-bed limits 
the width somewhat; (b) the ambushing light infantry, followed by the 
hoPlites, should be able to reach the cut-off point without obstacles in 
their path; III) the main force should progress beyond the ambushers' 
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site far enough to allow time for them to reach the cut-off point before 
the. enemy can retreat past them. An ambush of this kind would be 
one of the available measures to counter interference with plundering 
activities. 
ý, Agesilaos Is said by Xenophon 
(HeIL III. iv. 20) to have planned to 
go -: from Ephesos by the quickest way to "the Sardian Tdnov", 
Tissaphernes to have had his army moved from the R. Malandros area, 
and Agesilaos next to have seen the enemy cavalry, when they attacked 
his, foragers after arranging their camp in the Paktolos area. Two 
routes may now be consideredl one in the west and one In the east. 
ýI 
(I) From Ephesos the road across the plain of the Kayster is flat. 
The possibility of obstacles such as marshy ground and vegetation 
cannot be judged from present appearances, but Xenophon indicates 
that plains here were cultivated: 
Kat y6p ýv PaNq 6 GETOq IV TID mediv5pou ne6CQ (HeJL 111.11.17). 
The same conditions continue all the way to the Hermos plain, if the 
route of the, modern road to Izmir is followed, though there is high 
ground around that city itself. However, a shorter route into the plain 
of the Hermos uses the pass known as Kara Bel. This pass is reached 
via Selcuko Belevi G61ii, Torbali and the road north to Kemalpasha, with 
what is now rich alluvial plain offering the 'potential for booty as far 
as the foot of the Kara Bel. The climb over the pass (19575 feet) from 
south to north should present no problems of gradient, but vegetation, 
now in the form of old pine forestp new afforestation and undergrowtho 
would have had to be reckoned with. Water, too, would be a problem, 
but the climb up from the northern end took me only half an hour and 
the descent most of the way to the southern end was made in about 
the same time. The Kara Bel is a short, low-level pass andt although it 
is'. narrow, the safe passage of an army would be secured easily by a 
proper advance party. A few hours' march should be adequateg though 
the total time Involved would depend on the length of the column 
passing through. 
I At the northern end of the pass the valley does not debouch 
immediately into the Hermos plain but widens into an area of low hills. 
These are 'not ordinary foothills continuing the gradual descent to the 
plain, but isolated hillocks through which several routes wind into the 
open plain. To the east are higher mountains, in the seemingly less 
penetrable Tmolos range, for most of the way to Sardis. To the north 
from Kemalpasha, and beyond the Hermos river, is the western end of 
the wide Hermos plain, and the distance to the mountain at its 
northern edge, Sipylos, is not too great for either Agesilaos' 
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plundering raiders to travel, or the use of the name as a rough point 
of reference to denote "at the western end of the Sardian plain". 
i The Kara Bel therefore appears to offer "the shortest route" to 
rich plunder in the area of Sardis, entering the plain at Its western 
end, where the square formation for both defence and the reception of 
booty would be quite appropriate. Furthermore, and of great 
importance, perhaps, if Agesilaos used' this route, there would be no 
difficult terrain to delay him in his initial progress as he moved away 
from the enemy's position on the R. Maiandros. The approach from 
Ephesos across the Kayster plain via Torball, offering room for the 
square formationt isl besidesl too short a distance to allow the Persian 
pursuers from the R. Maiandros to have overtaken Agesilaos in the 
open and still on the march. 
GO The eastern route starts from the region of Aydin# almost as 
far east into the valley of the R. Maiandros as Sardis is Into the 
Hermos valleyqý and it crosses two mountain ranges and the Kayster 
valley between them. From Ephesosp it is possible to join this route 
towards the southern side of the Ka: Yster valley, using a road east 
through Camlibel and Ortaklarp but this entails using what appears to 
be a steep and narrow pass inland from Ephesos, in which the map 
shows a long tunnel on the railway line. ý If Agesilaos went this way, 
he was not only moving slowly 1n the enemy's area, but would be 
under easy observation, too, as he crossed the plain. It is, in 
addition, possible, from Ephesos, to join this route further north In the 
KaYster plain, in the region of Odemish, by striking east either 
through the narrow pass at Belevi Golu, or, more easily, further north 
still, nearer Torbali. This would again have taken Agesilaos Into the 
enemy's -path rather than out of his reach, and he would still have the 
difficult Tmolos range to cross to reach Sardis. These do not seem to 
be obvious choices for him, compared with Kara Bel. 
Even for Tissaphernes, if his army was near Aydin (J. K. Anderson 
(1974) p-38), the journey to Sardis by an eastern route was not an 
easy one. The first part, over the ridge of Messogis between the R. 
Maiandros and KaYster valleys, is said to be "not a formidable obstacle 
like Tmolus" (ibid. ), but my exploration did not entirely support this 
statement. From the modern road in the R. Maiandros plain, it Is 
Possible to distinguish, a few miles away to the north, a line of low 
foothills, broken only In two or three places, for instance, nearest 
Aydint at Incirliova, and best, perhaps, further west at Germencik, 
though the pass from here to the north bends even further to the 
west. But through these gaps can be seen, behind the foothillsp as 
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shown on the map, three or four more ridges to the north, which seem 
to make the journey to the Ka: Vster a difficult one, and no modern 
Public transport takes these routes. Exploration from the southern 
end thus proved impossible in the time available to me, but I 
approached the same routes into the KaýVster valley from the northern 
side. One of these, the road from Incirliova$, reaches the valley at the 
town of Tire. It could be a possible route for Tissaphernes, as it is 
the most direct, and the next, shown on-the map as a difficult one, Is 
well-to the east. From the. eastern end of the town cent re of Tire, this 
road immediately begins to climb to the south, and continues to climb 
in ýa long series of zig-zagst without allowing any glimpse of the 
summit of a pass until a few hundred feet below'what appeared to be a 
, saddle, which the map indicates at well, over 3,000 feet. 
The map shows the approach to this saddle from the south as a 
very steep-sided 'valley. with its contours in a sharp "V" shape and 
very close together. This indicates, even "though I was not able to 
explore it myself, that , it would be a, difficult- climbp though less 
tortuous, perhaps. The descent 'on' the northern ý side, which I did 
make by the modern track and observed from there, was over steep, 
irregular terrain, which appeared ý to' , 
be passable by cavalry at no more 
than a walking pace. Off the track, 'there were deep valleys which 
eventually reached the Ka: Yster plaing but to follow any of these down 
would necessitate the negotiation, 'of -sheer drops and steep gullies, or 
frequent detours. 
From Tire the journey northwards across the plain to Odemish, 
and eventually to the Paktolos valley-which leads directly to Sardist is 
again flat and easys but the route- from 'the plain to the top of the 
pass - involves climbing to 31494 ! feett though I did not have the 
opportunity to explore it. The upper valley route has been said to be 
comparable with the journey through the lower Paktolos valley on the 
northern side, which I did explore, and found it to present no 
problems, "the normal route Ao Sardis" from the south (J. K. Anderson 
(1974) PAO and note 54, 'pp. 40-1, and H. R. Breitenbach (1970) 393ff. ). 
However, at the northern end of the Paktolos, the pass is too narrow 
for a "square formation", or for free use by an enemy marching army 
or for rich plunder, but appears viable for unopposed movement by 
troops familiar with the area, suitable therefore for Tissaphernes' army 
but not for Agesilaos, who would, further have been deterreds perhaps, 
by a watch place, according to Strabo's notice, built on the summit of 
the pass (J. K. Anderson (1974) pp. 33 and 34 n. 31). 
The possible alternative to the pass I explored, on the route from 
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Aydin to Tire, which was formidable (3,583 feet)l is a lower route (3,166 
feet) to Odemish shown on the 1913 Staff Map some distance to the 
east, but the mountains there nevertheless seem even more tortuous 
and formidable. In The Times Atlas - of the World, Comprehensive 
Edition (1968)9 the modern road uses the pass to the south of Tire, 
suggesting that the, more easterly passo though lower, is more difficult. 
The real comparison for us, however, is not between these two 
more direct eastern routes over the,, two mountain ranges, one of which, 
though it is not identified in the authorities, is likely to have been 
used by Tissaphernes, but between these and the Kara Belt if Agesilaos 
used it. The greater difficulty, of both the eastern routes suggests 
that Tissaphernes would not necessarily reach the Sardis area before 
Agesilaos, even allowing for time he spent plundering, for Tissaphernes 
had a later start, and "the cavalry's own march will have been delayed 
by the passage of the hills to a pace which pack-animals (including the 
famous camels) could follow" (J. K. Anderson (1974) p. 49). 
Xenophon's description of Agesilaos' destination has been 
misunderstood since Ch. Dugas (1910). He , summarizes Xenophon's 
account: 
Ag4silas .** annonce qu'il va. envahir 
la Lydie ... et 
marche sur Sardes. La quatri6me Jours il voit apparattre lea 
cavaliers ennemis (p. 60). 
This is not quite accurate. Xenophon used almost the same words in 
both his accounts, where they 'coincidep and in fact expresses the 
destination as int T45 KPdTLaTa TAr, Y(SPoC. (HelL III. iv. 209 Agesilaos 1.28), 
which is less definite than envahir- la Lydiep and the march as EL100c. 
EtC. T6V EOPE)LOV6V T6nov (He1L III. iv. 21, Agesilaos I. 29)j which is less 
precise than sur Sardes. It is unfortunate that more notice was not 
taken of an early correction: 
"One would interpret this too narrowly if one thinks it is 
said that he would march to Sardis by the shortest route. No 
more need be -being said than that he would set off on the direct 
route to the heart of the land. By "best of the country" should 
not be understood only "the capital". Agesilaos now invaded the 
Sardian countryside where for three days he met no enemy and 
had abundant food - obviously plunder and requisitions" (F. Ruhl 
(1913) p. 176). 
The meaning of Xenophon's words, identical in his two accounts, 
representing Agesilaos' announcement of his intended destination, may, 
perhapst be clarified by reference to what follows in the text: 6nwq 
QOT60ev 06TO Tel 06PQTQ K01 TAV yv6pnv nQP0GKEU6C0LVT0 6q dy(JVLOOPEVOL; 
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the rich countryside will fit them in body and spirit for the fighting. 
Agesilaos' aim was clearly not, to get to grips , with the enemy as 
quickly as possible. He had chosen not to fight in Karia, and he would 
not choose Sardis as an immediate destination if he. wanted to build up 
his troops in body and spirit before meeting - the enemyg for fighting 
could be expected theret if anywhere. 
I- The troops were moving out. of "Ephesos. Promises of minimum 
hardship, maximum benefit and no immediate fighting would raise their 
spirits at the start, particularly those. who were the new arrivals from 
Sparta. Not only does Xenophon not. speak of the shortest route "to 
Sardis"; he also therefore cannot be - saying 
that Agesilaos reached 
Sardis from Ephesos, in three days -- (Ch. Dugas (1910) pp. 60# 62). Ilia 
phrase: 
TPE14; ApIpOC; ... nopeu6pcvor, no, 
\MN TCN InLT46La Tb CrrpoTLO nopetye 
(Agesilaos 1.29) 
does not designate Agesilaos' route or, specify a three days' march to 
his destination. ý Xenophon's point , here is that Agesilaos' men 
had the 
benefit of a three days' march "through a country, bare of enemies so 
that he supplied his army with abundance -of provisions" before they 
were intercepted by cavalry. Indeed the Greek text, &f0a, \c .** Kat 
nopEu6pEvoq, should mean that Agesilaos invaded - and then marched. 
This was suggested by F. Ruhl (1913) p. 1619, but the suggestion was 
dismissed as "inappropriate ft (unzutreffend) by another scholar, 
W. Kaupert (1924-31) pp. 261-89, without discussing it. 
The three days' march before interception then, took place af ter 
Agesilaos reached T13V Eap5tavdV. T6nov and could easily have taken the 
Greeks towards the river Paktolosp plundering all the way. In this 
case the route indicated clearly for, Agesilaos by Diodoros: 
'Ayna(Xaoq piv Uoyayd)v, TAV 50VOPLV E(q T6 KodaTpov nE6(OV 
Kat Týv nept E(nuXov )((Sp(XV ý 
15600C T64; TOV tYWG)PCQV KT4CYCLe. 
(Diodoros XIV. 80.1) 
is likely to be the one indicated by- Xenophon, too (cf. Oxyrhynchos 
Historian XV. 4-6). V. J. Gray (1979)9, on the basis of Anderson's evidence, 
rejects the idea that the sources . differ on the route that Agesilaos 
took to Sardis (p. 193). 
(2) There are divergences in the ancient accounts of the battle, too, 
which are well known and considerable. Xenophon refers to the arrival 
of the Persian cavalry and the baggage train at the river, only loosely, 
when he records the order for the baggage-train "to cross the 
Paktolos and encamp", while the cavalry immediately engage the Greeks 
foraging. He told of Tissaphernes' dispositions earlier In Karfaq but 
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does ý not now indicate if these cavalry had come from there or were 
from 
-the garrison 
in Sardis. For cavalry from Sardis a baggage train 
mightýbe thought rather superfluous - perhaps, if they were operating 
at ýa distance, not entirely so - and would not be likely to be sent for 
safety to the other (west) bank of ý the, river from Sardis. Howeverp If 
they were from Karia, and had perhaps comeýdown the left (west) bank 
of, the Paktolos, or if i coming from Sardis, i they 
had already crossed 
the river once to the west, then for safety they would properly now 
be. sent across to the right (east) bank, nearer Sardis, holding the 
cavalry's even minimal equipment available for any contingency. 
"The fact that the camp-, was small enough for Agesilaos to 
throw a cordon around it with the rest of his army when his 
peltasts turned to plunder also inclines one to think that it did 
not include the baggage-train;, of Ahe_whole Persian army" 
(J. K. Anderson (1974) p. 50). 
Xenophon does not say -where ý the. foragers, were certainly 
he does 
not- say "on the banks of the Paktolos": 
et fut rejoin sur, les bords du,, Pactole par les cavallers 
ennemis ... Vendroit od il fut atteint-par 
les Perses: c'est le 
Pactole (Ch. Dugas (1910) pp. 62 and 64) .- 
and he does not mention any Persian infantry there. Xenophon gives 
no location, but his engagement takes , place at an early stage, 
involving only the cavalry. -' Time for any, other engagement can 
therefore be found only after this firstýclash. -j 
That Agesilaos set a successful, ambush Is reported by Diodoros 
and the Oxyrhynchos Historian. Diodoros says that Agesilaos formed 
his soldiers into a square when-his scattered-, pillagers were attacked, 
and clung to the foothills of Mt. Sipylos. The'distance between Sipylos 
and the river Paktolos is - too ; great for these to be approximate 
references to the same siteg butt again, the battle in Diodoros' account 
was not fought immediately. Once the Greeks were in square formation, 
Tissaphernes hesitated to attack'for the, rest of that day. 
"Agesilaos over-ran the- countryside as far as Sardis ... 
turned back" [still being, pursued, no doubt9 and anxious to 
disengage himself] "and mid-way between Sardis and Thybarnal, 
sent Xenokles to 'set an ambush" (XIV. 80.1-2). 
Diodoros' account clearly has 'room ' for at least another kind of 
engagement in addition to its main, one. 
The Oxyrhynchos Historian's,: account has a fragmented start. 
Mention of the Ka; Vstrian plain links this with Diodoros' source. Other 
fragmentary references include several nouns giving geographical, 
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military, and chronological details, ' and verbs denoting various military 
activities, and all before the continuous narrative begins. The picture 
isý, not complete, but these words show extensiondn time and space, 
rather than a brief preliminary- to the main, event. As In Diodoros 
next, -an advance by Agesilaos -begins at daybreak, thus making clashes 
on, two successive days, and the'Persians follow, iný loose ý formation over 
the plain. Xenokles comes ýout from the ambushl choosing the moment 
himself, and causes the flight, of . the enemy. -,, Agesilaos engages with 
his -light armed troops and cavalry, but the ensuing pursuit fails to 
contain the enemy, though, 600 are- killed, and the camp is taken, the 
slackness of the guards allowing this and ý also, the seizure of men and 
booty. 
Diodoros- surprisingly was,, able to -describe the position of 
the 
ambush as between Sardis and -Thybarnai (XIV. 80.2)t a name preserved 
nowhere else and unidentified.,,,, He, adds other detailst toop including 
the,. timing of Agesilaos' signal toý: -the soldiers-, in the ambush - 
YEVOPtV114; U KaPTEPCM; Pd)(T11;. This phrase,,, often, said to indicate the 
importance of the battle, does -not, ,, however, mark the climax of the 
action, which, for Diodoros, is surely the charge out from the ambush, 
with the chanting of the paean. , 
The phrase can Indicate also sharp 
hand-to-hand fighting, 
.,, contrasting - 
the ,. 
loose 
, skirmishing of 
npoan(nTOVTCq dTdKTG)(; and TOrC. 1nE, Tflq, OOPC(YCC1(; ZE6nTOVTO. If this is 
so, there is nothing else to suggest, that this was a "full-scale" or 
Itgreat" battle or a "great" victory for. Agesilaos (G. L. Cawkwell (1976) 
PP-62ff. 9 I. A. F. Bruce (1967) p. 152), except 
Diodoros' figure of 61000 slain, 
which is invariably recognized as a mistake for 600. 
I These engagements were clearly a, setback for Tissaphernest none 
the less, and he wisely withdrew ý to , Sardis, presumably In case 
Agesilaos moved in for what would, have been a truly great military 
achievementt pressing home his advantage. However, neither Sardis 
itself nor Tissaphernes was attacked. Agesilaos, contented himself with 
allowing the enemy to collect their, dead and setting up a trophy, a 
detail mentioned nowhere else. The Oxyrhynchos Historian records that 
Tissaphernes was not overwhelmed , but gathered forces to shadow 
Agesilaos on his next march. Xenophon speaks here of three days, 
plunder of the countryside, Tcl nEpt T6-6GTU (Agesilaos 1.33). 
The two main versions of the battle,., that of Xenophon and that of 
Diodoros/Oxyrhynchos, are said to be irreconcilable, but it has also 
been conceded that the similarities are more significant than the 
differences (D. Nellen (1972) p. 52). The choice of one account rather 
than the other, however, entails the admission of other problems, and 
193 
some recent writers have accepted the possibility of two separate 
engagements, despite the suggestion of the unlikelihood that either 
success would have been omitted (I. A. R. Bruce -(1967) App. 1 pp. 152ff. ). 
This has indeed been met by the recognition that each version reveals 
its author's interests and limitations: the Oxyrhynchos Historian's 
interest is in geographical detail and stratagems lacking in Xenophon, 
who alone records qualities of -ý generalship and the course of 
negotiations (J. K. Anderson-(1974) pp. 51-3, V. J. Gray (1979) pp. 186,195-61 
D. Nellen (1972) pp. 45-54). 
? ''. The possibility exists9 then) that there were engagements from 
which each author could make his selection In accordance with his own 
historical interest. The importance of a crucial divergence has not 
been fully exploited, concerning -the make-up of the Persian force. 
Xenophon specifies cavalry -alone, oxyrhynchos has both cavalry and 
infantry. If the Persians were following the Greeks from the R. 
Maiandros and Karia, there will -have been an interval between the 
arrivals of their two arms. Even if the units were drawn from the 
garrison at Sardis, the same separation could have occurred. Once 
this is recognized the two accounts-'can be, broadly accepted, but not 
as descriptions of the same battle. ' 
Modern interpretations -have erred in assuming an exaggerated 
importance of the militaryý event andan exaggerated duration of no 
more than four days. In the first place, the importance of the 
engagement is not that of a direct confrontation In a set battle, for 
that was always avoided by, both sides, despite announcements by each 
of aggressive intentions. We are not given the impression that there 
was a short, decisive clash. Whatever, victory or victories Agesilaos 
won were only minor, and he defeated only a part of the enemy's army. 
The fighting that occurred. did not leave him so victorious that he 
could thereafter assert himself freely in the area of the satrapy. 
Neither side was rendered impotent, or was superior enough to press 
any advantage home. The execution of Tissaphernes, also adduced as 
an indication of the Importance of his defeatq is said by Diodoros to 
have been further motivated at court, -, by a desire for revenge on the 
part of Parysatis, mother of Artaxerxes. Xenophon indeed writes of the 
affair at Sardis as an encounter actiong and he does not suggest that 
the armies were carefully drawn up for battle (J. K. Anderson (1974) 
pp-47-8). Several minor encounters are likelyt and in fact both 
authors' accounts suggest more than one kind of action - plundering 
clashes and larger engagements. 
In the second place, the time scale: the three days' extent of time 
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is nowhere given or suggested as, the 1 maximum duration of Agesilaos' 
stay'in the area, or for the, whole episode. Xenophon gives a three 
days' march leading to a fourth for the meeting of the forces, 
Oxyrhynchos and Diodoros have a, night between Ahe two manoeuvres, 
and Oxyrhynchos. has a waWof ýthree days, afterwards. , That an even 
longer time was available is indicated also by the, double journey of 
messengers leading to,. the execution., of . 
Tissaphernes, after which 
Agesilaos was persuaded by Tithraustes to depart, more than sufficient 
time-for clashes in the plundering excursions in the plain. The ancient 
sources ý had their own reasons . for -being selective at this point 
(V-J-Gray (1979) pp. 186 and 197), and it is unlikely that in a series of 
actions on the marcht pillaging from Ephesos to Sardis, two or more 
authors or eye-witnessesp, one possibly- with access to command, level 
information, the other perhaps at! unit level, should Include precisely 
the same incidents in a, limited narrative. ,ý The large scale movements 
must be reconciled, but within those., the accounts can be separate, 
each supplied with connecting links, to create continuity with what 
precedes and what follows, ., for exampleg to indicate the places where 
the selected incidents occurred. The - 
topography of the Ifermos plain 
has been shown above to be suitable for battles of the two kinds. "It 
is ... just possible to argue that the authors are in fact describing 
two different battles" (P. A. Cartledge (1987) p-215), even although most 
scholars presume that there was only one. - 
(3) A brief outline of the events,,. including two main engagements 
Would be as follows. Tissaphernes guarded Karia until forced to move 
to the defence of Sardis by the threatened presence in that region of 
Agesilaos. The Persian cavalry, whether it came from Sardis or from 
the R. Maiandros, contacted Agesilaos,: who was already plundering in 
the area, before the infantry arrived., Agesilaos took advantage of this 
separation and won a success - but against only the Persian cavalry, 
not the full force. When the infantry became available, the combined 
, 
force engaged Agesilaos' plunderers in the Hermos valley, somewhere 
between Sipylos and Sardis, perhaps between Sardis and Thybarnal. 
Agesilaos formed a square, protected his foragers and bootyl but 
needed the ambush stratagem to extricate himself or to bring on an 
engagement. After the success ýof 'this, the Persians ceased to 
interferet and Agesilaos made his way to the upper R. Maiandros 
through the mountains between Lydia and Phrygia. 
Time is the factor which distinguishes the two received accounts, 
so'that Xenophon refers to a time before the arrival of Infantryl 
Diodoros to a time afterwards. Xenophon's events are in the interval 
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between the Greek departure from Ephesos - more preciselyt their 
arrival in the plain of theýHermos, - and the arrival of Tissaphernes' 
cavalry. A vital detail is Diodoros' -movement of Agesilaos from Sipylos 
to ýSardis before the battle. - There -were repeated attacks on 
the 
foraging unitst to which Agesilaos responded in different ways. In the 
previous campaign, he had had a base at Kymep from which he spent 
the-summer in the pillage. of Phrygia, and his base this year may have 
been initially near Sipylos. Xenophon describes one counter-measure 
before Persian infantry arrived, Diodoros another, latert adding the 
detail of the defensive formation of the square when Agesilaos moved 
across the plain towards Sardis. 
Each description ends with the capture of a Persian camp, and 
there is no improbability in there being more than one camp between 
places about fifty miles apart. Neither Xenophon nor any other source 
gives anything to Identify the Persian camp taken: it could be one of 
the permanent defences of Sardis, but more probably it would be a 
temporary cavalry camp beyond the Paktolos or even a marching camp 
near Sipylos. The further divergencest on the identities of the 
originator of the Greek attack and the commander who gave the order 
for the ambushers to move, can be explained by a difference In the 
sources of the reports of the details. If it was a member of the 
ambushing force, he may not have known of Agesilaos' signal to start; 
anyone else may have attributed the order to the highest command. 
Xenokless Agesilaos' cavalry commander, may have been Put in charge 
of the ambush, with, or, perhaps less probably, without, some of his 
cavalry. 
The texts do not contain evidence which can lead to conclusive 
arguments on the Battle of Sardis. The above is no more certain than 
other known interpretations, and perhaps no less certain, but the 
suggestion that Tissaphernes divided his army and used two routes to 
the Hermes valley (J. G. DeVoto (1988) 41-53) Is more complex. One other 
divergence, however, concerning the whereabouts of Tissaphernes, may 
be explainedt If the engagement or engagements were really minor, for 
in that caseq Tissaphernes himself could well not be in the field to 
command the army in person, but in Sardis, In general charge of the 
situation, and so to be held responsible. On the other hand, in the 
context, it is also possible to read "at Sardis" as meaning having 
returned to the area from where he had been - on the R. Malandros. 
The last part of the campaign is omitted by Xenophon in Hellenika, 
but is perhaps hinted at in Agesilaos, where he says he "prosecuted 
the campaign henceforward in complete confidence", and in Plutarch 
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there is the phrase "harry the country of the King without fear". 
Oxyrhynchos makes Tissaphernes gather forces to shadow Agesilaos 
from afar. Diodoros, gives a summary in twenty words, recording the 
unfavourable sacrifices Agesilaos made, causing him to abandon his 
projected further penetration into the country. It is possible that 
Agesilaos was seeking a way through to the Persian fleet base and 
called It off when it became too difficult. 
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4: Sparta and the north (Chapter 16) 
Spartan interest in these distant parts goes back a long, way, although 
it rarely involved large military campaigns. 
(1) In 519, according to Thucydides , (111.68)9 or rather in 509 
(W. G. Forrest (1971) p. 85), Kleomenes proposed an alliance between 
Athengý and Plataia, "in the hope, " according to Herodotos (VI. 108.2), 
"that he might cause trouble between Athens and Bolotia's leading city, 
Thebes". 
(2) Later, after returning to Sparta following the Persian defeat, 
Leutychides, "at some time between 478 and 476" (W. G. Forrest (ibid. ) 
pp. 90 and 100) led an expedition against medisers (the Aleuadaij 
perhaps) into Thessaly, but was recalled for trial on a charge of 
briberyg and exiled to Tegea (Herodotos VI. 72). 
(3) - Just before the earthquake of 465 (Thucydides 1.101)9 Thasos 
may have won from Spartans hostile to Athens (W. G. Forrest (ibid. ) 
p-102) a secret decision to invade Attika, though it was not 
implemented. 
(4) The founding of a colony at Herakleia (Thucydides III-92)j and 
Brasidas' expedition to Thrace (Thucydides IV. 78 and 102), "the only 
important area of Athens' empire which could be reached by land" 
(W. G. Forrest (ibid. ) p. 111), continued the Spartan interest in the north. 
(5) At Thucydides VIII. 3.1, Agis, raising money for a fleet, 
operated in the area of Malian Gulf, plundering and taking hostages. 
(6) Sparta's expanding interests immediately after the 
Peloponnesian War inclu'ded action in Thrace, Chalkidike, Larissa, 
Pharsalos, Pherai and Herakleia, apparently in an attempt to ring 
Thebes in Boiotia (Lysander 16,19,20. Diod. XIV. 38.3-4,82; see 
S-Hornblower (1983) pp. 186-7). 
(7) Derkylidas avoided being a burden to allies In Asia Minor by 
wintering in Bithynian Thraceg and provided eleven towns with the 
protection of a wall across the Chersonese (Xen. HeR. IIIA1.2,11-12), a 
few years before Agesilaos went to Asia Minor. 
Not all these activities will have made friends for Sparta, and 
Diodoros reveals widespread dissatisfaction with the Spartan presence 
in many areas, and much contraction of Influence (XIV 81.2,82.3). He 
records the death of Lysander in the siege of Haliartos, and then in 
395, following the alliance of the Boictians, Athenians, Corinthians and 
Argives, and the setting up of the Council of Corinth, he reports the 
dispatch of envoys to recruit members from among the allies of the 
Lakedaimonians. He mentions the Chalkidians of Thrace (of np64; TO 
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OPOKU) who joined, and, in the war between Medius of Larissa and 
Lykophron of Pheral in which 2,000 men were sent by the Council, he 
mentions Medius' seizure of Pharsala, previously garrisoned by 
Lakedaimonians (82.6). The Boiotians and Argives then took Heraklea in 
Trachis, killing the Lakedaimonians there, and restoring the 
Trachinians they had banished. Finally, further north again, 
Aenianians and Athamanians were won over by Ismenlas, the Theban, 
and together the allies defeated the Phokians who were commanded by 
Alkisthenes, the Lakoniant slew nearly 1,000, but lost about 500 (82.10). 
This is part of the serious situationg with troops gathered in Corinth, 
which leads to the Spartans' recall of Agesilaos from Asia (XIV. 83), but 
it also explains the, difficulties faced by Agesilaos In the course of his 
return journey. The reader of Diodoros, therefore, is not surprised at 
83.3 to read that some Thracians were drawn up against him, and that 
he met opposition further ont but Xenophon and Plutarch have left the 
hostility in this area unexplained at this point. 
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5: Narthakion (Chapter 16) 
At the Hellespont, Xenophon defines Agesilaos' route as that taken by 
Xerxes (Hell. IV. ii. 8; Agesilaos IM)p but he omits detailed reference to 
Agesilaos' route from the Hellespont until Derkylidas meets him at 
Amphipolis with the news of the Spartans' victory at Nemea. From 
there he merely reports that Agesilaos crossed Makedonta and arrived 
in Thessaly: 
6 51 'AyTjaC, \ao1; 6LaXXdEoq MUKC50VCOV Ctq OETTaX(CIV 6CP(KCT0 
(Xen. HeIL Mill. 3). 
How accurately Xenophon, knew Xerxes' route Is unknown, and 
Agesilaos' entry into Thessaly may have been through Tempep or by 
way of the valley of the River Haliakmon, or via Oloosson (Herodotos 
VII. 128; W. W. How and J. Wells (1912) Vol. II pp. 174f. ). Diodoros (XIV. 
83.3-4) devotes only three sentences to this part of Agesilaos' journey, 
mentioning opposition In Thrace, but referring thereafter only to tile 
march across Makedonia, and Thessaly and through the pass of 
Thermopylal, after which there is a lacuna in the text. 
Although topographical details are often obscure in literature, 
accurate information was clearly available to those like Brasidas 
(Thucydides IV. 78ff. ) operating in these areas. Xenophon (Agesilaos 
11-2; HelL IV. iii. 4-9) describes only briefly Agesilaos' Journey through 
Thessaly, but he records at greater length a battle fought against a 
force in which only the Pharsalian commander of the cavalry, 
Polycharmos, is given prominence. - The Thessalian force, defeated by 
Agesilaos' cavalry, was eventually driven to retreat into Mt Narthakion. 
Agesilaos set up a trophy of victory between there and Pras, and on 
the next day crossed the Achaian mountains of Phthia Into friendly 
territory. 
EcYTTluav 61 o3v oO np6oftv, nply A tnt TO 6PCL TO NOPOOK(4) 
1WV0VT0. Kal T&C ptv 6A 6 'AYTja0\C10C. TPonar6y TE tOT6OaTO 
PCTOEO npaVT6q Kat NopOC(KCOU (Agesilaos U. 4-5). 
A. W. Gomme (1979 Vol. III) on Thucydides IV. 78.3 suggests that the River 
Enipeus near Meliteia formed the boundary between Thessaly and 
Achaia Phthiotis, and so the area of the friendly territory may perhaps 
be identified by reference to the list of cities which sent men to 
Lysander at Hallartos: Oetaians, Herakleots, Malians and Aenianians 
(Xen. Hell. Imv. 6). However, relations between cities were not 
unchangeable, and the Malians (Xen. HelL IVAI. 17)9 Aenianians (IV. Iii. 15) 
and Athamanians (Diod. XIV. 82.7) are among the allies of the Boiotians. 
William Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, (1834) puts this 
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mountain, Narthakion, immediately south of Pharsala, and Kiepert's 1844 
atlas followed him. An inscriptiong described by B. Laticheff (1882), 
refers to archons of Narthakion, and the site of this town was 
thereafter determined in relation to where the inscription was found, 
much further south in the mountains which form the northern border 
of the plain of Lamia. Kiepert's map, in the 12th Edition of 1898, 
revised the positions of Narthakion and Pras, putting them at 
Limogardi and Divri, to accord with the position of the inscription, and 
this seems to have been followed ever since - except for E. S. U. E. 
(1963/72) and J. Koder und Mild (1976) (map). 
Xenophon (HeIL * IV. iii. 4. ) reports that Agesilaos led his army in 
hollow square formation: 6U T10r, PZV AyEv ty n, \aLC7(Q T6 GTPdTEUPO, 
until lines were drawn up in the battle, 6; U nopETdEQVTO 43XX4*\OtC,. 
This formation suits a march over a plain, and was perhaps used near 
Sardis, and my exploration revealed an appropriate route for Agesilaos 
to have followed south from Pharsalap skirting the plain of Pharsala, 
keeping close to the foothills on its eastern bordert and passing, for 
example, Brysia, whose name indicates the available water supply, on 
the way to modern Domokos and Lamia. There is another route leading 
to the east of Larissa, discussed by Y. Bequignon (1937), but this not 
only involves a detour and territory less suitable for the square 
formation immediately before the battle, but also passes the powerful 
city of Pheral, which Xenophon does not mention. A-W-Gomme (1979 
Vol-III pp. 540ff. ) on IV. 78; ref. Philippson and Stahlin) indicates that 
the normal route between the lower Sperchefos valley and Thessaly 
passed Meliteiat Lake Xynias, Thaumakoi and Pharsala. There is so 
little topographical detail in the sources that, while certainty is 
impossible, the normal route may best be assumed. At Larissa, 
according to Plutarch, Agesilaos seems to have made an arrangement 
with the Thessalians of Larissag Krannon, Skotussa and Pharsala, to be 
escorted through their lands, while they perhaps held his ambassadors, 
Xenokles and Skythes, as hostages (c. 16.3; but cf. Xen. Hell. IV. 110). 
This allowed a mainly peaceful passage, for which both he and they 
were likely to prefer the quickest route possible, for minimum 
expenditure of supplies and time. 
The plain offers ground likely to have been suitable for 
Xenophon's description of the hollow square formation on the marchl 
and of the lines of battle, and the subsequent operation of the cavalry. 
The slopes of the foothills near Pharsala on the south-west side of the 
town present no obvious difficulty or obstacles which might hinder the 
initial stages of the Thessalians' flight: QUYA T15V OETTCIXOV tEotafa 
201 
YCYVETOL; in which they did not stop until Mt Narthakion: nPIv tv 
NapOQKCQ tV To 6PEL IYIVOVTO (Xen. Hell. IVAH. 8). The hillso however, 
soon give what seems to be adequate protection from further pursuit, 
without the need for deep penetration. There seems to be no 
topographical objection to Leake's site. 
The inscription naming Narthakion was reported in 1882 by 
Laticheff to have been found incorporated in the chapel of OAytoq 
'I(JdvvTlq at a short distance from Limogardi, and so F. Stahlin (1924) 
and E. Meyer (1965) put Narthakion and Pras In the vicinity of 
Limogardi or Divri, in the mountain range named Othrys by Stahlin, i. e. 
between the Achaian mountains to the north and the plain of Lamia to 
the south. The following considerations suggest that, even if the 
inscription proves the site of the town of Narthakion, it does not 
determine the position of Xenophon's mountain. 
(1) Xenophon speaks only of the mountain Narthakion, not of a 
town. 
(2) The name may be related to the presence of the fennel 
(vdpE)TiE) and so may be an appropriate name for more than one place. 
(3) The greater distance of this area from Pharsala than Leake's 
site seems to put' it outside the territorial interests that the men of 
Pharsala would be concerned to defend in their plain. 
(4) The more massive range of mountains that would have to be 
crossed before the battle was fought would expose the Thessallans to a 
superfluous climbp a long and difficult march home, and an insecure 
line of retreat if danger arose, particularly when the enemy they were 
shadowing was finally leaving their territory. 
(5) The plain of Lamia offers less easy immediate access to the 
protection of the hills to the north. A retreating force of cavalry 
would meet instead immediate obstacles to their flight in the rough 
foothills bordering the plaint and could not penetrate far without much 
steep climbing over difficult ground. Their escape would involve stiff 
rear-guard fighting. 
(6) Similarly, if Agesilaos had placed his trophy here, hel too, 
would have had to penetrate and climb difficult heights. 
(7) An insuperable problem of the inscription site for the battle 
and the trophy seems not to have been sufficiently noticed. it 
concerns Xenophon's report that Agesilaos next day crossed the 
Achaian mountains of Phthia, an area which he has cause to mention 
several times in Hellenika (I. H. 18, VI. iv. 28,33). The atlases leave these 
mountains unmoved when they place the battle of Narthakion and the 
Pras of the trophy near the town to which the Inscription gives its 
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name. There can be no doubt that Xenophon has put the battle to the 
north of the Achaian mountains, not to the south of them. The 
distance that Agesilaos' army had to march on the next day after the 
battle from the site nearer Pharsala, starting at the southern end of 
the plains across these mountains -a straight line of about 20-25km. 
(about 15 miles) - seems to be well within its capabilities: 
Kal OOTOD EPELVE, p6Xa A56peVOC, TO ZPYQ ... TO U OUTEpCICQI 
6nePPCXX6V T(5 'ApyaVK& Tjq 08COC 6pn TýV XOMAY ndoav 601 (PLXCQq 
InopeOCTO PýYPL np6q T& BoWTOV 6PLCI (Xen. Hell. W. M. 9). 
A-W-Gomme (Vol. III, 1979) records a day's hard march to Pharsala from 
Meliteia for Brasidas, but he was leading a newly assembled force of 
allies (Thucydides IV. 78). 
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6: 06 PhV 6XX6 KOt (Chapter 23.4) 
06 PAV 43MO KCIC np6r, T13V Eln6VTCI TOO(; AC1KE5aLj1OV(OU4; Pt)SCCELV 6 
'AyncF(Xaoq 6nCKP(VQTO P13XXOV TOOq M45OUq XOKG)Y(CELV. 
The first four words form a connection frequently used by 
Plutarch. "A combination of particles giving a logical turn to the line 
of thoughtj not easy to render in English which does not always use 
an indicator" (J. D. Denniston (1954) p. 28). It may be helpful to take the 
four particles separately. 
1) ob marks a check or stop put to the preceding line of thought, 
though it need not deny the truth of it in general. 
2) PO carries emphasis, raising expectations of something relevant 
that will follow. 
3) 6XXd introduces a line of thought which will replace the earlier 
one now abandoned, and may move in one of a variety of directions. 
There need be no limit to the number of possible directions, so that 
complete classification may not be attempted, but primarily the new 
thought may be on-going, but In a more forceful expression; then, too, 
it may reverse the expected succession of steps; thirdly, it may simply 
modify the original line of thought within these two extremes. 
4) KQC is forward-looking and intensifying, and may continue a list 
or bring a climax, but it indicates, no further change of direction. 
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7: The trial of Sphodrias (Chapters 24-5) 
Plutarch gives an adapted version of Xenophon's account in Hellenik-a 
of Sphodrias' trial regarding the raid into Attika, of which there Is no 
mention at all in his Agesilaos. It may be that Xenophon has given the 
story as he believed it happened, but there are features which indicate 
that he received only an incomplete and, perhaps, very superficial 
version -of the treatment of Sphodrias' case at Sparta. In the 
traditional Spartan friendship, as Plutarch explaInsq it was not only 
natural (6(; EIK6q) that Archidamos should feel sympathy (ouvnycJYCo) 
and wish to help (PonftCv); there was also a strong desire to oblige 
when asked for a favour, similar to Agesilaos' wish to gratify his son 
(TO nat6t yapCCccoaL PouWpevoc, ). Sphodrias was exploiting this sense 
of obligation when he asked his son to approach his friend Archidamos 
(Xen. Hell. V. iv. 26). The pleas of Kleonymos and Archidamos and the 
obligations of friendship are presented by Xenophon as overpowering 
motivations, which determine the conflict of personal loyalties In the 
events immediately preceding the trial, and, although he has given as 
Agesilaos' reason for his final judgement, not friendship, but the city's 
need for soldiers like Sphodrias, in his emotional conclusion he still 
continues the subject of the personal relationship, when Sphodrias' son 
Promises Archidamos that he will never be ashamed of their friendship. 
Xenophon even-looks ahead to record that he died for them at Leuktra. 
However, despite this concentration, and the omission of any process of 
consideration behind the scenes, it cannot be supposed that there were 
no discussions of the wider implications of the Spartans' decision. 
It is not clear on. what grounds Sphodrias was charged in 
Xenophon. The embassy. claimed that he had acted without the 
knowledge of the city, but this had not been sufficient to entail 
condemnation in the case of Phoibidas, for it was then establishe d that 
the use of initiative was not prohibited, if it benefited the state. 
Agesilaos' first pronouncement was to condemn a man who harmed the 
state for his own profit, for which Xenophon had already prepared the 
way by recording, the suspicion that the Thebans had bribed him. But 
it is difficult to see that the Athenians could so readily have rejected 
this simple explanation, or that they could confidently have joined the 
Thebans at V. iv. 34, if they had suspected their sincerity. Agesilaos' 
final thought, reported by Etymokles, was that Sphodrias had done 
wrong (65LKEtV V. iv. 32), which, if interpreted as in Photbidas' case, 
would mean only that his action, as it had turned out, had not been in 
the best interest of the city. 
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It is also not stated on what grounds Sphodrias sought Agesilaos' 
help: he seems to have felt that he was being made a scapegoat 
reluctantly, and his guilt was evidently maintained publicly to the end. 
That Sphodrias absented himself from-Sparta, despite the ephors' recall 
to face their charges, does not indicate the nature of his crime or 
prove his guilt, but shows either that he expected to be punished or 
that he was not free to go., It served the Spartans' need for secrecy 
very well that he was absent during the 'proceedings, for his answer 
to the charge might have been embarrassing., However, his request for 
support clearly indicates confidence that, he had some ground for 
expecting to be acquitted, and he continued, to act honourably In every 
way until he fell at Leuktra (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 33). It is likely that his 
confidence would be greater if'he hadýbeen following higher authority 
than if he had taken a bribe or had acted without authorization. (See 
c. 24. ) 
The authority that sanctioned the raid is equally open to 
conjecture. Xenophon gives 
, no 
hint that Sphodrias was acting under 
orders and his view has been accepted (G. L. Cawkwell (1973) p. 55), but 
Kleombrotos left him as harmost , at Thespiai, with a third of all his 
allied troopsi and gave him all the money -he'h_ad brought from home, 
bidding him hire a mercenary force (Hell. V. iv. 15). Diodoros (XV. 29.5) 
claims that it was Kleombrotos who persuaded Sphodriades, no doubt 
the, 
_ 
same Sphodrias, without the knowledge of the ephors, to seize 
Peiraeus, which he attempted -with more than ten thousand soldiers, 
and his view has also been accepted (A. MacDonald (1972) pp. 38-44). 
None of the ancient traditions is susceptible of proof - 
(R. M. Kallett-Marx 
(1985) P-150) but the impressions given by Xenophon and largely 
followed by Plutarch may not be realistic.. 
A secret mission is inevitably difficult to penetrate. The veil is 
not lifted by either Plutarch or Xenophon to reveal negotiations 
were going on and what bargains were being made among the groups 
of Spartans, nor what considerations of foreign policy regarding 
Athens and Thebes were taken into account. Xenophon at HeIL Uv. 25 
indicates three political groupings 'an Id shows at V. iv. 32 that the 
temporary re-alignment of these . 
'determined 
- the final decision. The 
significant alignments at -Sparta are -known 
I: Sphodrias was appointed 
harmost at Thespiai by Kleombrotos, whose' friendsl-as associates also 
Of SPhodrias, wanted to', acquit him, but Jeared Agesi'laos and his 
friendst all thought to be going to condemn Sphodrias (Xen. HeJL 
V. iv. 32). Etymokles was one, of AgeSilao, s' friend's, 'and while Sphodrias 
was raiding in Attica, Etymokles was an, envoy; at Athens, and clearly 
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outraged by the affair. His mission is not disclosed, but can perhaps 
be assumed to have concerned Sparta's relations with Athens. There 
was an uncommitted third group. At the time there was no violation of 
the Peace, and Athens was not expected to be involved In hostilities 
with the Lakedaimonians (Xen. HeIL V. iv. 20), although the Athenians had 
taken part in the attack on the Theban akropolis which led to the 
withdrawal of the Spartan garrison (Xen. HeA V. iv. 10-12), and clearly 
there was growing tension (see c-24). Differences between Athens and 
Sparta would be, following Thucydides' distinction, the real cause of 
crisis, and the acquittal, of Sphodrias or the deed of Sphodrias was 
only the spark, or was symbolic. Xenophon (HeIL V. iv. 34) clearly 
indicates that the preparations for war were begun only when the 
Athenians who favoured the Boiotian alliance pointed out that the plot 
against them had been commended by Sparta: until then (pace 
P. A. Cartledge (1987 p. 137), it was not the case that "the rapprochement 
between Athens and, Thebes could not now be prevented. 
" If the 
Spartans had wanted to appease Athens, and to ensure that after their 
liberation the Thebans did not gain a powerful ally, whose sympathy 
with the liberators had long been evident, they could, as a first 
gesturet have exploited the suggestion of a Theban plot and turned the 
blame on to Thebesp or they could have condemned Sphodrias. The 
decision to acquit Sphodrias was taken in the clear knowledge that 
Athens would join Thebes and go to war. Just as Sphodrias' raid 
implied a clear intention to do something to injure Athens, and a 
disregard of the consequences of direct provocation of Athens 
(W. G. Forrest (1971) pp. 126ff)t so the Spartans did not avoid the 
consequences of the offence which their judgement would give. A new 
alignment of the three cities -was no doubt the issue behind the veil, 
and its resolution in ý favour of the Thebans and the Athenians will 
have followed resolution of the political differences in Sparta. Whoever 
intended Sphodrias' raid to bring pressure on the Athenians, it failed 
to do so, and the enemies of Sparta used it in anti-Spartan 
propaganda, and benefited even further by exploiting the unjust 
acquittal of Sphodrias. 
His condemnation for making the expedition would have symbolized 
the withdrawal of Sparta's influence in Central Greece. Agesilaos' 
condemnation of 65LKCtV is then a recognition of Sphodrias' failure to 
achieve the full measure of the military success of the mission, but his 
decision for acquittal seems to have followed recognition of the failure 
of the two Spartan attempts to disengage Athens from Thebes, a 
diplomatic mission to Athens and a. military demonstration, and Is 
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further a recognition that war was Sparta's best option. The 
Athenians clearly were not impressed by the imputation of Theban 
complicity, and were not satisfied with the Spartan condemnation of the 
wrongdoing, without the symbolic punishment of the local commandert 
but they also had other, more vital, interests to consider in 
determining their foreign policy. They took immediate defensive action, 
and perhaps rejected the diplomatic initiative until the Spartan 
involvement in the raid had been dealt with. In Spartaq the interval of 
time before the acquittal would be spent in assessing the prospects for 
a new military solution to the underlying issues. What is significant, 
then, is not the verdict on Sphodrias, but the decision affecting the 
balance of power in mainland Greece. 
Xenophon made it clear (Hell. V. iv. 24) that in giving his account 
he was responding to the widespread opinion that "the decision in this 
case was the most unjust ever known In Lakedaimon", and the 
Athenians clearly took this view (HeR V. iv. 3). He seems to refer to the 
guilt of the man regarding Spartan interests9 rather than to the 
offence against Athenian territory, referred to by the embassy. Yet 
despite this there is nothing but praise for Sphodrias. Xenophon 
presents two modest, unassuming, young Spartans making their 
requests, and a long encomium on the structure and values of Spartan 
society, and he records Agesilaos' decision without consideration of the 
case itself. He clearly was not reporting all the state secrets 
connected with the affairl, but only what he was told, or what he 
selected for his purposes. He presents the course of events in terms 
of personal relationships, both individual and collectivep although 
Agesilaos' pronouncement- about Sparta's need for such soldiers finally 
defines the issue in terms of military needs rather than in terms of 
friendship. To accept Xenophon's account at face value excludes the 
Possibility that the three political groups gave any consideration to the 
larger issue of the consequences that their decision would have for the 
continuation of the Peace. If the story is not to be considered exactly 
as a part of Spartaos political history, it contributes instead, perhaps, 
to its social history and historiography. 
-Perhaps Xenophon puts the emphasis, in the coda, on the loyalty 
of Spartan friendshipsl in an attempt to save Spartan self-respect. 
There is no blame here for anyone: Kleonymos is said now to be 
pledged to serve Archidamos and Sparta, and Xenophon can look ahead 
to record that he died for them at Leuktra: Sphodrias has something to 
be grateful for, having been acquittedg if he was guilty of having 
acted without orders: Kleombrotos need have no remorse concerning 
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Sphodrias, if he did give him the order for the raid. Perhaps 
Sphodrias would also have reason to be grateful if he was relieved of 
having to pay the penalty as the scapegoat for a Spartan policy which 
had gone wrong. 
ý The disclaimer asserted by the envoys and the pronouncements of 
the ephors may indicate., their ignorance of the venture, but they do 
not prove either this, or that there was no knowledge of the planned 
raid at Sparta. The concern of the friends of Kleombrotos may have 
been publicized as expressions of loyalty among the ITCAtPOL of 
Sphodrias, and Agesilaos may have given public reasons for his final 
judgementq but the military actions, which followed the affair, may 
rather indicate that there were underlying issues which would better 
explain the consciously taken risk of precipitating war. 
Plutarch evidently saw unsatisfactory features in Xenophon's 
account, and supplies fear at c. 24.5 to explain the failure of the raid, 
and a sense of shame at c. 24.6 to explain the Spartans' attitude to 
Athens. At c. 25.5, too, after Agesilaos' judgement of Sparta's need of 
men like Sphodrias, Plutarch reports his desire to favour his son, and 
explains his strong, ý family affections. Plutarch thus presents an 
independent view of Agesilaos' motives, for Xenophon has no 
explanation of what influenced Agesilaos to change his mind and to 
regard Sphodrias as a special case exclusively released from the 
application of the rules of strict justice. Yet the admission that there 
was a debt of gratitudet to be repaid by devoted service, confirms, 
perhaps unintentionally, on Xenophon's partq the personal element in 
the report of the process. Plutarch assumes the continuity of 
Agesilaos' motivation and makes Sparta's need of such soldiers a 
pretext. Indeedq Agesilaos and Archidamos each placed the obligations 
of friendship even before justice in very similar phrases, as reported 
by Plutarch at c. 13, and by Xenophon in this case Well. V. iv. 31). 
Plutarch was misled in his search for explanationsl and Puts the boys' 
initiatives independently of Sphodrias, displaying the power of 
friendship more forcefully. Yet Sphodrias, in Xenophon, will, no doubt, 
have been able to pass confidential information to Agesilaos through 
their sons, and this could concern the orders he was obeyingo and 
include intelligence about the situation regarding Athens and Thebes. 
This would have to be considered in Sparta in secret, and there would 
be no record for Xenophon to hear about. 
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8: Casualty figures at Leuktra (Chapter 28 
The figures available allow a hypothetical reconstruction of the line of 
battle. Xenophon says that the formation of the Lakedaimonian 
1V(L)tJQT(a was in three files, which would give a front of 32 x3 men for 
each mora, and for the whole contingent on the right wing, four times 
this, 384, to which may be added 259 if the 300 Innetc. were also twelve 
deep. The Lakedaimonian -line then contained 409 filest one third of 
these with 11 in the file, the rest with 12, making 19408 + 31072 = 4,480, 
and with the 300 tnnctc., 4,780 men in all. If there were 4,000 Thebanst 
drawn up 50 deep, their front would have been 80. It is easy to 
imagine that most of the Spartiate casualties were thus (nnctq, 
providing a front of 25 men facing a Theban front of 80t leaving a 
mixed Spartiate and non-Spartiate front of 55 also engaged. Thus, 
with 409 - 80 = 329 files not engagedl 642 other Lakedalmonians also 
faced the Theban phalanx and they were in the same situation of 
possible total annihilation. If the total of 4,480 contained 4,080 + 400 
Spartiates, giving a ratio of 10.2 to 1, there were 31 or 32 
non-Spartiates and 4 or 3 Spartiates in each tVG)PQT(0. It might be 
that the Spartiates were in the front line (Lak. PoL XI. 8) and were 
annihilated, accounting for 55, more than half their total of 100 
casualties. This extreme schematic possibility Is to some extent 
illuminating, for the Theban massed phalanx might have found difficulty 
in manoeuvring to make contact with the rest of the line. 
If the 700 Spartiates at Leuktra account for seven-eighths of the 
Spartiate membership of the four out of the six moral in the whole 
army in the original expedition to Phokisp as Xenophon's figures of 
thirty-five out of the forty age-groups for the call-up indicate (HeIL 
VIAV. 17), and if there were 100 in the remaining one-eighth Of these 
four moral, when these 800 are added to the Spartiates In the two 
moral remaining at Sparta, and the 400 casualties are subtracted, the 
total of Spartiate soldiers now still available for service will be two 
hundred short of a thousand. The size of the annual supplement may 
be calculated by dividing the indicated figure of 1,200 for the f ull 
strength by 40, the number of age-groups, and so losses would be 
made good by only thirty each year. This calculation Includes the 
tnnere., if that is the correct reading at HeIL VI. iv. 14, and if they are 
ot np6 06TOD pay6pEvot who enabled the king's body to be recovered. 
If, however, the (nnctq are counted separately, there were 400 other 
Spartiates at Leuktral and the number of Spartiates remaining would 
be 5859 from the full strength of 985, and about twenty-four would be 
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added each year. If, remarkably, every Spartan lived for 70 years, 
the total male population would be either 2,100 or 1,680. It is clear 
that Spartiate status, that is membership of syssitia, was part of 
Spartan social and religious life, and probably not part of the military 
organization (J. F. Lazenby (1985) p. 17), so that these figures will 
indicate, not the whole Spartan hoplite resources, but only those of the 
citizen body. However, the stress on casualties among Spartiates 
represents their importance for the survival of the essential fabric of 
Spartan society, for Spartiates were in a minority as regards, not only 
peribikoi and helots, but also those second-class citizens in betwýen, 
who brought the number of Lakedaimonian hoplites at Leuktra up to 
4f780 (the alternative figure of 2,540, with half the number of men in 
the mora, is surely too small, and to be rejected (J. F. Lazenby (1985) 
p. 7). 
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